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Art. 1.—QUEEN VICTORIA AND FRANCE.*

WHEN the Princess Victoria was born, on May 24, 1819, she had, except for somewhat distant connexions with the Royal Houses of Holland and Denmark, no relation who was not of German blood. The nation over which she was to rule had willed that it should be so. In the second half of the 17th century, the reigns of two monarchs who were half-French had convinced the people of this country that their future sovereigns must be chosen from the German House which could trace its descent, through James I to Henry VII and Edward IV and so to William the Norman, and through James VI to Robert the Bruce and so to Malcolm Canmore and his English Queen, the descendant of Alfred the Great. Three considerations made it certain that the House of Hanover would inter-marry with German princely families. Our law provided that all such marriages must be with Protestants; and the custom of the time, subsequently supported by the Royal Marriage Act of 1772, ensured that the marriages of royal personages should be contracted within the limits of what may be described as royal circles. Germany abounded in Protestant princes and princesses; and it was, therefore, in the nature of things that they should provide from among their number consorts for British princes and princesses.

At the date of Princess Victoria's birth, the danger from France was at an end; and it was a fortunate

* The quotations marked with an asterisk are taken from Queen Victoria's unpublished correspondence and diaries, by gracious permission of H.M. The King.

accident that, before she succeeded to the throne, she had been brought into close and intimate contact with relations by marriage who were of French blood. No sovereign of this country since Queen Anne had possessed any near relationship to the French Royal House; the wife of George I had, indeed, French blood in her veins, but the tragedy of her life prevented the transmission to her children of any French influences, beyond what might be derived from heredity. When the Princess Victoria was thirteen, her mother's brother, Leopold, afterwards King of the Belgians, the widower of the Princess Charlotte of Wales, married Louise, the eldest daughter of Louis Philippe, afterwards King of the French. This marriage was the first of a series of alliances between Queen Victoria's Coburg relations and the Orleans family. In 1837, a cousin of the Queen married Louis Philippe's second daughter; in 1840, another cousin married his second son, the Duc de Nemours; and in 1843, a third cousin married his third daughter.

By far the most important of these marriages, from the point of view of the development of Queen Victoria's outlook and sympathies, was that of the King of the Belgians. The Duchess of Kent, a Coburg by birth, was devoted to her brother Leopold; and his relations with his niece were like those of a father and daughter. The reminiscences of her early childhood, written by the Queen in 1872, and printed in the 'Letters of Queen Victoria,' indicate her affection for 'dear Uncle Leopold,' whose generosity had come to the help of the impoverished mother and child after the death of the Duke of Kent. King Leopold, among other paternal offices, guided the girl's reading, and urged her to study 'the memoirs of the great and good Sully,' which he presented to her; but, he added, 'As they have not been written exclusively for young ladies, it will be well to have Lehzen to read it with you' ('Letters,' I, 51). The record of the books she read shows that she was interested in France and the French; and when, in 1835, she met the Queen of the Belgians for the first time, she fell in love with her French aunt. 'Aunt Louisa has the most delightful sweet expression I ever saw. She is quite delightful and charming. She is so gay and merry too' ('Girlhood of Queen Victoria,' I, 188).

It was both novel and desirable that a sovereign of Great Britain should be educated to love French people and French ways; and she soon extended her affection from his daughter to Louis Philippe himself, who wrote, on her accession, a graceful letter in which he reminded her that he had been the friend of her father when the Duke of Kent, nearly forty years earlier, had been Commander-in-Chief in British North America. King Leopold wrote to her about his father-in-law's 'great disposition to be on the best possible terms with England,' and she replied that 'by the happy circumstance of your double near relationship to me and to the King of the French, Belgium—which was in former times the cause of discord between England and France—becomes now a mutual tie to keep them together.'

King Leopold's insistence upon the difficult and delicate position of Louis Philippe in France led the future Queen to be ready to make allowances for the provocations which French policy occasionally gave to British statesmen. Throughout the dispute over the revolt of Mehemet Ali against Turkey (1839-41), when France adopted an attitude antagonistic to that of the other Great Powers (Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia), and, under the guidance of Thiers, threatened to intervene as a partisan of Mehemet Ali, the Queen impressed on her ministers the necessity of doing nothing to irritate France. Louis Philippe was personally most anxious to preserve peace, and went so far as to dismiss Thiers; and the Queen, feeling that some return should be made by this country, found herself in conflict with Lord Palmerston. The Foreign Minister urged that the French, 'after having failed to extort concessions upon the Turkish Question by menaces of foreign war,' were now trying to obtain them by saying 'that such concessions are necessary in order to prevent revolution in France.' The Queen, in reply, insisted that, while the danger of revolution might be exaggerated, it did exist; and that there was nothing inconsistent with the honour and dignity of this country in 'attempts to soften the irritation still existing in France or to bring France back to her former position in the Oriental Question.' France, she said, had been in the wrong and had been humbled, 'but, therefore, it is easier than if we had failed to do

something to bring matters right again' ('Letters,' I, pp. 291-315). Her intervention certainly aided the happy adjustment of our relations with France.

In 1843, Queen Victoria paid a visit to the King and Queen of the French, who some years earlier had suggested an informal visit to her at Brighton. Recent experience has made us familiar with State visits, and it is easy to underestimate the importance of the step then taken. No Sovereign of this country, after succeeding to the throne, had left the British Isles since George II had paid his last visit to Hanover in 1755; and no foreign monarch, while in the possession of his throne, had, for some centuries, been entertained in this country, except when the Allied Sovereigns visited London after the fall of Napoleon. The last State visit to France was the meeting of Henry VIII and Francis I on the Field of Cloth of Gold. The visit was, therefore, no customary or conventional formality, but a real compliment; and it took place before the Queen had paid a similar compliment to any German State, even to the Duchy of Coburg, the ruler of which was both her uncle and her father-in-law. The French people gave her a cordial reception, and she returned with a personal regard for Louis Philippe and the 'dear French family' ('Letters,' I, 618).

This 'regard' was shortly afterwards tested by the publication in the following spring of a pamphlet by the Prince de Joinville entitled 'Notes sur les forces navales de France,' in which he 'talked of ravaging our coasts and burning our towns.' The Queen was much chagrined, but did not allow the incident to interfere with her general policy; and, when Louis Philippe made a return visit to Windsor in the autumn, he gratified her by his real distress for his son's imprudence. Perhaps not less gratifying were his remark, 'Le Prince Albert, c'est pour moi le Roi,' and his description of the Prince as 'Mon Frère.' The consideration shown by the King of the French for the delicate position of the Queen's husband was enhanced by the unyielding etiquette of the Prussian Court when the Queen and the Prince paid a visit to Frederick William IV in 1845. On their return from this expedition, they made a second visit to Louis Philippe.

The cordiality of these relations cooled during the long controversy about the 'Spanish Marriages.' The Queen was most anxious that Great Britain and France 'should not appear at Madrid as countenancing conflicting parties' among the suitors of the young Spanish Queen and her sister; but Louis Philippe took advantage of the considerate hesitation shown by the British Government, and the Queen was naturally and justly indignant. 'Have confidence in him I fear I never can again,' she wrote to the King of the Belgians, 'and Peel, who is here [Windsor] on a visit, says a war may arise any moment once that the good understanding is disturbed' ('Letters,' II, 126). In the beginning of 1848, when Louis Philippe lost a devoted sister, the Queen, after consulting Lord John Russell, resumed personal relations by a letter of condolence. A few weeks later, the King of the French was an exile in England.

The Queen treated the exiled family with great kindness and hospitality, but she fully appreciated the necessity of avoiding any suggestion of political sympathy with Orleanists in France. 'You will naturally understand,' she told the King of the Belgians, 'that we cannot make *cause commune* with them, and cannot take a hostile position opposite to the new state of things in France' ('Letters,' II, 183). She was willing to give Louis Napoleon a fair chance, and in December 1848, hailed his coming election as 'a sign of better times,' though she added, 'But that one should have to wish for him is really wonderful.' In February 1849, she praised his conduct as 'full of courage and energy.' The *coup d'état*, in December 1851, was a shock to her, as to healthy opinion everywhere in this country; and Lord John Russell's dismissal of Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, on the ground of his expressed approval of it before the Government had come to any conclusion on the subject, gave, for many reasons, great satisfaction to the Court. But it is abundantly clear from the Queen's correspondence that she was not hostile to the new Government if it should satisfy the French people. Writing on Dec. 9, she assumed that those in France who wished for order would rally round the President; on the 30th, she suggested to the King

of the Belgians that it was the unwise candidature of his brother-in-law, the Prince de Joinville, which 'led Louis Napoleon to take so desperate a course'; and on Jan. 20, 1852, she wrote to the King of the Belgians:—

'We shall try and keep on the best of terms with the President, who is extremely sensitive and susceptible, but for whom, I must say, I have never had any personal hostility; on the contrary, I thought that during 1849 and 1850 we owed him all a good deal, as he certainly raised the French Government *de la boue*. But I grieve over the tyranny and oppression practised since the *coup d'état*, and it makes everything very uncertain, for though I believe it in every way his wish and his policy not to go to war, still *il peut y être entraîné*' ('Letters,' vol. II, cap. 21).

An opportunity of showing a friendly disposition was not missed in the end of the year. Some of the European Courts were offended by the assumption of the title of Emperor; others took exception to the numeral III, which, indeed, in view of the fact that no Napoleon II ever reigned, was scarcely suited to a title conferred by popular election. The Tsar addressed the new Emperor as 'mon cher ami' instead of 'mon frère.' Queen Victoria had no hesitation about his full recognition, and, with regard to the numeral, she thought that, 'objectionable as this appellation no doubt is, it may hardly be worth offending France and her ruler by refusing to recognise it, when it is of such importance to prevent their considering themselves the aggrieved party' ('Letters,' II, 482). The Second Empire was officially proclaimed on Dec. 3; and, on the following day, the Queen wrote to 'my good Brother, the Emperor of the French,' a cordial letter expressing her 'invariable attachment and esteem and sincere friendship and regard.' The new French Emperor owed to Queen Victoria his introduction into royal circles; as it has been epigrammatically put, 'she made an honest man of him'—so far as this was possible.

Relations with Napoleon III continued for some years to be very friendly. In September 1854, Prince Albert visited the Emperor 'in a camp between Boulogne and St Omer' (to us the phrase is suggestive both of 1803 and of 1914); six months later, the Emperor, accompanied

by the Empress, came to Windsor, in the course of the Crimean War, and was invested with the Garter; in August, the Queen and Prince Albert paid an equally successful visit to Paris. 'It is not only a Union of the two Governments—the two Sovereigns—it is that of the two Nations' ('Letters,' III, 175). The policy of Napoleon III was, however, to cause great anxiety before many years had elapsed. In the peace negotiations of 1856, he seemed to the Queen to show too tender a regard for Russia; and in the years which followed the Crimean War, the increase of French armaments created an alarm similar to that which in recent years was inspired by Germany.

During this period, Queen Victoria, by letter and by frequent personal intercourse, exerted herself to maintain both peace and alliance with France, while frankly expressing her dislike of existing French policy. In 1859, she disapproved of Napoleon's giving aid to the King of Sardinia in the attempt to bring about the unification of Italy. Her attitude on this question is an exception to the late Lord Salisbury's remark that she always represented the feeling of the nation, but her reasons are clear and intelligible. She pictured Louis Napoleon as triumphant over Austria first and then Prussia and Germany, and, as the master of the Continent, challenging Great Britain; but her attitude was not determined by such fears or by the marriage of the Princess Royal to Prince Frederick of Prussia. She had made up her mind on the question at a time when she thought of Prussia as 'the country of all others which the rest of Germany dislikes,' and could not understand Stockmar's love for it. She had a genuine horror of war, and had been taught to regard the Treaty of Paris as sacrosanct. In 1848, she had protested to Lord John Russell that it was the boast of this country 'to stand by treaties,' and declared that 'the establishment of an *entente cordiale* with the French Republic, for the purpose of driving the Austrians out of their dominions in Italy, would be a disgrace to this country.'

In 1859, she described the action of Louis Napoleon as 'making war on Austria in order to wrest her two Italian kingdoms from her, which were assured to her by the treaties of 1815, to which England is a party.'

The long friendship of the House of Hanover with the House of Hapsburg may have influenced her sympathies; and she certainly distrusted the disinterestedness of the Emperor of the French. 'The conduct of France as regards Italy,' she reminded Lord John Russell, after the Peace of Villafranca, 'shows how little the Emperor Napoleon cared for, or thought of, its independence when he undertook this war' ('Letters,' III, 458). Nevertheless, a few months later, she wrote him a most cordial letter with good wishes for the coming year (1860), and in the course of that year she received the Empress Eugenie at Osborne.

In the years which elapsed between the death of the Prince Consort in 1861 and the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, the relations between Great Britain and France were disturbed by a general distrust of the policy and aims of the Emperor Napoleon. In these suspicions the Queen shared; in 1863 she addressed to him a solemn warning against any attempt to annex the left bank of the Rhine; and in 1867 she took steps to prevent an outbreak of war over the question of Luxemburg. But, meanwhile, she had come not less seriously to distrust the policy of Prussia and the ambition of Bismarck, who had long been a bitter opponent of those whom he used to describe as 'the Coburg gang.' It is often said that Queen Victoria kept this country neutral in the Danish war of 1864, but the ultimate responsibility rested with her Ministers, who encouraged Denmark and threatened Austria and Prussia, and, when it came to the point, agreed to remain neutral. The Prime Minister, Lord John Russell, accepted the responsibility, declaring that on every occasion the Queen had 'most willingly followed' the advice of her Ministers, and defended the policy of the Cabinet on the reasonable grounds that, though Denmark had suffered many wrongs, she herself had not been without fault and had declined to accept a compromise; that, in view of the declared neutrality of France and Russia, the whole brunt of the fighting would have fallen upon Great Britain; and that the Government did not believe that the nation desired 'a general war in Europe in the name of peace.'

Whatever the Queen's views were when the controversy first became acute, the policy adopted by Prussia and Austria aroused her indignation. In May 1864, General Grey told Lord Granville that the Queen had almost quarrelled with the Crown Princess by deprecating the violent counsels Prussia seemed disposed to pursue.† In June, Lord Clarendon wrote to the Queen pointing out that

'too much stress in Parliament must not be laid upon any assurance given by Prussia, as there exists a deep and well founded distrust (in which Lord C. shares) of M. de Bismarck, and great fear that he will consent to no arrangement unless he thinks that it can be turned to account for bettering his own position at home. Lord Clarendon ventures to think that, in writing to the Princess Royal, Your Majesty might perhaps inculcate the desirableness of moderation on the part of the King as a response to the pacific policy of Your Majesty's Government.' *

The Queen sent a copy of Lord Clarendon's letter to the Princess, who replied from Potsdam on July 2, 1864, urging the German case :

'That England should persist in turning the question upside down—and in thinking that big Prussia wishes to eat up little Denmark—is very lamentable. That the bad Government we have been so long suffering under here in Prussia should have done much to complicate the case and to mislead public opinion in England as to the aims and cause of the war is sad enough. But to submit a second time‡ to have conditions of an unjust and shameful peace dictated to us, in order to prevent public feeling in England driving the country to war with us, would be a crime which we would not a second time be guilty of, and the first commission of which has sown the fruits of endless confusions and difficulties which we are now reaping. *What* the calamity of a war with England would be, no one knows better than I, who lie awake half the night thinking of all the dreadful consequences with horror. But I would not have Prussia go one step aside from the right road in order to avoid it.' *

The Queen showed her daughter's letter to Lord

† 'Life of Lord Granville,' i, 467.

‡ The reference is to the Treaty of 1852.

Clarendon, and in sending her his reply, took the opportunity of giving some counsels of moderation :

'Let Prussia, who is master of the position, be magnanimous. She *can* be so now so easily; she has obtained *all* Germany wished, viz. the severance of the Duchies from Denmark and their release from a yoke which had become so hateful to them. Let Prussia also show that she does not mean to keep them for herself and all will come right.' *

The use made by Prussia and Austria of their victory, and the seizure of territory to which they had no plausible claim of any sort, led the British Prime Minister to denounce the war as a war of aggression. The Queen was in full agreement with her Cabinet in condemning the terms of peace, and she went so far as to desire that the King of Prussia should be informed of her views :

'Her Majesty thinks that Prussia should at least be made aware of what she and her Government, and every honest man in Europe must think of the gross and unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that she had given, which Prussia has been guilty of.' †

Two years later, the Queen contemplated the possibility of interfering 'by force against Prussian designs in the Duchies' ('Life of Lord Clarendon,' II, 311); and her distrust of Bismarck increased as time went on. When the Franco-German war broke out, opinion in this country was at first strongly pro-German. The Queen, like other onlookers, was at the outset shocked by the apparent recklessness with which the French had invited a European war, but she did not attach to the Benedetti Treaty the importance which was generally attributed to it when Bismarck first revealed it. In spite of the alarm which any suggestion of an attack upon Belgium naturally aroused in her, she believed, so early as the beginning of August 1870, that Bismarck was equally guilty with the French diplomatist ('Life of Lord Granville,' II, 40). In September, she made her famous appeal to the King of Prussia, on behalf of France :

'In the name of our friendship and in the interests of humanity, I express the hope that you may be able so to

† General Grey to Lord Granville, Aug. 25, 1864, 'Life of Lord Granville,' I, 476.

shape your conditions of peace for the vanquished, that they may be able to accept them. Your name will stand yet higher if, at the head of your victorious army, you now resolve to make peace in a generous spirit' ('Life of Lord Granville,' II, 45).

King William's reply was a polite refusal. He must, he said, 'place in the first line the protection of Germany against the next attack of France, which no generosity will stop.' The Queen's telegram convinced Bismarck that she was not pro-German; he jeered at the Crown Prince for describing her as friendly; and in 1887 he told Busch that her sympathies and those of her Court had been with the French.† The events of the siege of Paris increased her horror of Prussian methods of war and policy; and the influence of Great Britain was exerted, with some success, to procure a mitigation of the terms imposed by Germany upon France. In the summer of 1871, a conversation with the Crown Prince confirmed the Queen's attitude:

'July 31, 1871. Talked with good Fritz about the war. He is so fair and kind and good, and has the intensest horror of Bismarck, says he is no doubt energetic and had driving power, but was bad, unprincipled, and *all-powerful*; he is in fact the Emperor, which Fritz's father does not like, but still does not seem to be able to prevent. As for the Treaty which he published, said to be proposed by Benedetti, Fritz said that it was quite as much Bismarck's doing as that of the Emperor Napoleon; that he felt they lived on the edge of a volcano, and that he should not be surprised if Bismarck some day tried to make war on England! This justifies what many people here have said.'*

In 1874 and 1875, Queen Victoria again intervened on behalf of France. Bismarck was minded to strike again before France had reorganised her forces or secured an ally. In October 1874, the Emperor William I addressed

† 'As to the sympathies of the Royal Family, I may mention the following circumstance. Towards the end of the year 1870, I was asked to Buckingham Palace to dine with Prince Leopold, afterwards Duke of Albany. The conversation was upon the war. At that time I was pro-German, and adverse to the French. But the Prince said, "You will find no one in this house, not one of us, that shares your opinion. We are all of us for the French."—Dr J. Wickham Legg, in the 'Yorkshire Post,' Sept, 17, 1918.

the Reichstag upon the subject of hostile intentions against Germany, which, he said, were likely to be translated into action. Mr Disraeli, speaking as Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, at once took the opportunity of paying a tribute to the magnanimity and prudence which France had displayed; and the Queen wrote to the Emperor a letter, the draft of which has been printed in the 'Life of Lord Granville' (II, 115). She recognised the provocation given by some sections of the clerical press in France, spoke of the patience which was required in dealing with a proud nation after defeat, urged the Emperor to be as magnanimous in peace as he had been invincible in war, and called his attention to 'the possible effects of another great war upon some of the most dangerous social questions of the day.'

In the spring of 1875, the German newspapers talked, with suspicious unanimity, of an approaching French attack; how France, wonderful as her recovery had been, could hope to retrieve her fortunes within four years after her downfall, they did not explain. 'To finish with France,' they said, 'is not only an opportunity to be seized, it is a duty towards Germany and towards the world. . . . Germany is troubled by the consciousness of having only half crushed her foe.' While public opinion in this country was startled by an article in the 'Times,' in which Blowitz exposed the intentions of the German military party, the Queen was urging upon her Ministers the necessity of taking action to prevent the recurrence of war :—

'May 6, 1875. Saw Mr Disraeli and talked about the very alarming rumours from Germany as to war. This began by dictatorial and offensive language to Belgium, then by reports of the Germans saying they must attack the French, as these threatened to attack them and a war of revenge was imminent in consequence, which the increase of French armaments proved. I said this was intolerable, that France could not for years make war, and that I thought we ought, in concert with the other Powers, to hold the strongest language to both countries, declaring they *must not* fight, for that Europe would *not* stand another war.'*

'May 10, 1875. Lord Lyons said it was madness to talk of the French attacking Germany; they were horribly

frightened, and for five years at least they would be unable to do anything—that they wished to be at peace, and that Marshal McMahon and the Duc Decazes were most pacific. If the Emperor of Russia could keep the Germans back by strong remonstrances, then we could perfectly well hold the same language to the French. . . . Wrote to the Emperor of Russia to Berlin, appealing to him to use his influence to maintain peace and prevent an attack on France.’*

The letter to the Tsar (who was then on a visit to Berlin),† written on May 10, with the knowledge of the Prime Minister, contained the following sentences:

‘I cannot end this letter without expressing the fervent hope that you will use your great influence in the endeavour to maintain peace and to dissipate the profound alarm that has been aroused throughout Europe by the language held at Berlin. Everything goes to prove that France neither contemplates, nor is in a position to contemplate, another war, and it would be a culpable act on the part of Germany to commence war without provocation. You, my dear Brother, are so disposed towards peace, and the dear Emperor William would himself be so inclined towards it, that I hope our representations to all will arrive in time to prevent so terrible a calamity.’*

It was in accordance with her sense of fairness that she insisted upon using British influence to restrain any extravagances in the French press.

‘Lord Lyons thinks with the Queen,’ she wrote to Mr Disraeli and Lord Derby on May 11, ‘that, when we have got Prince Bismarck to give assurances of Peace, we should strongly warn and advise the French, in whose interest, as well as in that of Peace, we have been acting, also to give peaceful assurances. Lord Lyons thinks they would be ready to do this.’*

Not content with writing to the Tsar, Queen Victoria also addressed a letter to the Emperor William, imploring him to keep the peace. British and Russian intervention succeeded in averting war, and Bismarck was left to cherish his disappointed malice. Officially, he described the incident as a mare’s nest. ‘I am still ignorant of the source of these rumours,’ he told the Emperor William in a letter published in his ‘Memoirs,’

† The original is in French.

'but it must be a very credible one for the exalted lady who has written to your Majesty to have shown so much insistence, and for the English Government to have taken such important and unfriendly measures towards us.' The Queen's Diary shows that the Emperor, in his reply, adopted the same tone of injured innocence:

'June 8, 1875. Had an interesting letter from Vicky, giving an account of Bismarck's anger at what he called our pretended alarm about war, making out I had been set against Germany. I told her simply what had occurred. Also had a letter from the Emperor of Germany, very friendly and pacific, but trying to make out it was all nothing, and that it was very absurd having believed such rumours and taken any notice of them.' *

The letter to which the Queen refers, written to the Crown Princess from Balmoral on June 8, 1875, expresses in clear and unmistakable terms Her Majesty's view of the provocations which the German Empire was giving to Europe.

'I wish just to answer those principal points in your letter, though of course you know *how* absurd these ideas and notions of Bismarck's are. As regards my being irritated against Germany or *anybody else* working upon me! It was I *alone* who, on hearing from *all* sides from our Ministers abroad of the danger of war, told my Ministers that *everything* must be done to *prevent* it, that it was too intolerable that a *war* should be *got up* and brought about by *mutual* reports between Germany and France that each intended to *attack* the *other*, that we must prevent this and join with other Powers in strong remonstrances and warnings as it was *not* to be *tolerated*. No one wishes more, as you know, than I do for England and Germany to go well together, but Bismarck is so overbearing, violent, grasping and unprincipled that *no one* can stand it, and *all* agreed that he was becoming like the first Napoleon whom Europe had to join in *putting* down. This was the feeling and we were determined to prevent another war. At the same time I said France must be told she must give *no* cause of anger or suspicion to Germany, and must *not* let them have any pretext to attack her. France will for many years be quite incapable of going to war and is terrified at the idea of it; I *know* this to be a fact. The Duc Decazes is a sensible prudent man, fully aware of this, and who is doing all he can to act according to this advice.

'I wrote at that moment a private letter to the Emperor Alexander urging him to do all he could in a pacific sense at Berlin, knowing the anxiety he had to prevent war and how much he loved his Uncle and he him. As for anyone working upon me in the sense Bismarck thinks, it is too absurd. I am not worked upon by anyone; . . . but Bismarck is a terrible man, and he makes Germany greatly disliked—indeed *no one* will stand the overbearing insolent way in which he acts and treats other nations—Belgium for instance.

'You know that the Prussians are not popular unfortunately, and *no one* will tolerate any Power wishing to dictate to all Europe. This country, with the greatest wish to go hand in hand with Germany, *cannot and will not stand it.*'*

The closing words might have been written in 1914, and show how little the great Queen's attitude was affected by the family ties that bound her to the German Royal Family.

This letter closes the record of Queen Victoria's active interventions on behalf of France, for similar circumstances did not again arise in her lifetime.† It leaves no doubt as to what her opinion would have been had William II ventured to provoke a European war while she was on the throne of this country. That the French appreciated her sympathy and friendship was shown at the end of 1874, when representative Frenchmen presented to her at Windsor an address of thanks for the charitable services rendered by English men and women during the war, and she made a gracious reply in French. During the later years of her life she was a frequent and a welcome visitor to France, and was often an unofficial spectator of reviews of French troops. Not the least important part of Queen Victoria's personal influence upon the history of Europe was her consistent determination to bring about happy and cordial relations between her own people and the country which had, in her youth, been regarded as the traditional and natural enemy. The Entente of 1904 owes something to Queen Victoria as well as to King Edward, whose love for France was in full accord with his mother's feelings and sympathies.

R. S. RAIT.

† The Schnaebele incident (April 1887) was too slight a matter, and was over too quickly, to require intervention.

Art. 2.—GERMAN BUSINESS METHODS IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE methods of German commerce in pre-war days are familiar in their general outline; the concrete details have not often come to the light. This article will endeavour to give the story of how the German Dye Combination operated in the United States. The account will be given as far as possible in the words of witnesses taken under oath. These accounts, commented on only for the sake of clarity, should be allowed to speak for themselves.

During the war, the dye industry in Germany was united into one great chemical *Verein*, so that the gentle methods hitherto used might become universal and gain completeness of organisation and efficiency after the war, when England and the United States should open again their hospitable doors. Before the war, however, there were six leading German dye houses, divided into two groups of three each. The first group consisted of the Badische Anilin-und-Soda Fabrik (called for short the Badische Company); the Farbenfabriken vormals Friedrick Bayer & Co. (called the Elberfeld or Farbenfabriken Co.); and the Aktiengesellschaft für Anilinfabrikation (known as the Berlin Co.). These three Companies pooled their profits in the respective proportions of 43 per cent., 43 per cent. and 14 per cent. They were controlled by a cartel and met for fixing prices, determining policy, etc. The second group consisted of Farbwerke vormals Meister, Lucius und Brünner (known as the Hoechst Co.); Leopold Cassella & Company; and Kalle & Company. These three concerns were knit together rather more loosely than the first combination; and their unity of action depended mostly on interchange of share capital.

About two years before the war, an internal difference manifested itself, when the accounts for the preceding year were presented to the pool. The Elberfeld Company claimed an allowance of something like \$700,000 for 'graft' payments made in the United States. The other partners objected to the amount, not because they were ultra-conscientious, nor because the amount, if really expended, was excessive, but because vouchers were not

presented with ideal German completeness; and the notion seems to have been suggested that foreign agents and managers might have made an error in the calculation, resulting in unintended personal benefit. However this may be, a little private investigation was made by one Company in order to ascertain whether the dyers and ultimate recipients of the 'graft' were really getting what they were entitled to. The investigation, as will happen sometimes with the best regulated enquiries, got a little out of bounds. The result was a series of suits and a general explosion of indignation. From the evidence collected under oath in the enquiry, the following excerpts have been made. It should be noted, in order to reassure the British reader, that the convention called under the cartel entered on its minutes the following resolution: 'Resolved: that henceforth bribery shall be abolished except in the United States and in Russia.'

The operations of the Dye Trust in the States can best be examined in the words of the witnesses themselves. In explanation, it may, however, be added that these Companies maintained their American agencies under their own control; that the Elberfeld Company, which had expended the \$700,000, was extremely active among the mills in Philadelphia; and that Mr Keppelman was its manager. For convenience, the evidence will be grouped, first, with reference to the book-keeping methods of handling the matter, adopted to secure, so far as possible, proper profits and proper accounting to the principals in Germany; second, the distribution of 'graft'; and thirdly, certain incidental activities, such as chemical means of dealing with rivals, and persuasive invitations on board a yacht.

With respect to book-keeping methods, the problem was a difficult one. It was desirable to secure large prices for the dyestuffs sold, so as to afford a margin for 'graft' and allow of proper accounting in addition. It was obvious that this must be done not only by adulteration, but by misbranding the goods so that comparisons in prices would be rendered impossible and awkward disclosures would be avoided. A system, therefore, based on selling the same thing to 'A' by one name and to 'B,' 'C' and 'D' by different names, on allowances for

different degrees of adulteration, and on keeping accurate accounts so that the dyers should receive the correct amounts of 'graft,' would necessarily be complicated, especially since care had to be taken that each party should see only what it was desirable he should see. The thoroughness of the German mind, and the praiseworthy ingenuity and care with which it triumphed over these difficulties, appear in the following evidence of Clarence C. Du Plaine, book-keeper and order-clerk in the Elberfeld Company.

'My duties as order-clerk, besides the making-out of the orders for goods to be shipped, were to make out the "new-thing sheets," post the "new-thing cards," post the salesmen's price-books and price-lists, and also to keep my own set of price-cards from which I ascertained the prices to be charged as well as the character of the goods.

'The price-books would show the limit selling price for the dyes of the *Farbenfabriken*. The price-cards would show (a set of cards for each customer) the prices which the customer was paying for the colours he bought, the real or trade name of the colour as distinguished from the name under which he may have been buying it, and also the extent to which the colour was reduced or adulterated, if such reduction was being done.

'The "new-thing sheets" were kept for the purpose of keeping track of all new colours that were bought by the various customers, also any change in the price of the goods they had been buying. These sheets were, I should say, as near as I can remember their size, about eight inches square and ruled with columns, first for the fictitious name, then the real name, of the colour, then a small column for the price charged and a wider column at the extreme right-hand side. The name of the customer was not written on these sheets, but a small slip of paper with such customer's name on it was pinned to the sheet.

'Miss Gaul would do all the figuring-out of the graft to be paid to the dyers, in Mr Keppelman's office, her desk being in the corner of said office towards Market Street. . . . After these "new-thing sheets" were taken to Miss Gaul I never saw them again; so presumably they were destroyed after they had served their purpose of determining the amount of graft to be paid the dyer. The "new-thing" cards were a permanent record of any change in the name of a colour, a fictitious name substituted for the real or trade

name of the colour, or any reduction in strength. No price appeared on the "new-thing" cards. A regular code form was used to designate the amount the colour was reduced, so that to the ordinary observer the card would not convey the actual strength of the colour sold.

'The method I pursued in making out the order was as follows. Upon the receipt of the order, either through the medium of the mails, or the telephone, or brought in by the different salesmen, I would consult my price-cards, which were kept in four or five drawers, a set for each customer. In many cases these orders would be for dyestuffs known to the customer under a fictitious name, that is, names not generally known to the trade. The price-cards would show the fictitious name, the real or trade name of the colour, and the price to be charged.

'A long blank or form was used on which to transcribe the orders so given, with columns for the fictitious name, the correct name, the price to be charged, the gross, tare and net weights of the goods and the means of shipment to the customer. After filling-in on the order-blank, in the proper places, the fictitious name, the real name and the price to be charged for the goods ordered, I would give the order to the shipping department. The shipping clerk at that time was . . . , assistant . . . Schneider. They would know just what colour to send the customer from the second column on the order blank, for that contained the real name of the colour ordered by the customer.

'The shipper would erase from the package (in cases where a keg or barrel had been ordered) by means of red paint, painting over the whole head of the keg or barrel, as the case may be, thus erasing the correct name of the colour (for all such packages had the trade name of the colour painted on the head of the package in black stencilling ink), and substitute in its place the fictitious name of the colour by which it was known to the customer. After weighing the packages to learn the gross, tare and net weight, these would be inserted by the shipper or his assistant in the proper spaces on the order, and the means of shipment.

'After this the order was sent to the bill-clerk, whose duty it was to bill and charge the goods sent to the various customers. . . . The method of billing and charging was as follows. Quadruplicate copies of all charges to customers were made, the original being the invoice to be sent to the customer, the other three being sales sheets, one of which was retained in the Philadelphia office for the matter of book-keeping and record, and the other two sent to the New

York office, who in turn, sent one of these copies to the home office at Elberfeld, Germany.

'In cases where fictitious names had been given to the dyestuffs that were to be billed, when it came to the billing, the fictitious name was written by means of a typewriter of the billing variety on the invoice and the impression conveyed of such writing to the underlying three sales sheets by means of carbon sheets. Then a piece of paper would be laid over the invoice, the typewriter spaced on space and the real or trade name of the colour written. No impression of this latter writing would be made on the invoice, as the paper intervened between the type and the invoice, but this writing of the real or trade name of the colour would be conveyed, by means of the carbon sheets, to the three underlying sales sheets. In this manner, no inkling of the true name and character of the dyestuff bought was given to the customer, but a record was made on the sales sheets of the true as well as the fictitious name of the goods. After this, the piece of paper would be removed from the typewriter and destroyed. Then after spacing the typewriter properly, the gross, tare and net weights of the dyestuff were inserted on the invoice, together with the price to be charged for the goods and the final extension. By way of illustration, note the following:

1 keg of Fast Yellow S. C.

is Chinoline Yellow.

115-15-100 lbs. a 1-10 \$110-00.

'All of the above specimen charge, except "is Chinoline Yellow," would be written in the body of the invoice, for the paper inserted over the invoice, as stated before, would take the impression of "is Chinoline Yellow," which impression or writing could and would be destroyed after removal of the paper from the typewriter. This notation, however, would be conveyed to the three underlying sales sheets by means of the intervening carbon paper and kept as a matter of book-keeping and record in the various offices of the Farbenfabriken Company, viz.: the Philadelphia office, the New York office and the home office at Elberfeld, Germany.

'The ledger-cards were about ten to twelve inches and were arranged as an ordinary ledger, a column for debits and one for credits. To them was clipped, by means of an ordinary paper-clip, a separate card that was known as the "Is-card." These latter were about four inches wide and as long as the ledger-cards, and they were fastened to the ledger-cards by no more permanent fastening than the paper-clips.

The object of this temporary means of fastening will be explained later. The lateral lines of the "Is-cards" corresponded exactly with those of the ledger-cards, so that anything written, say on the fifth line for example, would be exactly opposite or in juxtaposition to writing on the fifth line of the ledger-cards. The fictitious name of the dyestuff sold would be entered on the ledger-card, together with the price charged and the extension as taken from the sales-sheet; then on the "Is-card" attached to the ledger-card would be entered the correct or trade name of the colour, so that the fictitious name on the ledger-card and the real or trade name of the "Is-card" would be exactly opposite one another.

'The object of the "Is-cards" was primarily for means of record, and they could be detached from the ledger-card at will at any time. Also, if a customer would come to the office and would wish to see how his account stood on the books of the Farbenfabriken Company, the "Is-card" could be quickly detached from the ledger-card and the latter shown to the customer, and he would be none the wiser as to the exact character and name of the goods he was buying.

'I remember one particular dyestuff of which the D . . . firm bought a good deal, "Brilliant Black BB." This was a fictitious name given to Naphthylamine Black 4BK. The market price of the latter colour was twenty-one cents, yet, under its fictitious name, D. was paying eighty-five cents a pound, and they used a good deal of it, at least three to five hundred pounds each week. On my order blank I would insert on the first column one keg or barrel, as the case might be, of Brilliant Black BB, in the next column the correct or trade name of the colour, that is, Naphthylamine Black 4BK, so that the shipper would know exactly what to send D., though they would not know the exact nature of the colour they were getting, thinking they were using a high-priced dye when in reality it was a cheap one.

'All these transactions, being typical, would be entered on the "new-thing" sheets, which in time would find their way to Miss Gaul or Mr Keppelman, and the graft to be paid for such fraudulent dealings would be figured out accordingly and paid to the dyer who was countenancing such transactions. I remember Mr McNeil coming to the office on several occasions and the men about the place speculating on the amount of graft he would be paid.

'It was also one of my duties to telephone all orders for goods that we did not have in stock here in Philadelphia to the New York office, and of course, any goods that were ordered that had to be reduced in strength and quality. Also it was

customary to wire to the New York office some of the orders ; and this was all done in code, odd and peculiar names being used to designate the various colours and the amount of reductions, so that to the outsider these wires would be absolutely unintelligible. Of course, this was done to keep their methods secret to the outside world.

John Cunning stated that he went first as errand-boy to the Elberfeld Company and gradually worked up until he 'had charge of the sample room.' He continued :

'In the sample room my duties were to tag the samples, send samples out, take care of samples and, whenever necessary, to re-tag samples. I would file these samples away in my room with the tag on them showing their proper names, and, whenever these samples would be sent to the mills buying those particular dyes, I would take off the tag showing the real name and substitute a tag showing the name and names under which these dyes were sold to this particular mill.

'I also sometimes saw the shipping orders under which the dyestuffs were sent out to the mills. I remember one of these orders was for the carpet mills of the D—s, and under this shipping order Congo-Corinth G was sold to the D—s for a direct red ; in other words, everybody knows Congo colours in the dye trade, and they wanted to pretend that this was a direct pink or a direct red. A direct pink or a direct red is almost anything or is apt to be any colour, and no one would know what it was in the trade, but Congo-Corinth they would. The price of Congo-Corinth was known and fixed, but for a direct red or pink they could give almost any price.

The foregoing extracts show how the book-keeping was elaborated and perfected to meet the exigencies of 'peaceful penetration.' It will be of interest now to learn how the bribery payments were calculated and made. But first we may glance at the methods adopted by the Elberfeld Company in order to supply proper vouchers to the New York office and to the home office in Germany. William Voris Gundy stated :

'The Farben people also had in their Philadelphia office, as part of their accounts, what is known as "P" slips. These "P" slips had on them the date the sale was made to a particular mill, the name of the dyestuffs under which the dye was sold, the quantity and the amount due to the dyer

as his graft or commission; and then there was a separate column in which the salesman (or whoever paid this graft) would fill in the date that this graft or commission was paid to the dyer.

"This "P" slip was about nine inches by six inches, white paper, and ruled by lines with different columns into which these things were placed. After the graft was paid to the dyer, this "P" slip, which had previously been given to the salesman in order to pay the right amount of graft to the dyer, would be returned or turned in by the salesman to the Philadelphia office. None of these papers would be seen by the dyers themselves but [they] were only known to the employees of the Farben people. The only one of these papers which would come into the possession of the salesman would be the last paper named—the "P" slip—and this only temporarily, when he would have to turn it in after payment had been made. Sometimes even the "P" slip would not come into the salesman's possession, because Mr Keppelman, the local manager, often made these payments himself to the dyers either at their houses or at a place which had been mutually agreed upon by appointment.

'In the list of firms which I have furnished, where I paid graft to the dyers in person by reason of money furnished me by Mr Keppelman, is the firm of the Gass Dyeing and Finishing Works, which was located on Ontario Street near "F" Street, Kensington. I mention this firm because this is a most notorious example of the injury that can be accomplished by this system of paying graft to the dyers. This firm was finally pushed to the wall and failed a few years ago. The dyer for this firm was a man by the name of McClintock—I think his first name was Harry, but I am not sure. McClintock was not paid all the graft to which he was entitled, according to the prices charged this firm on the bills for dyestuffs furnished them. McClintock was actually paid never less than ten and sometimes fifteen cents or more a pound. According to the size of the bills for dyestuffs sold [to] the Gass Dyeing and Finishing Works, however, McClintock really was entitled to twenty-five or thirty cents a pound; but, on account of the firm being rather slow payers, no more than ten or fifteen cents a pound was paid McClintock; and even the payments which were due him at this rate were withheld, according to my recollection, and McClintock never got these, although the firm was charged for the dyestuffs sold them the proper and market prices, plus the amount of graft which was supposed to be paid to the dyer.

'The custom and rule of the Company for which I was the salesman—the Farbenfabriken or Elberfeld Company—was that, in order to protect themselves, they would charge, as an additional price for the stuff, about the same as they would have to pay the dyer for graft. In other words, the amount paid the dyer for graft was just doubled, and this amount was added to the bill. This was done as a margin for protection for the firm selling the dyestuff, because the firm selling the dyestuff would consider it was taking some risk when it would have to pay the dyer graft, and they wanted an additional margin for contingencies. Some of the old dyers who were on to this insisted that this whole amount be paid them, that is to say, they wanted the amount which was allowed on the bill for their graft and also the amount which was allowed the firm selling the dyestuffs as margin for their protection. Some of the old dyers demanded the whole amount and got it within a very few cents.

'Another firm which occurs to my mind now as being a glaring example of graft is that of X. Y. & Co. The head of this firm was Mr X., and the dyer was A. B., who made a great deal of money by graft, and has since left the firm. I never knew just how much B. got, but on several occasions I took sealed envelopes containing money from Mr Keppelman to him. B. was a great hand at this graft business. He would order, for instance, five barrels of sulphur black, which is a cheap black, and one barrel of lizarine black or lizarine green; the sulphur blacks are very cheap and the lizarine colours are expensive. When the order would be filled, as was understood at the time, B. would give the order; all the barrels of dyestuff delivered would be sulphur colours; and B. would see that he got within a very few cents of the difference paid to himself.'

Warren W. Hartford, employed for general office work, stated:

'I remember often seeing Miss Gaul, who was Mr Keppelman's private stenographer and secretary, making out the envelopes to be paid the dyers at a desk at the south side of Mr Keppelman's private room. She would have the money all spread out before her and would take different amounts and put them in envelopes. . . . Sometimes the dyers would come to the office and get these envelopes, sometimes the salesmen would take the envelopes to the dyers. As a general rule, the salesmen would take the envelopes to the dyers. . . .

'Among the dyers whom I remember coming to the office interviewing Mr Keppelman in his private office, are A. B. [see preceding disclosure of Gundy], who was then a dyer of the X. Y. & Co.'s mill; C. D., who was a dyer at the mill of U. V. W. & Co., at Bristol, Pa.; and T. S., who was a dyer for O. P. at Norristown, Pa. I remember the last named, S., distinctly, because, when he would be there, Mr Keppelman would 'phone down for the "new-thing" sheets for O. P.'s mill, and "Is"-card and ledger-card besides. I remember the same thing with regard to C. B. and D. with regard to their mills of X. Y. & Co. and U. V. W. & Co. When these dyers were in Mr Keppelman's private office, and sometimes before he would call them up into his private office, Mr Keppelman would 'phone down and have us send money up to his office, and I have no doubt this was money which he paid these particular dyers.'

The following dyers, among others, confessed to having received bribes, and gave their evidence as follows. Alexander Macfeat, who worked at the P— Woollen Mills, stated:

'During the time that I was there dyes were bought from . . . , Cassella Colour Company, Farbenfabriken, Berlin Aniline Works, and I do not remember the exact or even approximate amounts, but the books of the Company will show this. During the time I was there the . . . loaned me \$1500.00, and have loaned me \$2000.00 more since leaving the mills; the Cassella Colour Company paid me five, ten and fifteen cents a pound on all dyestuff I bought from them; the Farbenfabriken paid me twenty and twenty-five cents a pound on all dyestuff I bought from them; the Berlin Aniline Works, through Leander Riddle, their salesman, left envelopes twice at my house, with fifteen dollars enclosed each time, in payment of my purchasing two barrels of sulphur black from them; the . . . paid me ten cents a pound on all dyes obtained by me from them. They would have paid me fifteen cents a pound. The reason I did not get the other five cents from the . . . was because the Philadelphia manager told me that N. B., the salesman, was giving this five cents a pound to Mr X. Y., the president and manager of the Company. Since I have confessed my part in this affair, Mr Y. denies this, and I now believe that he never got this five cents, but that N. B. put it into his own pocket.'

William Nolan stated :

'I went with the L. L. Hosiery Company about 1897. During all of this time that I was with them, up to the year 1905, they purchased their dyestuffs from the firm Metz & Company. Some time in, I think, 1905, I forget the exact month, a Mr Edward Sheppard came to my house, No. 720, East Clearfield Street, Philadelphia, and represented to me that he was a salesman for the Farbenfabriken Company and asked me if I could make a change in the dyeing department of the mill of L. L. Hosiery Company where I was working, and, instead of buying my dyeing stuff from Metz & Company buy it from the Farben Company. I did not do the buying of this dyeing stuff myself, but it was bought through the office, then sent to me, and I was in a position to say it was good proper stuff or else turn it down as bad and say it could not be used. Mr Sheppard said to me at this first meeting that, if I could succeed in having their dyeing material used instead of that of Metz & Company, whose dyeing material we had been using, he would put the dyeing material in at a certain price, whereas the real and true price would be considerably lower, and the difference between the price at which he would bill it to the L. L. Hosiery Company and the real price he would hand to me in cash as my share of the transaction. I told him to go ahead and send a sample to the office so that I could use it and be in a position to recommend its use in the dye shop.

'In two or three days afterwards a can of, I think, ten or twenty pounds of dyeing stuff came to the office of the L. L. Hosiery Company and was sent to me in the dye shop. I tried it and found it to be good stuff, and I recommended to the head of the firm that they use this dyestuff instead of the kind they had been getting from Metz & Company. This was an acid black dye. From that time on up to the time I left the service of the L. L. Hosiery Company, on my recommendation, they used this acid black dye of the Farbenfabriken Company. They would use on an average about fifty pounds a week—perhaps a little more. I did not know at the time about how much the mill was paying for this a pound, but I have since learned that it was fifty-six cents a pound.

'About three months after Mr Sheppard first saw me at my house, and about three months after we began using this dye, according to my agreement with Mr Sheppard, he came to see me at my house and paid me cash fifty dollars. He explained to me that this was not the whole amount to which

I was entitled, but that his boss (meaning Mr Alfred Keppelman, the Philadelphia manager of the Farbenfabriken Company) had put up a kick and would only allow him to pay me this much. I afterwards learnt that the truth of the matter was that Mr Sheppard, as the salesman for the Farbenfabriken Company, had been given the entire difference, or nearly the entire difference, between the real price or value of the acid black and the price at which it had been billed to the L. L. Hosiery Company, so that he, Mr Sheppard, could give the same to me according to his original agreement made with me; but that, instead of doing this, Mr Sheppard had retained the balance himself and had actually paid me only about one-half the amount he should have paid me according to our agreement.

'From that time up to the time I left the L. L. Hosiery Company some time in 1909, a period altogether of about three and one-half to four years, at stated intervals of about three months, Mr Sheppard would call at my house, No. 720, East Clearfield Street, Philadelphia, and pay me in bank notes a sum of money which generally was about fifty dollars, claiming that this was my share of the money coming to me under our agreement. During all of this time, too, this sum of money only represented about a half of what I was entitled to get under the terms of our agreement, and I have been credibly informed since that it really represented only about a third of what I should have gotten.'

Richard Pilson stated :

'I never used so very much of the dyestuff of the Farbenfabriken because I never thought very much of it, but at the different mills where I did use it, this Company paid me five, ten and fifteen cents a pound for all of their dyestuffs I used. I recall an interesting incident with reference to the dyer employed by A. & Sons ahead of me and whom I succeeded as dyer. His name was Benjamin Rhodes. He had been employed by A. & Sons for about two years. Certain dyestuffs had been sent into the mill from the main office in Baltimore by Mr A., to be used in dyeing goods by Mr Rhodes. Mr Rhodes thought this dyestuff was not from the people that he wanted to buy from and who were protecting him. He sent it back to Mr A. and told Mr A. it was too inferior to be used. Mr A. kept it at the office in Baltimore for a few weeks and then changed the tags on it. I think he changed the tags to show it was gotten from the Cassella Company, and then sent it back again to the mill and told Mr Rhodes

that it was a new dyestuff gotten from the Cassella Company and asked him to try it. Mr Rhodes used it and sent word to Mr A. that it was the best dyestuff he had ever used. Mr Rhodes wanted to get his dyestuff from the Cassella Company. Mr A. himself came to the mill as soon as he got this word, I think it was Monday morning, and shut the door of the mill in the face of Mr Rhodes, who was discharged from that moment.'

Alfred Selbmann stated as follows :

'The five companies that I got dyestuff from were as follows :—The Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company; the Berlin Aniline Works; the Cassella Colour Company; the . . . Company; and the . . . Company. In return for my ordering dyestuff from these particular Companies, I would receive money or graft from their various agents as follows :—

'My arrangement with the Farbenfabriken Company was that I was to get five cents on every pound used from their Company. This would amount in the average, in my opinion, to about two hundred pounds a week . . . I therefore received from them ten dollars, on the average, every week. This money would be paid me by James Gladfelter, the salesman from the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company, who would come to my house or else send for me to come to a hotel in Reading and would pay me the money every month. My arrangement with the Berlin Aniline Works was the same, viz. that I should get five cents on every pound used from this Company. We would use at this works, in my opinion, about two hundred pounds, on the average, a week from the Berlin Aniline Works. I received, therefore, from them about ten dollars each week, which would be paid me monthly by Mr Feldman, the manager, and at other times by Mr George Carmany, a salesman for that Company. This would be paid me also at my house or at a hotel. From the Cassella Colour Company I do not remember ever receiving anything, as we used very little of their dyestuff.'

Leonard K. Townson stated :

'My first personal contact with the dye goods manufacturers and with their paying the dyers commissions, which are known among the dyers themselves as graft, was at the C. Mill in 1910. I have often been in positions, of course, before this where I have seen this graft handed out and paid, but I had never been in a position of authority myself to receive it. I was head dyer at the C. Mills. While I was there I

bought dyestuffs from the Cassella Colour Company, the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company, and the Berlin Aniline Works. My business with the Cassella Company would amount to about five hundred pounds a month; and on this they paid me five cents a pound. This is considered the safe basis, which all houses are willing to deal under with the dyer. . . . The amount of dyestuff that I used altogether from the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company was about two hundred pounds, upon which they paid me only on the straight basis of five cents a pound. . . . The amount of dyestuff I got from the Berlin Aniline Works was six hundred pounds altogether, on which they paid me only on the straight basis of ten dollars. The way that colour was rated—it being sold as a fast colour, when it was a direct black—I should have gotten thirty cents a pound on this, according to all the rules of the dyers. Instead I was only paid ten dollars.'

Christopher Eisfeld stated:

'During all the time that I worked as boss dyer in the employ of the L. L. Hosiery Company of Frankford, Philadelphia, I received graft from the Philadelphia office of the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company amounting to from ten to twelve cents per pound on all the dyestuff furnished by that Company to my employers, the L. L. Hosiery Company. My employers used, I suppose, about a thousand pounds of black dye every two months, and about sixty pounds of various other colours every week. My graft, therefore, which was paid to me by the Farbenfabriken Company, would amount to about one hundred and ten dollars every two months on the black dyestuffs, and about six or seven dollars each week on the other colours. This graft was paid to me personally by the manager of the Philadelphia office of the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company, Mr Alfred J. Keppelman. The graft was also sometimes paid to me by the salesmen of the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company, Mr Litchfield and Mr Sheppard. It was always paid to me at my home by these men, at my address, 1906, East Venango Street, Philadelphia.

'From about the middle of July to the middle of October 1910, Mr. Sheppard, the salesman, instead of paying me the graft which was due me, kept it, and then came around to my house at the above address and paid me only half that which was due to me on the dyestuff that he himself had sold me, keeping the other half for himself. In other words, he offered me seventy-five dollars and kept seventy-five dollars himself in his own pocket, whereas the whole one

hundred and fifty dollars was due me on the dyestuff that Mr Sheppard had sold my employers.

'I immediately stopped giving any further orders for the dyestuff to the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company. Whereupon Mr Litchfield, the other salesman, paid me a visit to find out why his Company did not get any more orders, and I explained to him the treatment I had received from Mr Sheppard, and I also told Mr Litchfield that I was willing to go to Mr Keppelman and explain to Mr Keppelman the treatment Mr Sheppard was giving me. Mr Litchfield advised me not to do this, telling me he would fix the matter himself without Mr Keppelman knowing anything about it. A few days later Mr Litchfield came to my house and told me that Mr Sheppard could not pay me all the money that was due to me from him (Sheppard), but asked me if I was willing to accept five dollars a week each week until I was paid off this graft money that was due me and which Mr Sheppard had kept. This, of course, was in addition to the other graft money that was due me on the regular dyestuffs I was getting all the time for my employers, and which was being paid me regularly at my house by Mr Litchfield and Mr Keppelman. Thinking that Mr Sheppard might have need of this money himself, I accepted this offer of five dollars a week and was paid five dollars for two weeks, which was sent me by mail—a five-dollar bill in two envelopes for two weeks. No letter or writing was in these envelopes. After these two payments, the payments were discontinued, and I waited a few more weeks to give Mr Sheppard a chance to do the right thing, and then I wrote to Mr Keppelman a letter explaining my bad treatment by Mr Sheppard.

'In the meantime, I had given Mr Litchfield an order for five hundred pounds of wool black, to be used by my employers in dyeing, for which order Mr Litchfield paid me sixty dollars two weeks later. Mr Sheppard, however, did not come up with any further money on account of what he owed, and I again wrote to Mr Keppelman about it; and Mr Keppelman wrote me a letter saying he would come up to see me the following Sunday at my house. In the meantime, Mr Litchfield came to my house and paid me fifty dollars from Mr Sheppard and told me he would bring the ten dollars balance owed by Mr Sheppard the next week. I told Mr Litchfield that I had informed Mr Keppelman about the matter, and Mr Litchfield told me I had no business to do this.

'On the following Sunday, about the middle of December 1910, Mr Keppelman came to my house and asked me not to

give any orders to any other dye house other than the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company, for which he was the manager. He promised me that if I would do this that I would have no further trouble in getting the graft which was due me on all the orders, but that he would bring me the graft due me on all orders himself personally to my house every month. This promise he kept; and after this time, every month, during week days from eight to nine in the evening, two or three times each month, Mr Keppelman came to my house and paid me the graft money which was due to me.

'In the meantime, Mr Litchfield had left the employ of the Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Company; and on the following occasion when Mr Keppelman came to my house, on a Sunday, about the end of February 1911, I asked Mr Keppelman why he had let Mr Litchfield go but still retained in his employ Mr Sheppard. Mr Keppelman told me that Mr Litchfield was too old to train in the business; that Mr Sheppard was still young and could be trained as he, Mr Keppelman, wanted to train him. Mr Keppelman also told me that he had another salesman who did the same thing as Mr Sheppard—that is, he retained part of the graft money that was due dyers—but that he had succeeded in training him so that he was now one of the best men in his employ. Mr Keppelman did not mention his name. On the Sunday that I had this conversation with Mr Keppelman, he did not pay me any graft money. He merely made a personal call to talk with me about matters. On this same occasion Mr Keppelman asked me if I knew a dyer named August Dady. I told him yes, I knew him, and that he had worked as a boss dyer for the P. O. Dyeing and Finishing Works. Then Mr Keppelman told me that he had had the same trouble with Mr Litchfield and Mr Dady as he had had with Mr Sheppard and myself; and that Mr Litchfield had not paid over to Mr Dady all the graft money that was due Mr Dady for orders for dyestuffs that he had given for the P. O. Dyeing and Finishing Works. Mr Keppelman also said that it was through trouble such as this that he had lost a great many orders, and that he had a great deal of worry and unpleasantness over these things.

'While I was at K.'s, A. B. tried to introduce a new dye for another Company into the mill, but I stopped this and made the dye streak all the hosiery dyed by it, by secretly putting chlorate of potash in the double bottom of the tub. I did this while the chemist for this new company, A. B., and the manager of K.'s, were looking on at the experiment, but

they never suspected me. I felt I was justified in doing this not only because I was getting ten cents a pound from the . . . Company, which the new Company never offered to pay me, but also because the new dye was not really so good as the old dye and much more expensive in the end. By doing this trick I saved K.'s at least fifty dollars a week.

From Norristown this deponent moved to Utica, N.Y., where he worked for the R. S. Company and received graft from Kalle & Company.

'I was paid (he states) by Ervin Smith, salesman for Kalle & Company. He paid me from five cents a pound to twenty-five cents a pound for all dyes sold by Kalle & Company while I was there. When I first went there, Smith was afraid to approach me about graft, and he got Albin Benedict, the former dyer for the R. S. Company, to write me three letters explaining how graft was paid him while he was in that mill, so that I would understand about it. Then Smith wrote me, enclosing a slip showing how much was due me for two stuffs sold me by Kalle & Company—one a softener and the other a cotton yellow. After I was at the R. S. Company about four months, McAdams, the treasurer of the Company, sent for me and wanted to know if graft was being paid to me. I said "No," and McAdams said he didn't believe me, and wanted me to explain how it was done. I refused, and the upshot was I resigned. After that I couldn't get a job for love or money in New York State, and I believe McAdams must have put me on a black list. I went to several mills in the neighbourhood and couldn't get a job.

'After I lost my job at the R. S. Company, Benedict sent for me to come to see him at his hotel at Troy, N.Y., which he had bought out when he retired as a dyer. He sent me my railroad ticket. He was afraid I had betrayed him to the R. S. Company. When I got there, he and Smith were waiting for me and demanded the letters they had written to me. I said I had burned them. They said they didn't believe it, and prepared an affidavit for me to sign, stating that I never received graft from Kalle & Company, that I never received letters from Benedict, etc. All the time they kept giving me whisky until I was about half-full. Then they brought in a man who they said was a Notary Public, but they couldn't find any Bible; and Smith finally said, "Well, we don't need any Bible, just sign your name here anyway, Chris." Then I signed it, because I knew it was no good; the man was not a Notary, and I couldn't swear because they couldn't find a Bible.'

The imagination of the manager of the *Farbenfabriken* Company was stirred to activity when other dye competing Companies (probably English) threatened to gain a footing. How this emergency was handled appears in the affidavit of William Voris Gundy (already mentioned), who says:

'In addition to the facts that I set forth in my previous affidavits, among other things I now recall that, after going to work for the *Farbenfabriken* of Elberfeld Company, some time after first working for them—possibly in the year 1904—while I was working as head chemist in the laboratory of the *Farbenfabriken*, Mr Keppelman, the manager, sent for me to come up to his office (as he always did when he had instructions for me), and told me that they had been furnishing dyestuffs for a certain mill in Philadelphia—the name of which mill I do not recall—and that the dyer of this mill was working in the interests of the *Farbenfabriken* and had informed Mr Keppelman that a competitor was trying to get into this mill and displace the *Farbenfabriken*'s dyestuffs; and Mr Keppelman asked me to experiment in the laboratory on different chemicals in order to find the right kind of a chemical, or combination of chemicals, that would successfully spoil and ruin the dyestuffs of this proposed rival. The idea was that this chemical would form a very small package and could be adroitly carried by the dyer, or his second man under his directions, and dropped into the dye tub while they would be casually passing by, and thereby ruin the dye bath.

'I named several chemicals to Mr Keppelman as being the proper chemicals to do this, and among other things that I named I remember mentioning zinc dust. Mr Keppelman said these chemicals were all right so far as spoiling the dye was concerned, but that it would go too far and destroy too much of the colour, so that the game would be almost instantly detected. On the contrary, Mr Keppelman said what they wanted was simply something to make it bronzy or streaked, which would be sufficient to affect the dye, ruin the goods dyed, and prevent the competitors from getting the business.

'I then went back to the laboratory and worked on different chemicals and combinations of chemicals; and, according to my present recollection, I worked at this for about a week before I succeeded in finding the right kind of a combination or chemical preparation that would do what Mr Keppelman wanted. I finally succeeded in effecting and

making this preparation, and gave it to Mr Keppelman. I have no doubt it was sent by him in some way to the dyer and accomplished its proper purpose, as I never heard any objection to it afterwards.

'At other times after this I remember on various occasions, at Mr Keppelman's request, I would either give him the names of different chemicals that would affect and spoil various dyes, or else I would work on chemical preparations that would accomplish this purpose. These chemicals and preparations would then be given to him by myself, and I would hear nothing more about them, but I am sure they must have gone out to the dyers as they were intended, and successfully accomplished the purpose for which they were intended.

'Even before I was asked to make this first preparation by Mr Keppelman, and while I was working in the chemical laboratory, I knew from my predecessor there as head-chemist, X. Y., who now lives at . . ., that these chemical preparations were being constantly made by the Farbenfabriken in order to spoil the dyestuffs of rival and competing houses.

'Mr Y. had been there quite a number of years, and was doing this work, among his other duties for the Farbenfabriken, during all the time I was there, and had been doing it before I was employed by them. I think it was about 1904, or thereabouts, that Mr Y. left. I remember that Mr Y. was somewhat conscientious, and this was one of the duties that he was called upon to do for his employer that he rather balked at.'

What happened to the chemicals invented by Mr Gundy is shown in the evidence of Richard Meyer :

'On many occasions, I recall that, although the exact dates do not occur to my mind, dyestuff was brought in and tried from other Companies, but on each occasion I so managed that it would either spoil the goods or be so unsatisfactory in its result that the mill believed that the dyestuff from these other Companies was no good, and therefore would not buy from them.'

Mr Keppelman kept several motor cars, and the evidence of his chauffeur, C. S. Kille, has interest :

'I remember on very many occasions taking Mr Keppelman in his automobile to different houses of men whom I afterwards ascertained to be dyers. On some of these occasions, according to Mr Keppelman's instructions to me, I

would stop the car around the corner from the address where we were going, and Mr Keppelman would get out and walk around the corner to the house. Mr Keppelman would tell me on these occasions, if any one asked whose car it was, not to tell. Among the addresses to which I often took Mr Keppelman are the following:—

‘1823, E. Tioga St (address of William Fischer, dyer).

‘1821, E. Lippincott St (address of August Dede, dyer).

‘1906, E. Venango St (address of Chris. Eisfeld, dyer).

‘615, Locust Avenue, Germantown (address of Tommy Driscoll, dyer at Bradford Mills).

‘1847, Hunting Park Avenue (address of Kirgeis, dyer; and William Zipper, chemist for Farbenfabriken).

‘1217, E. Allegheny Avenue (address of E. F. and H. F.).

‘Also a lettered street in Olney (address of William Schumann, Jnr., dyer for U. V. W.).

‘Also I took him down to a beer saloon in Chester, I do not just remember the street, where he met men. On some occasions we would pick men up on the street who looked to me to be dyers, by appointment, and after taking them around in the automobile for an hour or so would let them out again. I also went to many other addresses with Mr Keppelman in the car, which addresses I cannot just recall now, but will remember them later on or when my attention is particularly called to them. I remember once taking Mr Keppelman in the car on a Sunday afternoon out Broad Street, Miss Gaul accompanying him, and at Mr Keppelman’s instructions, I stopped the car on Broad Street and he gave me a long envelope which felt to me as if it was full of “dough,” and at Mr Keppelman’s instructions I took this around the corner in Allegheny Avenue, I think it was 1912, Allegheny Avenue, and delivered it in person to Mr H. F.

‘Mr Keppelman never told me directly what he was doing, but I had a good idea that he was doing something crooked with these dyers right along, and that these trips, conferences and appointments were for this purpose. He always carried with him a portfolio bag and sometimes a black grip, and sometimes had a revolver in the black grip for some purpose.’

Mr Keppelman, who has acquired more or less fame for the ingenuity and thoroughness of his methods, hired a yacht during the summer, whose cruises became popular in certain dye circles and whose career has since attracted perhaps undue interest. Modesty made it extremely difficult, except in the close confidence of conversation,

to obtain detailed evidence of the courtesy and favours extended during these cruises. But one may gather that, invitations having been sent to certain of the dyers who had large orders in their gift, they would accept and find society which, if not congenial, was intended to be so, on board the yacht. If they objected, suggestion and reflection were sufficient to convince them of the wisdom of silence; if they found the programme attractive, there was surely no reason for them to talk. In either case, Mr Keppelman got the orders for dyes.

C. S. Kille gives us a glimpse of life on board the yacht :

‘I also have a distinct recollection of Mr Keppelman’s yacht. He has had three yachts, each one of which has been called the “Ilsa,” after his daughter. The yacht he now has is called “Ilsa III.” It has been all winter in winter quarters at Essington, and is now being refitted for the season of 1913. I believe Mr Keppelman is a member of the Delaware River Yacht Club. I filled different positions on board this yacht, being sometimes chief engineer, and purser, and other times acting as brass polisher. Mr Keppelman would take me along for company, and I remember one night late I was summoned to come on board his yacht in order to take the place of the engineer who had left and gone to Baltimore on a drunk. I have a complete log-book which I kept myself for this yacht for 1909. Many parties have been held on board this yacht; and among these parties would sometimes be men who were the managers, superintendents, foremen or owners of mills at different places, and who were either customers of Mr Keppelman or men whom he wanted to entertain.

‘The boat was always well stocked and provided with wines, eatables and every possible luxury. At these parties they drank whisky, champagne, wine and beer. Many times he would have Miss Gaul and her lady friends on board, never Mrs Keppelman. I remember among these ladies was Miss Isabella Ennis, the manicurist over Fox’s Flower Store on South Broad Street, just below the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. I do not know whether the others were manicurists or not. They were pretty gay ladies, and altogether they would have quite jolly parties. I remember one time the mate, Albert Carlson, fell overboard and went to the bottom of the river and a man had to fish him out. Both Mr Keppelman, his guests and the crew had lively times on board this boat.’

As will be gathered from these statements, the testimony of Miss Gaul, the private secretary, would

have been of the greatest value. Her clever lawyer appreciated this point of view. After a settlement of \$100,000 on Mrs Keppelman, a divorce was arranged; and Miss Gaul, as Mr Keppelman's present wife, cannot, under American law, be a witness against him.

The foregoing evidence enables one to see, as on a stage, an excerpt from the busy and profitable life of German organisation. Psychological lessons are not wanting—the degeneration caused among the employees of the German concern themselves, the suggestive complaints of Mr Keppelman as to difficulties in 'training' salesmen, together with the delightfully human picture of Chris Eisfeld, who was willing to make any affidavit because a Bible could not be found! But it is necessary, in closing, to recognise the scale on which the German dye industry worked, and its methods of adulteration and corruption. Statistics, when cited at any length, are apt to weary and fail to fix the attention. Let us content ourselves, therefore, with stating that the annual value of the dyes imported into the United States before the war amounted to about \$10,000,000; and that, although the general rule was to add 10 per cent. for the selling expenses and 10 per cent. for the profits of the American distributing managers, the total prices paid by the American consuming mills were almost \$25,000,000 yearly—which sum, of course, included the results of 'graft' and adulteration. One of the six Companies alone claimed credit for \$700,000 in 'graft'; and one American mill (the one where 85 cents was paid for a certain black instead of 21 cents) presented figures to the author of this article showing, after 'graft' was eliminated, a yearly reduction of expenditure on dyestuffs from \$265,000 to \$125,000.

Art. 3.—CLIVE IN INDIA.

1. *The Life of Lord Clive.* By Sir George Forrest, C.I.E. Two vols. Cassell, 1918.
2. MSS. at the Madras Record Office, India Office, Public Record Office, and British Museum.

THE work of the first Englishmen who attempted to control an Indian province has seldom been duly appreciated. Their motives and difficulties, the system they gradually built up, the methods they were obliged to adopt, have been discussed and judged from the standpoint of European conditions and ideas. It may then be useful, especially when the whole fabric of Indian administration is under revision, to re-examine its beginnings with the aid of contemporary documents, many of which have just been published in Sir George Forrest's 'Life of Clive,' while I have also drawn on others still unpublished, some of which are in my keeping in Madras.

It is, indeed, strange that we should have had to wait till now for an authoritative biography of that great man and statesman. Orme, though authoritative, was, as a contemporary, bound within narrow limits of discretion, and deliberately refrained from dealing with Clive's later and more important achievements. Malcolm's biography is well-intentioned but confused. The writings of Malleon, Wilson, and Arbuthnot are second-hand, uncritical, and misleading. Thus Sir George Forrest's work fills what was a deplorable gap in our historical literature, and does so in the manner which those already acquainted with his 'Bombay Selections' and 'Foreign Department Papers' expected.

We propose to indicate here merely the salient features of Clive's wonderful career, and his decisive influence on the origins of British power in Hindustan. At the age of nineteen he went out as writer to Madras, and for two years performed the easy duties assigned to the junior servants, amusing his leisure in the library accumulated by a succession of pious chaplains and beneficent governors. When, in 1746, La Bourdonnais captured the settlement and Dupleix violated the capitulation, Clive fled to Fort St David, and for the next three years served as an officer, distinguishing himself on several occasions.

When the war ended he returned to civil employment, and was appointed Steward at St David's. Humble as it sounds, this was the first step in an amazingly prosperous career. War broke out again almost at once, on account of the way in which Dupleix's schemes threatened the continuance of English trade. The English took the field with a large part of their troops; and to Clive as Steward fell the duty of providing bullocks and coolies for transport, and meat, rice, and arrack for provisions. By the time Clive went home, early in 1753, he had made 40,000*l*. Nor had this involved great personal exertions. Clive had employed numerous agents—many of them were his brother officers—who themselves amassed handsome sums of money as well.

The war was at first carried on with indescribable incompetence. Lawrence went home almost at once to quarrel with the Directors over his pay. The command devolved on a captain named Rodolf de Gingens, who considered that the art military lay in keeping out of the enemy's reach. When the Francophil Nawab, Chanda Sahib, marched to attack Trichinopoly, the only refuge of the English candidate, Muhammad Ali, Gingens retreated with such haste as to lose most of his baggage and some of his guns. When the enemy approached the city, he would not stir beyond the shelter of its guns, and but for the Nawab's protests would have retired behind its walls. Luckily the French troops with Chanda Sahib were commanded by officers equally unenterprising and incompetent.

The English Council, however, wearied of this bloodless war. In order to relieve the pressure on Trichinopoly, they resolved to attack the enemy's capital, Arcot. This promised the collection of revenue in the enemy's country, or at least the disturbance of his collections. But, when Gingens was ordered to detach a force for this purpose, he refused. Clive then offered to invade Arcot with such troops as could be spared from the garrisons of St David's and Madras, on condition of receiving rank as Captain. His offer was accepted. In August 1751, he seized the city of Arcot; and next month was closely besieged by forces gathered from Trichinopoly and Pondicherry. This is the siege long famous as the occasion on which sepoys are said to

have offered their rice to feed the European troops. Sir George Forrest, we note, accepts the story as genuine. But, if so, how comes it that no allusion can be found either in Clive's letters from the besieged place, or in the diaries of the men who served there, or in subsequent correspondence, or in any of the official records? The story depends wholly upon what Sir John Malcolm called 'undoubted authority,' without saying what his authority was. Malcolm was an uncritical person, and we suspect was deceived.

At last Clive's tottering walls were breached, and the enemy sought to carry the place by storm. But the French troops consisted of sailors newly landed and undisciplined—'tarpaulin rascals' an irreverent Englishman called them—and they took no part in the attack, while the native troops were driven off with considerable loss. Shortly afterwards they withdrew, on the approach of certain Maratha allies of Muhammad Ali.

When, early in 1752, Clive had expelled the enemy from the Carnatic by an unbroken series of victories, the English Council resolved to send him with every man that could be spared to reinforce Gingens at Trichinopoly, in the hope that at last that sluggish commander would venture to move. On his way to St David's, Clive marched by the ground on which fourteen months earlier the French had by a night-attack secured their most conspicuous success—the death of Nasir Jang, Subahdar of the Deccan and principal enemy of Chanda Sahib. But instead of the city and the stately monument which Macaulay declared Dupleix had built there in commemoration of his victory, he found only a couple of choultries, or rest-houses for travellers, and an unfinished inscription on a block of stone. Of such materials are some of the high-sounding stories of history composed.

Just as Clive was ready to march from St David's, Lawrence arrived from Europe. This was very lucky for Clive. Had he proceeded alone to Trichinopoly, he would have found small occasion to distinguish himself. He was the youngest captain on the list; and most of his seniors were exceedingly jealous of the reputation which he had acquired. Any attempt on the part of the Council to give him command of the English forces would certainly have been followed by the resignation

of the officers generally, just as happened when Dupleix tried to give Paradis command of the expedition against St David's in 1746. Under Lawrence's command, however, Clive was given every opportunity he could desire.

At this time the French were led by an exceedingly inefficient officer, Law, who failed to prevent the junction of Lawrence's reinforcements with the troops already at Trichinopoly, and then retired into the island of Srirangam, which lies between the Cauvery and the Coleroon. Clive then proposed that the English forces should be divided, one part operating to the south and the other to the north, so as to block up the French and compel their surrender. Every English officer but Lawrence condemned the plan as foolhardy; and indeed its sole justification lay in the proved inactivity of the French command, but for which the two parties might have been crushed in detail. The plan was adopted, and Clive received command of the detachment operating to the northward. Once there, he became much more sensible of the dangers of his position, from which indeed he escaped only by his own activity and the enemy's negligence. His camp was surprised, but by a party too small to take advantage of the confusion they had caused. Soon after this all the French posts outside the island were carried. A party advancing with treasure from Pondicherry was driven back and finally captured. Thereupon Chanda Sahib and the French surrendered. Chanda Sahib was beheaded by the Tanjoreans, whose territory he had ravaged a dozen times in his day of power; and Law's surrender determined the French Company to recall Dupleix. It is hard to see what else they could have done. Dupleix had for three years been amusing them with stories of a war that was always going to end and was never going to cost any money. He had never explained to them or even formulated to himself the principles on which his policy rested. Nor was his recall so great a misfortune as some have supposed. Fertile of expedient as he was, he lacked all sense of reality and failed to see what was, and what was not, practicable.

Clive's military career in Southern India was now almost concluded. He conquered a few posts which the French had re-established in the Carnatic, and then

went home, at the age of twenty-eight, with a great fortune, considerable military reputation, and a character for being vastly favoured by luck. As is often the case, this last meant that he possessed that rapid and accurate judgment which alone enables a man to avert impending disaster and to seize every chance of victory.

Two years in England sufficed to incline him again eastwards. He lived extravagantly; his generosity was profuse; and he dabbled in politics. He returned to India, in 1755, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and as second in council on the Coromandel Coast. He proceeded at first to Bombay, for the Company had evolved a plan to overthrow the supremacy which the French under Bussy had established in the Deccan. That province was continually in dispute between the Moghul subahdar and the Marathas; and it was proposed that the Bombay Council should enter into an alliance with the latter—which, in view of the French support enjoyed by the subahdar, they were almost certain to embrace. But the Bombay councillors were better qualified to deal with matters of trade than questions of policy. They refused to enter into the project; and the only use they made of the troops sent out to them with Clive was the destruction of a stronghold of petty pirates who had long vexed their private commerce.

But this decision, though stupid, was fortunate for Clive. He reached Madras by May 1756, instead of being engaged in a serious campaign in the Deccan, at the very moment when Siraj-ud-daula chose to threaten the English in his province of Bengal. The reasons for his action have been much discussed. It was asserted by the unvarnished Holwell that he was warned by Alivirdi Khan, his predecessor, against the ambitions of the European nations; and, though Holwell's evidence would not hang a dog, we have no doubt that Siraj-ud-daula from the very first entertained strong suspicions of English, French, and Dutch alike. However great the apathy with which Indians regarded the fate of distant provinces, it is hard to suppose that a Muslim court regarded with unconcern the extraordinary events which had taken place in the Carnatic—the slaughter of two Muhammadan princes by the infidel, and the predominance which certain of these unbelievers had established

at the court of Hyderabad. Nor is this a mere plausible suggestion. We know on unimpeachable evidence that Siraj-ud-daula's grandfather had been so shocked by the murder of Nasir Jang that he had threatened the French in Bengal with the confiscation of their property.

These suspicions, directed especially against the English, were strengthened by the fact that they ventured to prepare defences against a possible French attack from the river. The Nawab ordered the new works to be demolished. The English were unwise enough to explain. Siraj-ud-daula seems to have supposed that these nations meditated a repetition in Bengal of the events which had laid waste the Carnatic. He at once turned back from an expedition on which he had set out, seized the English factory at Murshidabad, marched on Calcutta, and, to his own enormous surprise, captured it with ease.

This news, with that of the great crime which accompanied it, reached Madras in August 1756. An expedition had been on the point of starting for the Deccan; and more than one member of the Council was anxious, from interested motives, to continue it and neglect Bengal. But, thanks to the efforts of Clive and Orme, it was resolved to send every available man to recover the lost settlements. In October they sailed under the command of Clive himself. Calcutta was recovered as easily as it had been lost. When the Nawab advanced to repel the invaders, he was so alarmed by a night-attack on his camp—tactics which Clive had borrowed from the French—that he at once conceded all the English demands.

It was known, however, that he had only yielded to circumstances. He continued scheming how best to avenge himself for this humiliation, and wrote repeatedly to Bussy to come and help him. War had now broken out again between France and England; and there was an obvious danger that Bussy, or at all events the French at Chandernagore, might join the Nawab. But there was a long-established custom among the European nations in Bengal not to take part in European wars. A neutrality was proposed, and, though it came to nothing, Siraj-ud-daula was cajoled into looking on while the English captured Chandernagore and destroyed his

only possible allies. It was then the Nawab's own turn. Just as Dupleix had joined the conspiracy of Pathan nawabs against Nasir Jang, so Clive joined in a plot, supported largely by Hindus, to overthrow Siraj-ud-daula and establish Mir Jaffar as Nawab. The latter proved a most futile ally. He would neither join Clive on the march nor unite with him on the battlefield. But the Nawab had disgusted all his supporters. His camp was full of rumours of treachery. When the English at last reached Plassey, where Siraj-ud-daula lay covering Murshidabad, the Nawab's troops were prepared for defection and defeat. After a short action the Nawab gave up all hopes and fled to his capital.

All this time Mir Jaffar had done nothing. But now, on the urgent representations of Clive, he followed the Nawab and reached Murshidabad while the latter was still there. With strange imbecility this irresolute victor went quietly to his own palace, and allowed Siraj-ud-daula to complete his preparations for renewed flight. Luckily, however, for him, his relatives were of a more determined type. One seized the fugitive; another murdered him. Thus within a year of capturing Calcutta Siraj-ud-daula perished.

Meanwhile Clive had seated Mir Jaffar on the *masnad* of Bengal, just as five years before Bussy had made Salabat Jang subahdar of the Deccan. There were further resemblances. Neither prince was in the least qualified for government. In spite of their difference of age, both were feeble, irresolute, and untrustworthy; and both, according to the tradition of oriental generosity, rewarded those who had raised them to their undeserved eminence. It has been usual to condemn such gifts; and, from an abstract point of view, subjects of European sovereigns doubtless should not have accepted them. But we gravely doubt whether there was a living man who, in the circumstances in which Bussy and Clive found themselves, would have refused what they accepted. Acceptance was warranted by the custom of the country, the traditions of the service, and a lively sense that such gifts were merited.

It was now to be seen what would happen when the whole political power lay in the Nawab's hands and the whole military power in those of the English. There

were two precedents—Dupleix and Chanda Sahib in the Carnatic, Bussy and Salabat Jang in the Deccan; and each offered warnings and examples. Thus Dupleix found Chanda Sahib's management of the finances so intolerably bad that he procured farmans appointing himself governor of all the country south of the Kistna; and, at the time of Chanda Sahib's death, he was only awaiting an opportunity to put these farmans into force. Bussy met with a similar difficulty at Hyderabad. Though the accumulated treasure of the past had sufficed for a while to meet both the French demands and the daily requirements of the administration, yet within eighteen months Bussy was writing, 'There is no hope of his [Salabat Jang] ever re-establishing his finances, they are too badly administered. . . . It is a kind of brigandage. The renters only pay half what is due.' The officials were corrupt and uncontrolled; the native army was on the verge of mutiny; and the French were unable to obtain the high pay which had been promised them. The only remedy which Bussy could apply was to get a grant of certain districts—the Northern Circars—to defray the expenses of his army.

Again the control which Bussy exercised over the Durbar had occasioned wide-spread discontent. The French, it was muttered, were carrying off the whole wealth of the Deccan. Only a few months before Clive had sailed for Bengal, all Madras had been agog with the news that Bussy had been dismissed; and an expedition designed to replace French by English influence had been on the verge of despatch, being only stopped by the news from Bengal. Bussy had been reinforced, had successfully resisted the attacks made upon him, and had finally condescended once more to support Salabat Jang on his tottering throne. But it was abundantly clear that the control of an Indian prince involved endless troubles, arising from financial mismanagement and durbar jealousies. In one respect, however, the position in Bengal afforded Clive an advantage which Bussy lacked in the Deccan. In Bengal the Hindus were enjoying a larger share of important posts than was usual in the southern province. The revolution by which Siraj-ud-daula had been overthrown had been supported by several prominent Hindus; and, by continuing the

alliance thus begun, Clive secured the general support of something like a party, whereas Bussy could never obtain more than the selfish and uncertain aid of individuals.

The fruits of this were soon evident. Difficulties with Mir Jaffar began almost at once. He delayed payment of the sums he had promised to the Company. At the same time he aroused grave distrust in his Hindu dependents. Several small rebellions broke out. A Hindu, Ram Narayan, was still Deputy of Behar, and was believed to be hostile to the new government. Mir Jaffar decided to make a progress thither and bring him to book; but his chief financial minister, Rai Durlabh, refused, under pretext of illness, to accompany him. It was, in fact, apparent that Bengal was threatened with troubles which would throw the finances into complete disorder. Clive then intervened. He resolved himself to accompany the Nawab into Behar. At his approach the rebels submitted; Rai Durlabh agreed to proceed with him to Patna; and, on the promise of his support, Ram Narayan gave up all thought of resistance.

Successful as it was, this policy was plainly open to grave objection, for it tended directly to encourage that jealousy of English power which was certain sooner or later to outweigh the Nawab's gratitude. Mir Jaffar was much displeased at finding those whom he had hoped to plunder guarded by so powerful a protection. But any other policy involved the still greater danger of administrative chaos and financial ruin. Clive's conduct ensured the continuance of government on the traditional lines, and won for the English additional support besides that of military superiority. But it may be doubted whether any one else could have for so long a time maintained this position of unstable equilibrium. For the two years and a half that elapsed between the revolution of 1757 and his departure early in 1760, he had to employ constant vigilance, unwavering resolution, extraordinary dexterity, to oppose the intrigues which were always being hatched at the durbar by the party of discontented Muhammadans headed by Miran, the Nawab's son, who lost no occasion to incite his father against Clive's control.

The most critical situation that thus arose was the

affair with the Dutch. That nation had hitherto stood aloof from the political complications of India; but now certain of their agents saw in the notorious ill-feeling with which the Nawab regarded English control a heaven-sent opportunity for intervention. Accordingly they entered into relations with Miran, at first (it seems) to establish him instead of his father; subsequently Mir Jaffar himself was brought in, and the project became the deliverance of the durbar from English thralldom by Dutch aid. After some delay their superiors at Batavia were brought to share their aims, and an expedition was despatched, ostensibly to augment the garrisons of Ceylon and Coromandel, but really to expel the English from Bengal.

In this the Dutch, like every nation of that age, were guided by what they believed to be their real interests, as the English had been in their conduct towards Dupleix. The Dutch, however, were guilty of the unpardonable sin of irresolution and delay. Their fleet lay for some time at Negapatam and at the mouth of the Hugli before the leaders could make up their minds to proceed. Clive thus had full warning. As usual, the Nawab looked on while others decided the fate of his province. With exquisite irony the English used his name to forbid the Dutch to enter the river; and, when the latter decided to ignore the commands of their supposed enemy and secret friend, they were beaten with the loss of all their ships, and almost all their men, while the faithless Miran now surrounded their settlement with his cavalry, breathing fire and slaughter 'against those Chinsura cowards.' There was nothing left for the unfortunate Dutch but to confess their error and accept the terms which the English imposed on them in the Nawab's name.

A system which could only be maintained by such *tours-de-force* was evidently unworkable except in the most skilful hands. In January 1760, Clive went home to rest on his well-gilded laurels, leaving the government of Calcutta in the hands of Holwell and Caillaud, until the newly-appointed President, Vansittart, should arrive from the Coast. Holwell was a man of great intellectual ability; Caillaud was an agreeable man and a good soldier; but both were sadly lacking in Clive's force of

character and honesty of purpose. Behar was invaded by a wandering princelet from Delhi; and, though Caillaud beat the invader whenever he could come up with him, he failed to secure any decisive success because he could not induce Miran and his cavalry to act with vigour. The Nawab, as soon as Clive's influence was removed, again allowed his payments to the English to fall into arrears. Within three months Holwell had resolved that a new revolution was inevitable. Moreover, his acute mind discerned that it would be quite useless to pull down one Nawab only to establish another. More was needed than a mere change of persons. 'We could never be possessed,' he wrote, 'of a more just or favourable opportunity to carry into execution what must be done, I plainly see, one time or other . . . to wit, take this country into our own hands.' But, however clearly he saw what ought to be done, his want of character led him into conduct which irretrievably ruined his good name. Miran died in the middle of 1760; and at once there stood forth as candidate for the Nawab's succession the most finished politician of his age, the Nawab's son-in-law, Mir Kasim. He immediately entered into correspondence with Holwell, and, as we shall see, converted him from the views which he had at one time entertained.

In the following August Vansittart arrived from Madras, and naturally enough consulted Holwell and Caillaud regarding the situation in Bengal. It was decided to give Mir Kasim the whole power of the Nawab, leaving to Mir Jaffar the name only. The maintenance of the English troops was to be assured by the grant of certain districts which were to be entirely under English management; and the Company's immediate necessities were to be provided for by the payment of a considerable sum of money. When the old Nawab refused his consent, declaring that his life would not be worth a week's purchase, he was allowed to retire to Calcutta, and Mir Kasim reigned in his stead.

Although every one concerned in this revolution of 1760 knew perfectly well that Mir Kasim would in due time give solid proof of his gratitude to those who had made him Nawab, it is probable that only one was actuated by corrupt motives. After all, as an acute observer has said, those who wished to make unlawful

fortunes had many ways open to them, far more convenient than this public method of a revolution. But Holwell was on the point of going home; it was the last chance he had of a considerable *coup*; and to him Mir Kasim's generosity was swifter than to any one else. There is no other explanation of the change in his views. He had been convinced of the futility of changing one Nawab for another; but, on Vansittart's arrival, he advocated the claims of Mir Kasim to be the Nawab's deputy, knowing full well that Mir Jaffar could not possibly agree to the appointment, and that the proposal would lead inevitably to the substitution of the former for the latter.

Vansittart doubtless believed that in replacing Mir Jaffar's incompetence by Mir Kasim's energy he was achieving a great stroke of policy; but, from this moment, we can trace a steady, unceasing effort to escape from English control. Thus the capital was removed from Murshidabad to the distant city of Monghyr. He had promised to reduce his troops to 6,000 horse; but instead set about augmenting the forces, training them after the European model, and establishing factories for cannon and small arms. He had agreed that the English should assist the wandering Emperor Shah Alam to recover the throne of Delhi, but intrigued so industriously that Shah Alam departed without a single Englishman. He insisted that the commanders of the English forces should be placed under his orders; he affected to regard them as mere mercenaries in his pay; and the least hint of independent volition on their part was declared to be a studied insult to his authority.

Two matters deserve something more than a passing mention. One was the question of Ram Narayan, whom the English had maintained in Behar ever since 1757. At first Vansittart followed Clive's policy, and repeatedly assured him of English protection. But Mir Kasim had long nursed a grudge against the man whom he had twice tried to supplant. In the face of his repeated complaints, Vansittart and his committee gave way, and at last, after long hesitation, delivered Ram Narayan into the Nawab's hands. When as much money as possible had been extorted from him, he was put to death as a signal proof that English protection availed

little against the Nawab's hostility. None can now tell whether the deputy's conduct had been unusually corrupt; but, in any case, the least that Vansittart could have done was to offer him an asylum in Calcutta.

The other matter was the Inland Trade, which Mir Kasim began to obstruct in December 1761, and to complain of in the following May. A careful examination of the facts shows that this matter was not quite as it is usually represented. The old farmans, under which the English had formerly traded in Bengal, had never drawn any distinction between goods intended for export and goods intended for consumption in the country; but, in practice, the former Nawabs had prevented the English from trading in the second sort, and on one occasion had compelled the English chief of Kasimbazar to sign a renunciation of all right to take part in inland trade. To the English this had always appeared a grievance; and in 1757 Clive had been instructed to see that Mir Jaffar's parawana should abrogate the renunciation. The parawana reads: 'Whatever goods the Company's gumastahs may bring or carry to or from their factories . . . you shall neither ask for nor receive any sum, however trifling, on the same. . . . Whoever acts contrary to these orders, the English have power to punish them.'

At a later date Clive denied that he had allowed the English to trade in articles of internal consumption during his first government. Be that as it may, they did so, for at the end of 1759 Mir Jaffar complained of the extent to which the privilege was carried, and was referred by Clive to the Council for an answer. Under Holwell and Vansittart it was certainly allowed; and Mir Kasim not only accepted the nawabship with a full knowledge of this practice, but allowed it to continue without protest for almost two years. This explains why his attacks on this valued but impolitic privilege were so bitterly resented by the English.

Another point arises in this connexion. Mir Kasim suddenly objected to the English custom of punishing the revenue-people who invaded their privileges. We have seen that this was expressly authorised by Mir Jaffar's parawana of 1757. More than that, it was an admitted principle of action. Hastings writes in 1759:

'To be perpetually complaining to the Nabob renders us too little and mean in his eyes. . . . If you have not a force capable of protecting you and your servants from insults, you should apply for it.' No one can pretend that Mir Kasim was ignorant of this practice. Yet he now affected to regard it as a grievous innovation made by personal enemies resolved upon his overthrow. In short, by the beginning of 1763, it was plain, to all but the optimistic Governor, that the English would either lose their privileges or have to fight for them.

It is needless to detail the prolonged and heated discussions which took place between Vansittart and Hastings on the one side and the remainder of the Council on the other, regarding the policy that should now be followed. The arrangements which the President had made with Mir Kasim were formally disapproved. The Chief of Patna, who had from the first condemned the revolution of 1760 with a violence which damaged his own cause, was authorised to take measures for the security of the factory and garrison if an attack were threatened; and an embassy was sent to make a last effort to dissuade Mir Kasim from hostilities. But he categorically refused every demand. After some delay he permitted the English envoys to depart, but his troops were already moving on Patna. The English thereupon seized that city, but owing to ill-leadership failed to hold it, and in their retreat were surrounded and taken. The embassy was attacked near Murshidabad and massacred.

Thus for the third time within seven years the English came to an open rupture with the Nawab of Bengal. In this case various causes rendered the struggle prolonged and severe. Although Major Adams, by an unbroken series of victories, drove Mir Kasim out of Bengal and Behar, the fugitive succeeded in getting the support of Oudh and thus renewed the struggle by invading Behar in 1764. The military command had now fallen into the weaker hands of Carnac; and the army had been demoralised by promises of a donation, payment of which had been delayed. Little was done beyond defending Patna from the enemy until, in the autumn, the spirit of mutiny was crushed; then the English advanced into Oudh, beat the Nawab at Buxar, and occupied that province as well.

Such was the end of Mir Kasim's government. Before flying to Oudh he gave a shocking proof of the ferocity of his disappointed ambition; for he caused his English prisoners to be massacred at Patna. But the guilt does not lie upon him only. Some rests upon one of the victims, Ellis, the late Chief of Patna, whose intemperate speech had given reason for suspecting his intentions. Even more rests upon Vansittart, who had allowed, nay, even encouraged, Mir Kasim to exercise power without reference to the wishes of the English; who had fed his ambition without being prepared to give it free scope; whose policy from the day he landed in Calcutta was marked by blind inconsequence, and perfect inability to read men or forecast the future.

Vansittart was succeeded in 1764 by Spencer, who, while suffering to the full from all his predecessor's defects, added to them a complete subordination of public to private interests. Meanwhile, on the outbreak of war with Mir Kasim, Mir Jaffar had been drawn out once more from his retirement and proclaimed Nawab by the man who had deposed him. He proved even feebler and more incompetent than before. The ministers he chose and insisted on retaining were men of low birth, vicious habits or undoubted treachery. They contributed, to the utmost of their power, to the difficulties encountered by the English in the campaign of 1764; and, although the Nawab and the Council held prolonged conferences, they failed altogether to find a satisfactory solution of their disputes. Presently, in January 1765, Mir Jaffar died; and the new Governor resolved in future strictly to control the appointments of ministers. So far it was well enough; but unfortunately he proceeded to allow the new Nawab to display substantial gratitude for this reduction of his power, and also laid the selected minister under contribution. What made this conduct the more remarkable was that orders had been received from the Company absolutely prohibiting further participation in the inland trade, and requiring all its servants to enter into covenants against receiving presents; but the President, who felt fully qualified to deal with the political future of Bengal, shrank from the responsibility of executing these orders because a successor, Lord Clive, had already been appointed. It

would seem that he felt empowered to carry out whatever projects might be of private benefit but none that threatened private loss. In fact, the Company's government was rapidly falling into chaos, and Clive was re-appointed Governor to bring it back to order and decency. It was the hardest task with which he was ever entrusted, and in its achievement he secured his greatest success.

He reached Calcutta in May 1765, and at once took up the work of reform. Supreme control had been assigned to a Select Committee of the Council so long as the war with Oudh should last; but Clive, finding that he would encounter the greatest opposition in the larger body, resolved to keep the Committee in force, though Oudh had been overcome, and use it as the controlling organ of government. With its aid and his own commanding personality, he broke down all resistance. The covenants against presents were executed. An inquiry was held into the acceptance of presents on the late appointment of Nawab and ministers. When vacancies occurred in Council, he sent for Company's servants from Madras in preference to promoting men unsuitable from youth or character.

The result of these measures was an outburst of indignation. According to the custom of those days, the Governor kept open house for all respectable persons; but Clive's dinner-table was deserted, his invitations were declined, his Madras nominees sent to Coventry. Clive was not the man to bear this meekly. Every person who was prominent in this movement met with severe punishment; they lost every lucrative post; they were transferred to disagreeable and unprofitable stations; they were reduced to the bare pay and allowances which every one drew but no one could live on. Presently it was evident that to resist Clive was a bootless attempt; and the civilians gave way.

Even severer trouble was encountered with the army. It was usual in India to pay officers when in the field an allowance, called *batta*, to enable them to meet the additional expenses of campaigning. In Bengal this had been fixed at a far higher rate than elsewhere, and the Company had sent repeated orders for its reduction. This again was left for Clive to carry out. The officers regarded it as a breach of faith. They were encouraged

by the civilians with promises of support. They formed an association which was joined by practically the whole body, and then threatened to resign their commissions unless *batta* was restored at the old rate. But Clive regarded their threats no more than he had regarded the discontent of the civilians. He sent for officers from Madras; he promoted men from the ranks; he insisted that every officer who resigned should be at once sent down to Calcutta so that they should not spread mutiny among the men; and this movement too, like that of the civilians, collapsed.

While he thus effected the reforms demanded by the Company, he accompanied them with another which plainly marks his firm grasp on the essentials of human nature. He laid it down that, while it was undesirable that youngsters should be able to return to Europe with fortunes after a few years' service, a man should have the prospect of securing a competence after enjoying the rank of councillor or field rank. To this salutary end he took advantage of the Company's orders forbidding its servants to participate in the inland trade. The public revenues derived from that source had been, under arrangements to be mentioned below, transferred to the Company. Clive resolved to employ these revenues to provide adequate pay for the senior civil and military servants; but, as he was well aware that the Company's traditions were all against making such payments from its own pocket, he disguised his proceedings by vesting the revenues in a society acting for the servants concerned, who were to manage matters on much the same footing as that allowed to the monopolists and tax-farmers under the native Government.

This step was disapproved at home, principally on the ground that interference with the inland trade had already been prohibited—an objection that did not in reality apply. But Clive's arguments had this much effect, that the Company decided to allot $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of its territorial revenues among those servants who would have benefited under Clive's scheme, so that he in fact inaugurated the system under which Indian administrators ceased to look to irregular, and often illicit, forms of gain for the reward of their labours. By these measures of reform taken together Clive enabled

the Company's servants to break with their old traditions and prepared the instruments for the future administration of India. But he accomplished this at enormous personal cost. To these reforms are to be ascribed that deadly and persistent hatred which called his conduct in question before the Houses of Parliament, which pursued him to the grave and then attacked his memory, which sought to blacken and defame every one of his friends. In like manner the corrupt and vicious French agents at Pondicherry hounded to death the unhappy Lally. Here, too, we see the English conquest of Bengal following the same lines and yielding the same consequences as Dupleix's temporary conquest of the Carnatic. The evils were due not to the special worthlessness of the English or the French agents, but to the weakness of human nature exposed to extraordinary temptation.

Lastly, we have to consider the political settlement which Clive effected in Bengal. In the first place he restored the Nawab of Oudh to his former dominions. He considered rightly that he would be careful how he again attacked the English, and that his territories would form an advanced guard for the frontier of Behar. Oudh remained so until the days of Dalhousie. Secondly, he had to decide what should be done with the fugitive Emperor Shah Alam. The dream of marching to Delhi and making Moghuls had long floated before European eyes. Bussey and Caillaud and a host of others had been allured by the wealth and power which the prospect seemed to offer. But Clive resolutely put the idea aside and assigned Kora and Allahabad for the imperial residence and maintenance. He was not going to embroil the English with the strongest powers of Hindustan for the sake of an empty name, or waste their blood to establish the authority of another. Thirdly, he fixed the future position of the English in Bengal. Hitherto they had had no status beyond that conferred by military power. The immediate problem was how to secure control without evoking violent protests from Paris and the Hague. This was solved by taking for the Company the *divanni* or revenue administration, and leaving the rest nominally in the Nawab's hands. But the Nawab himself was now powerless for good or evil. The English named the ministers who exercised authority in his name. Thus

complete control was secured, without assuming sovereign powers or undertaking the direct administration of the province.

This settlement has usually been criticised because it divorced power from responsibility. From the point of view of theoretical politics, the fact is indisputable; but this criticism wholly ignores the facts of the case. It was not possible for Clive, even if he had desired it, to establish a direct administration. He lacked men skilled in law, in languages, in the customs of the people. Such men had to be bred and trained. A tradition of administrative service had to be formed. Clive cannot be attacked for not establishing what Hastings found so difficult to create. Meanwhile the English continued to administer the districts which had been granted them by Mir Kasim, and in so doing prepared themselves for a wider field of action and a heavier responsibility. It is not claimed that the Dual Government which Clive established was an ideal system; but it is not too much to assert that it was the best possible solution in the circumstances. At the worst, the Government of Bengal was as good as it had been under Siraj-ud-daula or Mir Jaffar; and the English were in a position to assume direct control as soon as the time was ripe.

The wonder is, not that Clive's settlement was incomplete, but that it lent itself so readily to the developments of the future. There is no severer test of successful statesmanship. For these reasons we think Clive was even greater as statesman than as soldier or as politician. As a soldier, both in the Carnatic and Bengal, he allowed himself to be surprised; as a politician ranged against Siraj-ud-daula and Mir Jaffar he condescended to meet them with their own weapons of intrigue and deceit; but as a statesman, in his last government, he rose to rare heights of disinterested action and, without ever losing his grasp of the actual facts, not only built for the present but also prepared for the future.

H. DODWELL.

Art. 4.—STATE MORALITY.

THE question, how far the dictates of individual morality apply to the conduct of the State, is one of the highest practical importance at the present time, while it also embodies a strictly scientific problem, connected both with the axioms of ordinary ethics and with the view taken by sociology of the meaning and significance of the State. And yet, while it is true that a few politicians and constitutional lawyers * have recently occupied themselves with certain aspects of the question, and that a few pamphlets dealing with it have appeared, chiefly in Germany, the students of ethics or sociology have not hitherto paid much attention to it.

The following observations are not based upon any special moral principle, whether of transcendentalism or utilitarianism or the principle of evolution. It is possible to agree with me, irrespective of the way in which one conceives of the genesis of the ordinary moral laws. For thousands of years the human intellect has laboured to shape the ethical constitutional laws which govern the mind and actions of men. One may conceive of these laws as the work of man, as a stage in the ordinary progress of civilisation; or as a categorical imperative with sovereign rights over human life, which needs only to be recognised ever more and more clearly. In any case we have before us a splendid intellectual achievement, which is becoming to an increasing extent the joint property of the whole human race. Speaking generally, nobody in our days is in doubt as to what is good and honourable between man and man. Lying, cheating, stealing, violence, and so forth, are not only proper subjects for the reaction of the penal laws, but also come under a common moral condemnation. And men do homage in their hearts to the great laws of brotherhood, although they may be very far from realising them in their lives.

All the more surprising is it, then, that there should be a great and important field of human intercourse, in

* Since this article was written, two essays by the late Prof. Henry Sidgwick, bearing on this subject, have been reprinted, under the title 'National and International Right and Wrong,' with a preface by Lord Bryce (Allen and Unwin, 1919).

which the applicability of the ethical laws is still regarded by the bulk of mankind as an open question. Yet this is a field with which we come in contact, so to speak, every day, and which has the greatest significance for the welfare and development of mankind. I am thinking of the Foreign Policy of States, their actions in international intercourse, trade policy, colonial policy, international controversies, treaties, war and peace.

Now it is certainly in this field that the doubt and confusion of thought are most obvious. But if we look closer, we find that this doubt and confusion really start deeper down. They actually begin at every point where men step beyond the narrowest sphere of their private life, and where co-operation with others in business and public life takes place. For, when one has to act for or on behalf of others, there come into play conflicting interests, which at times culminate in a collision of duties. One has duties both in respect of him *for* whom one is acting, and in respect of him *towards* whom one is acting. The manager of a company, for instance, may find that out of regard to the shareholders he cannot accommodate the workmen in the industry to the same extent, or act as openly and honourably towards customers or competitors, as he would have done if the business had been his own. This circumstance furnishes, indeed, one of the darker sides of the widespread application of the shareholding principle in industrial life which marks our time. The difference is perhaps still clearer in the contrast between the independent individual and the trustee. The individual is entitled to spend his whole fortune in charity if he likes; the trustee cannot do so, for he has to safeguard the rights of others. Now the Government of a State is in the position of a trustee for the nation committed to its charge.

Here may at once be seen the reason why the above-mentioned uncertainty in regard to the ethical verdict on the actions of political societies, especially of the State, occurs almost entirely in one great field of governmental activity—the international relations of the State, not its domestic functions. For there does not enter into the latter domain any collision of duties such as has been alluded to. No one is in doubt that the State

should aim at the advancement of its citizens' spiritual and bodily welfare, in its Church policy, its educational policy, its social policy; that the axioms of morality should actuate the State in its labours to promote enlightenment, to eliminate poverty, to help the weak, and to promote national welfare by means of social reforms, old-age and health insurance, employment bureaux, factory legislation, etc.

The fundamental moral laws have thus completely captured one side of the State's activity, namely, the inner. On the other hand, they have not conquered the other, the outer side—the State's activity as an international legal entity, as a member of the great society of peoples. It is here, as already indicated, that we confront a curious groping uncertainty. Practice lags infinitely behind the moral conquests of advancing civilisation in all other departments of life; and theory, as already remarked, has ventured but little into this field. Wherever it has done so, opinions are divided.

From one quarter it is asserted—with greater or smaller differences of statement—that the foreign policy of States is practically exempt from the moral laws. If States in their mutual relations are actuated by the evil motives which we condemn in individuals, such as covetousness, vanity, envy, desire for revenge, and the like, they do not, according to this view, incur the same severe censure as the individual. On the contrary, States are entitled to regard solely what is in their own interest, to satisfy their need of expansion at their neighbours' expense, to let force decide all disputes and the strong dominate the weak. In statements built up on this chain of reasoning, it is declared that international policy lies 'on the other side of good and evil,' and need not recognise a moral judgment. Societies (it is said) have no conscience; questions of foreign policy are and always must be questions of power; self-interest is decisive, and no moral consideration will, or ought to, hinder the stronger from using his power. For it follows from the law of natural selection that the strong conquers the weak; war is the only just court of appeal among peoples; and the verdict of History actually consists in this, that it confers on the State which has shown its capacity for conquest the right to rule. The conclusion

of the whole matter is, that the morality of altruism or the feeling of brotherhood can only be applied between individuals, but not between States. And this conclusion is supported by quoting one or another great statesman's motto: 'Might before right,' 'My country, right or wrong,' and the like.

Absolutely opposed to this whole line of argument is the other—perhaps now the most prevalent—according to which the actions of the individual and those of the State come under exactly the same ethical judgment. What is wrong, dishonourable, sinful for the individual man is equally so for the society, the people, the municipality or the State; to lie is to lie, whoever does it; likewise in the case of fraud, burglary, theft, murder, violence, oppression or slander; and whether it is a horse or a province that is misappropriated, whether the suppression of truth occurs in dealing with a business customer or a foreign government, the action incurs exactly the same moral judgment. And from this point of view I suppose it would be added that to kill some hundreds of thousands or millions of another State's citizens cannot at least be judged more mildly than to murder a single man.

In order to see clearly what is right and wrong here, one ought first to distinguish between the moral claims which on the one hand may be made upon single persons, princes, statesmen, diplomatists, who act on behalf of the State, and those, on the other hand, which can be made upon the State itself, considered as a willing and acting unit.

First then: Is it the duty of these single persons to act as morally in affairs of State as in their own? Here the answer may be, yes and no. Duty has both a negative side—to avoid wrongdoing; and a positive—service, self-sacrifice. One can give away only what is one's own, not what belongs to another or to the State. But one has as little right to do wrong on others' behalf as on one's own. The organ or the servant of the State comes under this law. A diplomatist who tries to deceive a foreign government, out of State considerations or by superior orders, will feel his conscience react, if it is sound. The 'necessary lie' is a very doubtful ethical

category; and the implicit excuse cannot be considered more applicable in public than in private life.

When I say that a man can only sacrifice what is his own, not what belongs to others, but has as little right to do wrong on others' behalf as upon his own, the line of demarcation thus drawn is anything but clear. To the difficulty of drawing it in practice may be ascribed the previously mentioned doubts and collisions of duties, which arise for the man who has to act on behalf of others, e.g. for the manager of a limited-liability company. The same applies to the organ or servant of the State. And another point comes in here. As the manager will, as a rule, influence the direction of the company, with the consequence that he is by no means free from responsibility for its direction, so, to a still larger extent, will be the case with the servants or organs of the State (princes, government, parliament, etc.), since these actually shape the will of the State, and act at their own discretion on the State's behalf. Therefore the investigation of the moral responsibility of individuals acting for the State blends with an investigation of the State's own relation to the claims of morality.

Can it in reality be said that any such relationship exists? In other words, can the State be considered as actually willing and acting in a responsible way? From the more modern point of view, according to which the moral claims on the State and the individual are identical, the inclination would doubtless be to deny this. One will assert, from that point of view, that to speak of the State as willing anything and as acting is a mere *façon de parler*. Only living creatures, it will be said, are able to act; and only human beings act under moral responsibility. The State is only an institution, a tool which men create under given circumstances to promote their aims. To say that the State 'acts' only means that its leaders act in order to promote their own or their fellows' interests. It is these leaders, organs, and servants who bear the moral responsibility for the State-will which they obey and the State-actions which they themselves create and carry out. And, as these persons, in the performance of their public duties, are subject to the same moral standards as they obey in private life, the identity of the State's and the individual's relation to the moral law is thereby conceded.

Yet such a denial of the State as an independent willing and acting subject does not hold on closer investigation. Of course there are many kinds of 'States,' and there are many steps in the ladder between the more arbitrary, mechanical forms of State and those which have grown naturally by a predominantly historical process. I shall, however, confine my attention to the highest of all civil or political forms of State—the national State, i.e. the ethnological, historic, linguistic unit consisting of the people or nation organised as a State. There cannot, in my opinion, be any doubt that the State so conceived is something more than an artificially formed institution, which men could, of their free will, just as well have omitted to form for themselves. This is not the place to discuss the difficult and disputed questions as to the right with which, or the sense in which, one may designate the State-society an 'organism,' a 'super-organism,' or the like. It is sufficient in the present context to note that we clearly have here to do with a power-centre, whence not merely conscious but unconscious powers emanate. I regard it therefore as equally indubitable that the nation organised as a State can rightly regard itself as a willing and acting unit, as a link in historic evolution and in the society of mankind, with its own special tasks, rights and duties. And its task, together with the right and the duty therein involved, will first and foremost be self-assertion, in the sense of the right and duty both to live its own independent life and to develop itself in every way which does not invade the interests of others.

In the national State, conceived as a unit and a historic growth, the centre of gravity lies in the nation organised as a State. Juridically, of course, every State, *quâ* legal entity, both wills and acts. But that view which sees in the State a unit historically and morally bearing the responsibility for its will and its actions is materially weakened if it be applied to any sort of conglomerate people or fraction of a people organised as a State. Certain political writers of our day would put the concept of nationality completely out of court, and proclaim the State as a concept elevated high above the nation, having the right to draw around itself all the feelings of piety associated with the fatherland, and the ability to appropriate the historical tasks associated with the race and

the nation. A protest must be entered against this. Theories of the kind merely form a transparent veil for State-egotism, which, detached from a national basis, lays the yoke of its might on foreign nationalities and seeks power for its own sake. It is the nation, the individuality of the people, which has the right of existence; detached from it, the State becomes only an artificial creation fitted to serve certain human aims, but also fitted to be changed or dissolved according as those aims alter.

If we agree in regarding the State-society in this sense, as an historic formation with its independent life and its own will and power of action, independent of that inherent in individual members of the society, then it follows that that argument fails, according to which the question whether the actions of the State are subject to the moral commandments can no longer be said to resolve itself into a question about the subjection of the acting statesman and civil servant to these commandments. We stand, rather, face to face with a new morally responsible subject—the State itself as different from the individual; and thus it is not *a priori* impossible that a different morality may hold good for the will and action of the State, or at any rate that the moral commandments may have a modified application according to the condition of the State in question and the circumstances of the particular case.

It is just this, as we have seen, that is asserted by a number of well-known sociological and political writers, whose opinion is crystallised by one of them in the saying that brotherly kindness has nothing to do with the policy of States. This assertion may be met with the observation that the burden of proof rests with those who make it. For it holds true for the moral world-order, as it holds true for the higher religions, that, when once that order is recognised, it must be regarded as universal, embracing the whole life of mankind, human affairs in general. The great fundamental law of charity is this: do unto others as you would they should do unto you. Now, if such a moral law is recognised at all, it becomes necessary, if its universal applicability be denied, to prove that unusual conditions are present which exclude it. But I have never seen any attempt to establish any

such proof. And it is difficult to see why some of the most important aspects of human intercourse, namely international relations, should lie outside the ordinary moral world-order, and be exempt from the fundamental principles of morality.

The application of these principles may indeed be different for the State and the individual, because in the case of the State there may be a collision of duties, which does not occur in that of the individual, at any rate when he acts in his own concerns. Such collisions of duties do not, however, occur, as I have said, so long as we keep to the negative side of the altruistic law: thou shalt do no wrong. That a foreign policy which leads to encroachments upon other States, acts of violence, oppression, misappropriation of their land, and so forth, must consequently incur a moral censure as severe as in the case of individual acts of violence, illegal misappropriations, etc., appears to me to be beyond a doubt. That so many respected and otherwise upright people in our time can hold the opposite, declaring that might is higher than right and that the policy of States lies outside the range of moral law, is very deplorable. It is impossible to imagine anything more reactionary, more hostile to progress, than these theories which cancel the most precious moral conquests of mankind, and take us back to barbarism and the days of club-law.

If, on the contrary, we turn to the positive aspect of the law of charity, the will to service and sacrifice; if we ask about the relation between self-assertion and self-sacrifice, I take it that we have to confess that State and individual stand in different positions, since such collisions of duty occur for the one but not for the other.

This question of self-assertion *versus* self-sacrifice belongs to the more difficult points, even where individual morality is alone concerned. How far one can go in this respect cannot be discussed here. But let us suppose that the duty of self-sacrifice is, for the individual, stretched to the utmost limit. If we accept this, we must regard the saying of Jesus about turning the left cheek when one is struck on the right cheek, as excluding all defence against unrighteous aggression; and the commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself must be interpreted as enjoining the extreme of

self-forgetting self-sacrifice to promote the welfare of others. But, even if one may make such stern ethical demands upon the individual, we are not justified in applying them to the national State, because it has duties both within and without. The individual can never sacrifice more than himself. But the nation's self-sacrifice would mean loss of happiness and of the capacity for evolution for unborn generations, treachery to the nation's historic mission, treachery to its duty towards mankind.

For the national State, therefore, it is a right and duty to assert itself, to live its own independent life, and within its own territory to develop freely all its capacities for promoting civilisation. And, whatever an ascetic morality may think concerning the individual's right of self-assertion and self-defence, one must concede the right and duty of the State-society to defend itself by force against unjust violence from without, where this cannot be warded off in some other way without the loss of indispensable ideal or material values.

This accords with the circumstance that, of the State's double function, within and without, the first must take precedence as the more important. The individual is placed in the world to work outwards; and the inner building of personality follows as the result of this outer activity. The State, on the contrary, is first and foremost required to work inwards, for the evolution of the society whereof it forms the organisation; and its significance for humanity at large develops as the result of this inner activity. The aphorism, 'Charity begins at home,' applies exactly to the State. For the individual, the great ethical commandment is service for others—self-sacrifice. For the State, on the contrary, self-assertion—within the bounds of law and equity—steps into the foreground, because this self-assertion is the condition of the service it has to perform within—of its work for national development and the good of the society. The State may of course have such a surplus of life and power, that it is able within certain limits to help other State-societies in an entirely unselfish way. It may, and ought, according to its capacity and without any recompense or advantage to itself (alas, how seldom this happens!), to seek to spread the good things of civilisation among uncivilised peoples. It may, without egotistical motives, support another

people in its struggle for freedom, or fight for the common interests of humanity. It may, without recompense, allow economic and other advantages to a neighbour State. But here we already approach the limit of the State's positive external altruism. For, where the choice lies between promoting its own or another people's welfare and development, the State must, in accordance with its position and function, prefer its own.

The result, then, of this investigation is that the State has exactly the same moral duty as the individual not to violate another's right or act inequitably towards any one; but it has not the same moral duty to help foreigners or subserve their interests. It is, however, quite clear that such general propositions do not qualify an observer to pronounce a moral judgment upon the foreign policy of a State in every concrete case that may occur. There arise in foreign policy a variety of combinations, transitional cases, *casus mixti*, in which the moral justification of the action taken may be open to doubt. I must here confine myself to indicating only one or two such cases.

Even supposing we could agree—and the preceding pages have shown, of course, that very many do not agree—that the appropriation of foreign territory by conquest is, as a rule, a national sin, yet the question may arise, whether the same can be said of the reconquest of lost territory inhabited by a national population which desires reunion with its kindred stock. It is obvious that one cannot surmount this difficulty by merely pointing to the fact that a man has the right to recover stolen goods from a thief either personally or by help of the law. For conquest in our days and among civilised people will doubtless find support in some agreement, really compulsory, but in form voluntary, which gives the conqueror the right to occupy and retain the conquered territory.

I do not believe that it is possible to lay down any general rule for the solution of this question. So much only may be said: that the time sooner or later comes when the historic fact has to be recognised as a *fait accompli*, which can no longer be revised with any moral right; and when, in consequence, an attempt at

reconquest becomes a morally objectionable encroachment, a national sin. But by that time the above-mentioned condition—the desire of the population to be reunited with their old fatherland—will presumably as a rule have ceased to exist.

What here in many cases renders the moral verdict so difficult, is that so much can be adduced politically for the rights of both parties. One side fights to heal and compensate an old amputation and to collect the national elements under that common form of State-government which will best promote their development; the other fights to retain the position of power which it has secured, and to protect itself against a weakening which would perhaps hinder it in its civilising mission. Both parties may be subjectively convinced of their political and moral right. But, if we believe at all in a moral system of the world, we must concede that, from an objective point of view, only one of the parties can have the moral right on his side. Nor must the difficulty of deciding where this right lies lead us into making the bankrupt declaration that the moral right must be left for arms to decide. A conflict may be unavoidable; but the moral right is in any case entirely independent of its result. The contrary assertion—that the conqueror proves his right by the victory itself—partly supported as it is by a misconception of the law of natural selection, is nothing more nor less than barbarism, club-law, raising its head again.

I may mention another case in which the position from an ethical standpoint may often be uncertain, viz. in colonial policy, and the attitude to be adopted towards uncivilised peoples. But it would take too much space to enter upon these difficult questions. And, whatever answer be given to them, it may safely be asserted that the subjection of other nations which are practically on the same level of civilisation, or the misappropriation or occupation, by force or threats, of territories belonging to them, will hardly bear trial by such a tribunal, but must be condemned as a national sin.

Of course the aggressive and conquering State will always adduce reasons for its action which may appear quite plausible. At one time, the pretext will be insults which in the name of national honour and prestige

cannot be left unavenged. At another, it will be pointed out that threatening armaments or alliances make necessary preventive measures which may lead to war. In the abstract, it is possible that aggressive steps, leading to occupation and conquest, can be defended on these and similar grounds. So long as States, in their disputes with one another, are subject to no international coercive authority, with unquestioned power of decision, the State which is offended or threatened in its interests may be compelled to assert its own rights against, or to punish, a State which refuses to yield to milder measures. But such an assertion of rights by a stronger State against a weaker will always be reprehensible from the point of view of strict justice, and will as a rule illustrate only too well the fable of the wolf and the lamb. Furthermore, even though we have as yet no international coercive authority, still we have come a fair distance on the way to international legal decision and adjustment of disputes. A State which really desires nothing except to obtain its clear right will in our day seldom be reduced to the necessity of violent action. And a State with a sound and awakened moral consciousness, which seriously desires only to promote right and equity and to defend its own possessions, would hardly ever adopt aggressive measures with a view to obtaining these things.

Thus we find that the line of thought, which defends the right of expansion and conquest by the stronger at the expense of the weaker, does not rest satisfied with apologetics of the above-mentioned, more external character. It probes deeper, and goes, if you will, more brutally to work, in that it extols the policy of expansion and conquest as such, when adopted by the great State, the highly organised people. It designates extension of power at the expense of others as a legitimate, indeed natural and necessary, outcome of such a people's vitality and need for development, and as an indispensable means to promote its world-historic civilisatory mission; or else it holds the alleged stagnation or decline of other nations to be a sufficient reason why such nations must give place to a more vigorous State. Then, on this foundation, there is constructed an argument for the

necessity of war—including also wars of conquest—as a stage in the evolution of human society. Speaking figuratively, war is considered as a means to suit the garment to the growing body, or—leaving metaphor—to correct the disproportion which has arisen in the course of time between the boundaries of a State and its real condition of power.

This latter argument belongs, however, more to the world of hoary theory than of reality. In other words, I do not believe that the wholly unbiassed historian can point to a single instance where such a disproportion has justified a stronger State in attacking a weaker neighbour-State. And this reasoning steadily loses its applicability, according as the boundaries of States cease to form impassable barriers for human enterprise, and as mankind discovers other means than war for solving the conflict of interests between States.

With regard more especially to the strong emphasis which is laid upon the large State's need of self-expansion and its civilising mission, in preference to others', such reasoning involves the peculiar—and suspicious—circumstance that its ability to bring conviction, when applied to a concrete case, does not as a rule extend very far beyond the limits of the conquering State in question. It will not win many adherents outside that people which employs it as a cloak for its own lust for power and its egotistical efforts to acquire the greatest possible advantages at the expense of others. Outside that people, it is much more likely that such pretensions will be rejected with the strongest protests. First and foremost, of course, it will be rejected by the State-society which is directly injured by the occupation or conquest, and which will consider its own right of self-expansion to be just as inviolable, and its own civilising mission to be just as important, as that of the conquering State. But this defence of the right of conquest will also be rejected by all impartial spectators, who will not be able to see why the one civilised nation should claim a greater right to expand or to set the stamp of its national culture on the world, than is possessed by others.

These spectators will therefore regard every attempt to elbow a way in the world at other people's expense

as a violation of the great fundamental laws of morality, which apply to all the domains of human intercourse, to States as well as to individuals. Nor will they be impressed, in such a case, by the circumstance that one State is greater and stronger than the other. For they know that the small State-societies, such as the Jewish and the Greek, have been to the full as indispensable for the development of culture as the large ones. And they know that the right to live one's own national life, unimpeded by aggression from without, rests upon inner, qualitative essentials, and is independent of any quantitative valuation dependent on size or power.

When looked at more closely, the defence of a policy of conquest built upon the great State's need of self-expansion and its civilising mission stands revealed as the expression of an egotism and over-estimation of self which is frequently found in other fields of human life. There exists a State- and community-egotism which is as narrow as individual egotism. This is sometimes overlooked, because the two ways in which individual egotism may expand—the organic and the mechanical way, so to speak—are confused. Egotism may expand into family-instinct, tribe-instinct, patriotism and universal sympathy, through an organic process of transformation in the direction of altruism. But it may also expand mechanically when two or more combine in the endeavour to appropriate to themselves common advantages, or when members of a family, a tribe or a nation support each other mutually in competition with others for power and wealth. Fellowship in a struggle inherently selfish does not make egotism less egotistical or the heart less narrow.

Bound up with this community-egotism is also an over-estimation of self. This latter is also, in the case of the community, of essentially the same sort as the over-estimation of self which occurs in the individual. The 'Superstate' views its need of expansion, its right to rule, its civilising mission, its right to set aside the ethical laws which apply for others, in the same light as that in which the 'Superman' sees his supposed unique position. Who does not know the typical politician with his mixture of unselfish desire to serve his country and his personal ambition? He also may

easily come to look at his political mission, and consequent right to rule, through a magnifying glass. If he uses morally dubious methods to win the favour of the electors or to injure his opponents, he will appease his conscience by urging the necessity of winning that position of power which will enable him to do his country the greatest service.

The difference between the position of a Superman and a Superstate, in such a case, is simply that the former is easier to see through than the latter. Human comprehension has reached a higher stage in the region of individual than in that of State morality. Where the individual man is concerned, every one with an awakened moral sense feels that it is not permissible to do wrong even to serve a good cause, and that no good is thereby gained in the long run. Jesuit morality is out of date. But conscience is not yet equally awakened in regard to national sins, partly because the very conception of the State's responsibility is so vague, partly because the sense of responsibility in the nation is weakened through being distributed among so many, partly, in fine, because patriotic feelings, which in themselves are noble, interfere with the verdict upon the foreign policy of one's country, and by suggestion render the great majority either unable to see what is unjust and aggressive and dishonourable in that policy, or cause them to cover up all this by representations regarding the higher necessity, the Superstate's civilising mission, its rightful need of expansion, and so forth.

On the whole I suppose it cannot be denied that the evolution of the morality of States in international intercourse still lags far behind the evolution of individual morality. The evolution of morality moves in this respect parallel to the evolution of law, just as law on the whole crystallises to a large extent out of morality; and the two categories stand in deep inner relation and interaction. As regards law, the line of evolution passes from national law, regulating the intercourse of individuals, to international law, regulating the intercourse of States. And the growing recognition of the great fundamentals of morality as valid for the intercourse of mankind follows the same line.

But should we not by this time have reached the

point where we recognise that State-societies cannot possibly express the highest idealism in human endeavour, unless they likewise represent the highest grade of morality which mankind has reached at any given time? There will surely be a deep inner cleavage and contradiction in the moral consciousness and intercourse of mankind, if we try to maintain a dualism in the laws for the moral conduct of life, and if that which is considered right and equitable, good and honourable in the intercourse between man and man, may be excluded from consideration so soon as the society to which one belongs steps, so to speak, outside its own front-door and comes into contact with people belonging to other State-societies. We see remnants of predatory morality, of primitive narrow tribal instincts, where the stranger is not fully recognised as a human being with human rights. But the feeling of universal brotherhood begins to dawn. The whole sum of that energy, heroic courage and self-sacrifice, which unite around the love of country, will stand in a still purer and clearer light on the day when complete harmony in the ideals of life has been attained, and the citizens of a State need no longer observe a double morality, one for his own and the other for his country's actions; on that day when it will no longer be said: 'My country, right or wrong,' but when honour and the sense of justice, fidelity to one's word and respect for the rights and interests of others, are practised to the same extent in the intercourse of States as of individuals, or when, at any rate, a sin against them is judged as strictly in the one case as in the other.

BREDO MORGENSTIERNE.

Art. 5.—THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF WOMEN IN INDUSTRY.

1. *Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry.* Parly. Paper, 1919. [Cmd. 135.]
2. *Appendices, Summaries of Evidence and Statements by Economists.* Parly. Paper, 1919. [Cmd. 167.]

THE present is proclaimed to be 'a time of reconstruction.' In its ordinary meaning, reconstruction is a process of pulling down and then building up. It is the pulling down that seems to possess, for many reformers, the greater attraction. A remarkable feature in the present process of national amelioration is the absence of effort or admission of any necessity to think things out constructively, to act with prudence, to prefer the sober to the heroic remedy, where both present themselves. With a happy optimism that has escaped the jars and bruises of experience, enthusiastic reformers attribute to that indefinite entity called Government a constructive genius and a wealth of experience in industrial matters that they would hesitate to assign to any individual Minister. They proceed on the convenient assumption that Cabinets can, by a stroke of the pen, or an Act of Parliament, successfully apply, with prescience of results, any measure of reconstruction to any industrial conditions. Another remarkable feature is the apathy of the public in regard to matters in which it is vitally interested. It seems to have dispensed with that critical faculty concerning broad essentials which on so many occasions has been the saving of the nation. It views now-a-days with a complacent tolerance tempered with amusement the visionary pitting his untried theories against experience and economic law. It appears not to realise that, in the end, it will bear the burden. When Governments, whose primal instinct is always to free themselves from organised political pressure, are stampeded into benefiting a section of the community at the expense of the taxpayers or consumers generally, the public seems impervious to a sense of injustice. Its restraint and patience, for example, under the recent 12½ per cent. political prodigality form a sufficiently convincing illustration.

But, it may be asked, why this exordium? What is its

relevance to the economic future of women in industry? The answer is, that there is no industrial matter of current moment to which it is more directly pertinent. The Government has pledged itself to bring about 'a new industrial era.' Of what that portends, no one has any very definite conception. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the Government itself has a clear idea, if one may judge from the conflict between vague and contradictory official statements. At any rate it implies an organisation of industry under which all the productive resources of the nation will be utilised to the full. It involves freedom to every member of the community to live his or her life, to develop his or her personality, to use to the best advantage his or her natural aptitude and abilities for production. But predominantly it postulates the precedence of the common good before any sectional or private interests.

To argue the necessity of increasing production is superfluous. No other means are available to rid the country of the incubus of debt, or to enable the standard of life and living of the industrial classes to be improved as they ought to be. While few will controvert the urgency of production, the public in general little appreciates the enormous latent and unutilised capacities for production possessed by the women of the nation. In any scheme for reconstruction of industry, provision, at once clear, equitable and economically sound, must be made by Government for the full and appropriate use of women's talents, skill and ingenuity. Failure in this respect would be not merely ineptitude, but a crime against the taxpayer and gross injustice to women.

It is certain that, however much the responsibility is one for political reasons to be avoided, Government will be compelled in the immediate future to assign to women a fitting place in industry. That responsibility carries within itself the seeds of mischief—hence my opening observations. There are gathering forces operating in the political world to which any Government is specially sensitive. On the one hand, there are the powerful and highly organised men's trade organisations which, especially in the case of the craft unions, are determined to resist to the utmost the permanent introduction of women into industries from which they are now

excluded, whatever be the economic justification for their admission. Their opposition takes not merely the form of forcibly warning the women off the men's preserves, though the work is well within the women's compass, but frequently the more specious subterfuge of admitting women to the work in question on terms which make it commercially impracticable to employ them on it. There is, on the other hand, a growing body of women possessed not merely with determination to enter every occupation, but fully conscious that their possession of the franchise confers upon them a potent weapon for the attainment of their ambitions. The men's trade unions have great and growing political power, but the women's trade unions and the women's party will soon attain to as great, if not greater, political influence. Unless one has been, like the writer, behind the scenes, so to speak, of both the men's and the women's movements, it is difficult to realise the determination, prejudice and fanaticism which centres round the question of women's industrial position.

No more highly controversial matter than this aspect of the women's question could confront a Government, nor one in which domestic peace, industrial harmony and efficiency in production more directly depend on a sound economic decision. Anything in the nature of an industrial sex-war would be disastrous. It was a noticeable fact that, during the war, the Government regulated the employment of women on women's own work with very remarkable success. In regard, however, to the employment of women on work that was really men's work, the Government's record is of the opposite character. It was marked by frequent indecision and precipitate surrender to the men's unions or the women's unions, as one or other at inconvenient times put on the political screw. There is a real practical danger that, if the Government procrastinates further in this urgent matter of women's position in industry, it will ultimately, under political pressure, be forced into hasty opportunist action. That would be a calamity. As a preventive, it is essential that the public, who are the final arbiters, should understand the nature of the problem and declare their judgment in no uncertain voice.

A sound national policy is vital to our national prosperity and happiness.

The intention of this article is, therefore, to explain the problem from the economic point of view, in broad outline but at the same time with balanced proportions and in due perspective. I propose, first, to investigate the industrial position of women before the war; next, to examine the position in industry to which women attained during the war; and finally, with the experience we have gained of the potentialities and defects of the industrial woman, to make an attempt to assign to women a definite economic place in the future organisation of industry.

The phrase 'industry' is used in a conventional sense. It must be understood, for the purposes of this article, to mean the various trades at present grouped in the Board of Trade statistics under the heading of 'Industry,' and such analogous trades as may in the future come into being. That is to say, the metal, chemical and textile trades; clothing, food, drink and tobacco; paper and printing; china and earthenware; skins and leather; gas, water, transport, agriculture, and so forth. As used in this article, 'industry' excludes occupations like domestic service, clerical work or teaching, merely because there is not space to discuss their special circumstances.

Those who desire to make a really profound study of the employment of women should consult the recently published report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry. The writer was a member of that Committee; and if, in any respect, of which he is not aware, his present expression of views differs from the majority report, it is his own opinion. It becomes him to speak with diffidence of the Report. This much he can say: it covers the whole field of women's employment, not merely in industry as defined above, but in commerce, teaching and other occupations.

Starting, then, with women's position in industry before the war, it will be found that there were occupations distinctly earmarked as men's trades, in which only men and boys were engaged; and others equally well defined as women's trades, in which only women and girls were employed. In many trades, however, men

and boys, women and girls, were all working. These 'composite' trades were of two main kinds: the first, those in which certain processes were assigned to women, all other work being reserved to men; the second, those in which there intervened between the men's work and the women's work a number of processes or a range of work common to both. Every highly organised industry falls into one of these three categories, a man's trade, a woman's trade, or a 'composite' trade in one or other of the foregoing senses.

The broad point to be observed is the rigid division in well-organised trades between men's work and women's work. This demarcation of work, as it is called, is the dominant feature of the pre-war position. The men's unions insist that it exactly corresponded to economic differences between the respective capacities of men and women in industry. That contention is strongly contested by the women. To some extent demarcation has proceeded on the basis of assigning to men machines and processes involving strength or skill, operations requiring protracted exertion, and rough work necessitating exposure to heat or dirt. So far as demarcation has proceeded on the principle of the reservation to men of machines, processes and work which are within the compass of a man's strength and skill and beyond those of a woman, it is economically sound and justifiable. At the same time it must be admitted that a comparatively small amount of demarcation can be so explained. The truth is that the men and their trade unions have been signally successful in staking out their claim to all the best and most highly remunerated classes of work. Around these they have erected impenetrable barriers against the entry of women. The prejudice of many employers to women workers unintentionally but materially assisted in establishing the men's ascendancy.

'Women,' said many employers before the war, 'are seldom trained to any trade.' Such scanty training as they possessed they picked up, not in the course of a formal apprenticeship, but from one another in the workshop or the warehouse. This may have been due to want of opportunity, or to knowledge that, even if trained, they would be allowed no proper scope for the exercise of

their skill, or to disinclination on the part of many women to enter industry as a permanent occupation precluding marriage. Whatever be the explanation—and it varies in different trades—one fact is clear in regard to the pre-war industrial position of women, that, although the number of women engaged in industry increased largely during the years immediately before the war, and the varieties of work and operations on which they were employed also increased, yet the classes of work and operations which had come into being, on which women could have been employed but on which no women *were* employed, had increased in a vastly greater ratio. Between 1881 and 1911, taking census periods, the proportion of men in industry rose from 43·38 to 47·59, or over 4 per cent.; while that of women rose from 15·47 to 15·96, or about 0·5 per cent. In July 1914, out of a total of 8,479,600 persons engaged in industry, 6,301,000 were men and 2,178,600 were women.

The second striking fact in connexion with the pre-war industrial position of women is, speaking generally, the dehumanising conditions under which, in many trades, they were employed. Chief among these were wages and environment. In 1916, the writer, as Chairman of the National Tribunal of Women's Wages, had to investigate and adjudicate upon the rates of wages and piece-prices paid to women engaged on women's work in numerous munitions trades. Their inadequacy, from the human standpoint, was very pronounced in certain districts. In such cases, no woman dependent on her earnings could make sure of keeping herself supplied with reasonable bodily necessities, still less of living in common decency. That many women nevertheless succeeded in doing so is a tribute to their sex.

The explanation of such insufficient remuneration is simple. It represented the pre-war market value of women's labour. There was an ample supply of women at these pittance; that was the real secret. Many women not dependent on their earnings accepted any wage offered, for pocket-money; others took it to supplement the family wage. Few entered industry as a permanent occupation; most regarded it as a temporary employment. In few cases were they organised, so that their collective bargaining power was ineffectual for

their own protection. No wonder, then, that men almost instinctively regarded women's labour as 'cheap' or 'blackleg' labour. The conditions in which women worked before the war were, relatively speaking, very inferior to those of men. Except in trades scheduled by the Home Office as dangerous, there was practically no supervision of the health of either. But, while through Trade Union pressure men were able to secure a reasonably good environment, women had no such driving force behind them. The Factory Inspectors did noble work in improving shop conditions, but what were a few inspectors among a multitude of factories? One may accurately summarise the pre-war position of women in industry by saying that it was pre-eminently characterised by a demarcation of work which handicapped severely women's potentialities, and by conditions of work which seriously impaired their physical and mental well-being.

I now pass to women's industrial position during the war. It marks a great advance in women's industrial evolution. It presents a picture of extraordinary complexity, intensified by bitter controversies that perpetually threatened their whole industrial position. The circumstances of the disputes look trivial in the retrospect of to-day. To apportion the blame on the men's unions, the women's organisations, or the Government—although an attractive diversion for one who has been engaged, like the writer, in organising women's labour from the beginning of the war—would afford no real insight into fundamentals. I shall confine myself to delineating in outline the really dynamic facts.

These show that at the end of the war, as compared with pre-war days, women had literally leapt, as agents of production, and by inherent economic powers and aptitude, into a position of eminence in the industrial world previously undreamt of even by themselves. In industry alone the number of females employed rose from 2,178,600 in July 1914, to 2,970,600 in July 1918, an increase of 792,000; and of these 704,000 were females who had directly replaced males and were doing work customarily done by men. Significant as this latter figure is, it must also be remembered that the character of the work in the 'women's' trades was fundamentally altered

by munitions requirements. In many cases, so far as precision, intricacy and workmanship were concerned, it involved a much higher standard of efficiency than the pre-war work which it superseded. Nor must it be forgotten that the whole period of the war, during which women attained to this development of powers was considerably less than the duration of the apprenticeship served in the skilled trades in normal times.

The war-time experience can with substantial accuracy be thus epitomised: on work involving severe physical effort, or prolonged strain, or exposure to exhausting conditions—and there was a certain amount of that work done by women under the dire necessity of war, which ought not to have been done by them—women in a given time did less work than men. According to the class of work, it was possible to state, after a little experience, the excess number of women required to do the work of a given number of men. On all-round skilled and jobbing work ordinarily done by a fully qualified tradesman, women were much less efficient than men. It has accordingly been urged by many employers and by the craft unions that women can never become skilled tradesmen. My experience is to the contrary. It would have been absurd to expect that a woman with little training could in a few months equal a trained craftsman. The Clyde Dilution Commission, of which I was Chairman, was the first to put women on to do skilled work; that is to say, to do particular jobs ordinarily done by skilled men. As quick as, and in many cases quicker than, youths put on at the same time, the women learnt to do the jobs efficiently. If they could do one such job, why not every job within a woman's strength and manual compass?

In point of fact, during the war, many women were promoted on merit to the responsible position of fitters and turners in the tool-room, and of 'tool-setters' in the machine-shop. The feature of war-time industry was 'mass production'—a sustained output of many kinds of similar articles, effected by specially contrived machines where the skill was in the machine and not required of the worker, or by a succession of separate operations each performed by an adept at that one operation. On such repetition work the women proved equal, often

superior, to men. They seemed temperamentally immune to the deadening effect of monotonous work, to which men on the other hand are peculiarly susceptible. Paradoxically enough, where the work required constant alertness, a sure deft touch, delicacy of manipulation, in short a combination of quick intelligence and manual dexterity within a limited ambit, women were invariably superior to men. I could give many illustrations of these facts that have come within my own experience.

On the other hand, as against these efficiencies, women exhibited during the war certain defects. They lost rather more time than men. In some cases this was due to a series of wage advances accruing at short intervals. If the standard of living lags behind the standard of wages, and the worker cannot at once assimilate beneficially an increase in wages, lost time very commonly results. That is only human nature. In the majority of cases, however, it was undoubtedly due to long hours. A reduction from a 12-hour working day to an 8-hour shift almost always improved time-keeping in the case of women workers. The increased domestic responsibilities of a woman worker with a soldier-husband at the front also tended to increase 'absence from work without notice.' Assuming, however, reasonable working hours and a fairly uniform wage, the war experience proves that, apart from the urgent call of domestic and personal exigency peculiar to the sex, there is no reason to assume in the normal working woman less inclination or ability to keep time than in the ordinary man. The general circumstance which has been mentioned and is not confined to the war-period—namely that women do not enter industry intending to remain permanently in it—discounts to some extent their industrial potentialities.

The employment of women during the war undoubtedly threw upon an employer certain expenses not incident at that time to the employment of men, for example, extra supervision, due to women's want of technical skill; but with training that would largely disappear. Then there was the cost of special canteens, cloak-rooms and lavatories for women workers. In the case, however, of men similar improvements in respect of these matters, inevitable in the near future, will tend to equalise this particular item of comparative expense

as between men and women workers. Labour-saving appliances had also during the war to be installed for the special assistance of women. If, however, such devices are available, they ought equally under progressive management to be used with a male personnel. Government wisely insisted during the war upon proper shop conditions being maintained, so far as possible, in all munition factories in which women were employed. It is obviously wrong to debit against women-labour—as many persons do—the difference between the cost of the improved and the antiquated shop conditions. The standard of men's shops after the war will undoubtedly have to be levelled up to at least that of women's shops during the war. Then, again, it is said by many employers that women soon learned to restrict production. In certain districts women drawn from working-class homes did unhappily imbibe the men's traditions. In others, unassimilable increases in piece-prices diminished the stimulus to effort; but this only occurred in the late war-weary days just before the close of hostilities.

Women's industrial record during the war is truly one of the greatest of modern economic revelations. It will be found brilliantly told in the 'History of the Ministry of Munitions,' the conspicuously able and discriminating work of Mr G. I. H. Lloyd, now nearing publication. As might be expected from an historian, who was also an eminent Professor of Political Economy in Toronto University, vital economic facts for once receive due emphasis.

Surveying the war-period broadly and balancing both sides of the account, it is unquestionably true that women have demonstrated their ability to discharge, on an economic basis, in any scheme of national industry, enormously extended responsibilities.

In our future reformed scheme of industry what, then, ought women's place to be? That question we can answer with some assurance after our survey of the past. It must obviously no longer be determined by political opportunism or temporising compromise. Still less should it be such status as the men with selfish condescension may dole out. Three master-principles should regulate women's future station in industry,

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and these can be stated quite definitely. First, women should always be entitled to such employment as is fully commensurate with their economic attributes and industrial qualifications. This concedes what is commonly called 'equality of opportunity,' repudiates the sex-prejudice by which women workers have been so unjustly handicapped, and, at the same time, discountenances the extravagant claims of certain sections of women that all kinds of artificial grades should be introduced into industry merely to assist the entrance of women. Secondly, the work at which, and the conditions under which, they are employed must be compatible physiologically and psychologically with their sex peculiarities. It cannot and must not be overlooked that women are 'the mothers of the race.' Thirdly, women must not be allowed to undercut and displace men. This is a practical danger which, if it became habitual, would be fatal to industrial concord. Without any doubt, as things are to-day, a woman of efficiency equal to a man, if obtainable—as she is in many cases—can always be secured, especially in unorganised trades, for substantially less remuneration than the man. It is imperative that this should not take place.

The first of these dominant principles is plainly no more than should be the guiding precept in any community organised under progressive economic conditions. The second and third are limitations on the extreme effects of economic forces and are essential on social grounds. Experience proves that definite legislation, backed by strong administrative action, is necessary to ensure compliance in industry with the first principle. Experience has also proved that the second also can only be enforced by legislation. The three together embrace the whole root of the matter. If a charter had to be framed to regulate for the future women's industrial activity, it would be nothing more than the elaboration of these three fundamentals into working rules.

When once root principles are disentangled, the solution of a serious industrial problem is at hand. With their aid let us now mark out within definite boundaries women's future sphere in industry. It should be three-fold. Primarily, it will comprise the trades and work which are to-day women's trades, and women's work in

composite trades. If, as is transcendently important for the future prosperity of the nation, there is to be largely increased production, there must inevitably be absorption of numerous new women operatives. That will entail modernisation and up-to-date equipment of 'women's shops,' in most of which before the war, owing to the cheapness of women's labour, many employers had never been driven to instal modern machinery or labour-saving appliances. Some 'women's shops' known to the writer were utterly incapable of efficiency. All employers, however, during the war, must have grasped the vital truth that manual labour is no substitute for 'special purpose machines' or efficient mechanical appliances. If, therefore, they are sufficiently progressive to anticipate and seize the commercial opportunities that are coming, there will be great expansion of employment in women's trades and in the whole range of women's work.

The future field of industrial work for women ought also to include many new trades and processes such as are bound to spring into being out of mechanical invention and improved methods of industrial research. There are many industries in an embryonic condition to-day. They have not been 'demarcated'; they ought to be 'no man's land'; women ought to be free to enter. The aircraft industry illustrates this point. In its pioneer stage a few skilled men, carpenters and joiners, sheet-metal workers, tinsmiths, coppersmiths and mechanics did all the work. The men, though they tried hard, were prevented from 'jumping their claim' to the industry when it attained its full development. To-day the greater part of the work of this new industry is done with striking efficiency by women; a comparatively small portion only is done by men:

Lastly, women's future industrial arena ought to embrace a very substantial admission into men's trades or men's work in composite trades, and on a definite economic basis. There is undoubtedly enormous scope for women in this direction. The chief barrier is the prejudice of the men. Were men reasonably satisfied that their security of employment, rates of wages, and piece-prices would not suffer, this obstacle might be removed. Let us follow out the process. It only awaits a full blast of production. There would then be urgent

need for an immense supply of labour, and for instant remodelling of workshop organisation in order to effect simplification of process and standardisation of work—the normal practice in the United States of America and the war-time phenomenon in Great Britain. Then, if only the devastating hostility between the skilled men and the semi-skilled and unskilled men, and their combined antipathy to women workers, could be eliminated, this is the course events would take. Every man in each industry would be advanced to the most skilled work within his powers. To meet the shortage of male labour, unskilled women would have to be brought in to operate such machines and to undertake such processes as they could learn with reasonable expedition. This was the method of industrial evolution during the war, but on a non-economic basis. Output was then everything, and cost comparatively unimportant. The real circumstance conditioning the admission of women into men's occupations is production. It guarantees employment to the men; it enables, as will later be shown, wages to be paid to the women which are not subversive of the men's trade-union rates. Not merely does production assist, but it is itself dependent on, the admission of women into industry, as a condition of efficiency and of low cost of output. With sustained production and with women admitted into men's trades and into men's work as a normal incident, complete arrangements would be necessary for women's technical training. That would be indispensable for their progress; in some industries a definite apprenticeship would be required.

The second general principle postulates that, side by side with equal economic opportunity for women as for men, provision must be made that the work on which and the conditions under which women are employed are suitable physiologically and psychologically to their sex. The physiological characteristics for which allowance must be made are described in a most able monograph by Dr Janet M. Campbell, published in the Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry; and in it the detrimental effect on women's health of inappropriate employment is scientifically explained. Three radical physiological differences distinguish the woman worker from the man: first, her inferior physical

strength, her lower power of endurance, her smaller reserve of energy; secondly, her potential or actual motherhood. As a consequence, women can never compete with men in industry on absolutely equal terms. Two other facts have also to be recognised: one, that most women workers have a great mass of domestic duties to perform, and, whatever their industrial work may be, will insist on performing them regardless of the resultant drain of the combined exertions upon their health; the other, that women not only consume less food than men but, to a degree far surpassing the capacity of men, can and will stint themselves in food in order to save money.

There are also some important psychological facts that have come prominently under the writer's observation. Women workers are exceedingly susceptible to their environment; amid dirty, noisy, distasteful surroundings their output goes down at once; if, under such conditions, their output is forced, it reacts injuriously upon their health. To guard against these dangers it is necessary, first and foremost, to make sure that women receive adequate remuneration. The pre-war real rates of wages must be prevented from returning. It is indeed impossible to devise an abstract formula for fixing the wages of women or any other class of industrial workers; too many economic factors affect the calculation. This, however, can and ought to be ensured: every woman worker should receive a minimum wage, sufficient to cover, for a single woman, lodging within a reasonable distance of work, clothing, dietary, fares to and from work, insurance, trade union subscriptions, with a fair addition for amusements, comforts and the amenities of life. Whether it should be a national, a district, or a trade minimum, and the still more debatable question whether maternity grants, contributory or non-contributory, State or industrial, should be paid—these are details which we cannot discuss here.

Next in importance to wages come women's working conditions, that is to say, hours, environment and so forth. There should be no difficulty in getting proper conditions fixed by agreement in each industry, subject to Government control. In any event there must be a substantial enlargement of the Factory and Workshop

Acts, so far as women workers are concerned, in regard to the matters emphasised by Dr Janet Campbell, viz. (a) hours of work, including intermittent spells and pauses, overtime, and night-work; (b) the provision of seats, labour-saving devices, etc., to avoid unnecessary fatigue; (c) improved sanitation, i.e. sanitary conveniences, lavatories, cloak-rooms, etc., ventilation and general hygiene; (d) the provision of canteens, rest-rooms and surgeries; (e) the general supervision of health. This will require an increased staff of Home Office Factory Inspectors—a change which has long been wanted. Employers may object to such control, but times have changed since Halifax employers described the first Bill to limit the employment of women and children as the death-blow to British industry, and since John Bright thundered against the ten-hours' Bill of 1847 as 'one of the worst measures ever passed.' The writer has seen during the war the health of women workers and their output in the munition factories advanced materially by the introduction of proper wages, proper conditions and proper health supervision; and it always will be so. In the allocation to women of work suitable to their strength, powers and aptitude, there is no great difficulty. This was one of the writer's duties during the war. It can in each trade be done effectively by Whitley Councils, subject to the supervision of the Factory Inspectors.

The third root principle governing the future of women in industry is that they should not displace or undercut men. I have expressed my view that with increased production there is room and need for both. But undercutting is a more subtle matter. That danger will always recur, owing to the ample supply of women. Undercutting can only of course occur in the case of women entering 'men's trades' or doing men's work in composite trades. To prevent it the men have raised the claim of 'Equal pay for equal work.' It is not possible within the limits of this article to enter on the metaphysical tangle into which that topic has degenerated. The matter can nevertheless be explained quite simply. Some sections of men, notably those engaged in the skilled trades, claim that any women put on to do the whole or any part of the work customarily

done by a man should, irrespectively of her efficiency or output, be paid the same time-rates as are paid to the men. That claim is made with a twofold intention: first, to keep women out of the trade altogether, as it undoubtedly would; secondly, to prevent any lowering of the men's standard trade rates of pay. Such is the skilled workman's idea of 'equal pay for equal work.' But most women advance the claim in a different sense, namely that women put on to do the whole or any part of the work of a man should receive, in respect of so doing, the whole of the men's time-rate, if women's efficiency is equal to that of men, and, if not, a rate of pay based on the proportion which women's efficiency bears to that of men. This is the average woman worker's idea of 'equal pay for equal work.' Her intention is also twofold: to eliminate sex-prejudice and to secure 'justice.' The men's rejoinder is that the relative efficiencies of men and women can with difficulty be ascertained, and that employers would continually be altering the conditions under which the work was done by women as compared with men, in order, ostensibly on the ground of simplification, to lower the rate of wages to be paid to women, and ultimately to bring down the men's trade rates for the work in question.

The writer can, however, say that even on the Clyde he found himself able, with the assistance and concurrence of employers and men and women, and to their mutual satisfaction, to determine approximately the relative average efficiencies of women as compared with men. If for given efficiency or output the employer is paying the woman rateably on the man's time-rate, there is no inducement to the employer to prefer women to men, and therefore no question really of 'cheap labour.' Curiously enough, men admit the propriety of payment proportioned to output in the case of piece-work. They then insist, as a rule, that a woman doing, on piece-work, work customarily done on piece-work by a man shall receive the man's piece-prices. If she does only half the work of the man, she will naturally be paid only half the man's earnings. This the men accept as fair, nor do they regard it as being in any way subversive of the piece-prices established in their trades.

This latter sense—namely payment in proportion to

output—is that in which the principle of equal pay for equal work has been endorsed by the War Cabinet Committee on Women in Industry. There are naturally, in practice, many complicated cases to which the principle as so defined is difficult of application, but its essential intention is quite clear. It is more in favour of the men than appears at first sight, for a woman doing a particular part of a man's work receives for a man's output the full rate of pay earned by a man. But the man is able to do that job and many other jobs; the woman may be able to do the one job only. In conceding to the woman the full trade rate for each job of the trade, the man's general trade position is therefore safeguarded. The principle to be followed precludes any reduction of a woman's pay on account of the greater costliness (in the matter of establishment charges) of employing women due to the causes described earlier in this article.

In conclusion, the writer must in fairness inform his readers that in hastening, as he has done, across the widely extended subject of women's future economic sphere in industry, he has turned aside from the commonly trodden and tortuous paths and tried to beat out a new straight path over uplands with commanding view-points. He hopes that from it the landmarks have clearly been discerned standing out above the mists. On it—to their advantage, he thinks—his readers have been remote from the clash of conflicting battle-cries and catch-words. None of these assists clear thinking. They merely witness that to many working men the subject is one of dark foreboding and to vast numbers of working women an uplifting aspiration, but they warn the public to inform themselves upon the national issues that are involved, even if only for the purpose of steadying the Government.

LYNDEN MACASSEY.

Art. 6.—THE ECONOMICS OF INLAND TRANSPORT.

1. *First and Second Reports of the Select Committee on Transport.* H.M. Stationery Office. [Cd. 130, 136.] November 1918.
2. *Four Reports of the Royal Commission on Canals and Waterways, with Appendices.* H.M. Stationery Office. [Cd. 3183, 3716, 4839, 4979.] 1906-10.
3. *Interim Report of the Coal Industry Commission.* [Cd. 84-86.] March 1919.

THREE points in space require only three lines of inter-communication, six points require fifteen lines, twelve points require sixty-six lines, and so on. The network of lines increases nearly in proportion to the square of the number of localities. If the localities increase from 100 to 200, the lines of communication increase from 4950 to 19,900. If, then, we suppose that each of these lines is of measurable breadth, it becomes clear that a stage will be reached when the whole of the intervening space will be covered with lines of transport, leaving no area available for any other of the elementary purposes of existence except that of traffic alone.

The problem of transport, therefore, raises no difficulty until population reaches a certain density. One footpath sufficed for the cottages on Darnell Waste, but six roads intersect Darnell Park; and the river, which once was crossed by one wooden bridge, is now nearly hidden from view by half a dozen stone viaducts. Before each of these was erected there had intervened a time when the problem of transport became acute; it had become a necessity either that traffic should be regulated or that new lines of communication should be established.

Granted the increasing urgency of transport problems, it is desirable to consider whether any general principles are discoverable whereby these problems can be attacked. What kinds of transport are there to be provided for, and how can they best be dealt with so as to harmonise individual needs with the convenience of the community? We may distinguish five kinds of transport, to one or other of which classes all movement of commodities may be assigned :

(a) Transfer from place of origin to place of manufacture, or from place of production to place of consumption.

(b) Transfer from one process of manufacture to another.

(c) Transfer from factory to seller (wholesale).

(d) Transfer from seller to consumer (retail).

(e) Mere removal.

It seems obvious that of these five classes the first is of paramount importance. The progression from producer to consumer is a vital part of the economic organism. It might suit the purposes of political economists of the classical school to assume that the producer has in all cases a consumer at hand ready to absorb his product at the market price; but, as a matter of fact, the consumer has now retired into the distance, and is to be approached only through byways guarded by toll-gates where sit the intermediaries of commerce taking toll of all goods that pass. Classes (b), (c), and (d) are largely concerned with forms of transport which are non-essential. They add nothing to the value of the article but frequently detract from it. Individual convenience often determines the course of commerce. The maker of an article finds it more convenient to have dealings with a few people personally known to him than to discover for himself the ultimate purchaser. He thus prefers to make contracts for the exclusive rights of sale and purchase for a certain period or over a certain area; and under these contracts the goods are delivered in bulk to be afterwards split up into smaller consignments.

This system is responsible for much waste of energy. For instance, a large consignment of Manchester goods reaches the wholesale dealer in the congested Cripple-gate district of London, where it blocks for hours the streets wherein Shakespeare and Milton once lived. There it remains until it is split up into parcels and sent in different directions, the larger part of it perhaps retraversing the route by which it came and finding ultimate purchasers in the North of England not far from its place of origin. From the point of view of the community at large such a process is not merely unnecessary but positively harmful, since it interferes with traffic which is really essential, enhances the ultimate

price of the goods and frequently has a prejudicial effect on their quality. Nor is it necessary to the business of the individual merchant whose ends it is supposed to serve. Goods which are intended to change hands several times need not be actually delivered until the ultimate purchaser is discovered. The methods of the Baltic or the Stock Exchange, whereby cargoes or shares are sold many times over without actual delivery, are no less applicable to dry goods or hardware; and much of the traffic which blocks the streets of great distributing centres might be economically represented on paper in the form of warrants and delivery orders, the goods themselves not being moved until their ultimate destination is known.

The coal trade is that which gives rise to the greatest amount of traffic. If the coal of Britain could be converted into power at the pit-mouth, three-quarters of the railway sidings would become unnecessary. In this case also customs which have grown up in the trade tend towards a block of traffic. It is necessary, of course, that loaded trucks should stand at a port until the ship's bunkers are ready to receive them. But it is not necessary that a merchant should be able to keep a number of loaded trucks standing on the lines for six months until he finds a purchaser at a better price. Nor is it necessary that coal should be carried by rail at all when it can be carried far more economically by canal.

These irregularities and excesses of transport have arisen naturally out of a course of free commercial intercourse; nor do they become noticeable until they conflict with equality of freedom for all alike. But, as the density of population increases, it is inevitable that such conflict should arise. A point is reached at which traffic control becomes necessary if chaos is to be avoided; and the necessity has long been recognised and the control provided in the streets of our large towns, in the approaches to public buildings and upon occasions of public resort. The more serious consideration has now arisen whether a similar system of control should not be exercised over the movement of goods in general throughout the country.

This question cannot be considered without reference

to the existing resources or means of transport and the manner in which they have been dealt with in the past. The whole history of our inland transport extends no further back than a century and a half, before which all conveyance of goods was effected by pack-horses traversing roads which were barely distinguishable from sheep-tracks. Almost simultaneously began the improvement of roads and the construction of canals; a good mail service had barely been established on the new main roads when the first line of railway was laid; and Brindley's canal plans had only been partially worked out when the Liverpool and Manchester line was opened for traffic. As each of these methods appeared, it was regarded as completely superseding all that had gone before, with the result that for the last seventy years the railway has had a practical monopoly of long-distance traffic.

The immediate effect of the construction of canals was a great reduction in the cost of transport, due, of course, to the elementary fact that a horse can draw on a canal from six to eight times the weight that it could draw on a good road. The canal companies were able to quote rates of transport which seemed amazingly moderate to those who had been accustomed to cart or horse hire; and not only so but they were able to pay dividends to their shareholders ranging from 20 to 50 per cent. and in some cases to nearly 100 per cent. per annum. Many shareholders had received their original investment several times over before the railway menace became serious and the crash came. If the State had purchased the canal system before that date, it would have had to pay 40 millions sterling for what could now be acquired at less than six millions.

As soon as the London and Birmingham line was opened, the public made up its mind that canals were obsolete. Many of the new lines ran side by side with canals, whose owners were only too glad to dispose of them to the railway company. Thus about half of the total canal mileage fell into the hands of the railways, which have since been free from external competition.

The story of the decline of canals and the advance of railways is too familiar to be repeated here. The salient features from an economic standpoint are as follows:

(a) Two canal companies in the coal districts which are themselves carriers of goods flourish exceedingly and succeed in carrying goods with profit at a rate which a railway company could not approach.

(b) The effect of the disuse of their own canals has been very prejudicial to the railway companies. A large capital expenditure has been incurred in the provision of additional lines and sidings for the accommodation of traffic which could have been carried more economically by their own canals. Evidence was indeed furnished to the Royal Commission showing that one railway company had thrown away 300,000*l.* a year by the non-usage of a canal in their own occupation.

(c) Of the different kinds of traffic carried on by railway companies only one portion, namely the passenger traffic and the goods carried by passenger train, shows a really satisfactory profit. That part of the revenue pays the expenses and provides the dividend, thereby concealing the fact that the ordinary goods train barely covers its expenses, and that the mineral traffic is run at an absolute loss. This result is partly to be attributed to the fact that slow locomotive traction is mechanically uneconomical. Each method of traction has its own definite speed of maximum efficiency, and that of the locomotive is about thirty miles an hour; at speeds above and under that rate there is an inevitable waste of energy. But the absence of profit in goods haulage is far more due to the inefficient management whereby nine-tenths of the life of a goods engine is spent in shunting and 95 per cent. of the life of a wagon is consumed in idleness.

(d) The unrestrained manner in which the various railway systems grew up is largely responsible for their present unsatisfactory position. Any scheme was sanctioned by Parliament, so long as it could show adequate financial backing. Opposition came purely from land-owning interests or from rival and competing lines; and there was no supervision in the interest of the community at large. Consequently the extent of mileage is in excess even of present requirements; and, as a further consequence, a substantial part of the capital stock of the railway undertaking represents merely the outlay originally required to buy off opposition or the expenses of subsequent litigation. The railway interests, by their

predominance in both Houses of Parliament, have for more than half a century been able to stifle all opposition to their monopoly. It was they who, sixty years ago, secured the passage of an Act which fixed the road-tolls for a steam-waggon at a prohibitive figure, and another Act which compelled the employment of a pedestrian with a red flag to walk in front of any vehicle driven by a steam-engine. Thereby they closed road traffic to all except horsed vehicles. It was they who, by the disuse of their own canals, compelled the neglect of all other canals communicating with them, thereby diverting traffic to their own lines and causing an immense and unnecessary extension of permanent way and sidings and an inflated capital expenditure, representing much injury to many localities and a permanent burden on the nation.

(e) The expenses of railway traffic will in the future be increased by the enhanced price of fuel and labour. On the other hand, there are economies to be effected in the amalgamation of different companies leading up to the abolition of the clearing-house, the reduction in Boards of Directors, the separation of express traffic from goods traffic and thorough reorganisation of the latter, the reduction in clerical staff, the abolition of separate engine-building shops, the electrification of all suburban systems, etc.

(f) After half a century of monopoly the railways have now to meet the revived competition of the road. For short distances the petrol-driven vehicle is already an important competitor. It may be that this particular form of fuel is destined to a brief existence, if, as experts estimate, the visible supplies of petroleum provide for only thirty years' consumption; but there is reason to believe that gas, coke, alcohol, benzol or electric driven vehicles will play an important part in the future of locomotion even if mineral-oil deposits fail. In any case the roadways are and will remain the prime means of transport. They alone possess the advantage of carriage from door to door without unloading. They alone furnish the means of despatching goods at any hour without reference to time-table. They alone are immediately available for any new method of propulsion which may hereafter be invented. Whatever advantages the air

may possess in speed, it can never compete in weight-carrying with a road-motor.

(g) Our existing resources of locomotion and transport may shortly be supplemented by new methods. The mono-rail is one of many devices in the experimental stage. Even the wheel itself is not necessarily the last word in progression. New methods on land, at sea and in the air have to be reckoned with among our methods of transport.

These being our available resources, how are they best to be managed in the interest of the community? So far as the roadways are concerned, they are already dedicated to the public. The canals, in so far as they are in serviceable condition, are free for use, subject only to the payment of tolls. The railways, on the other hand, are private carriers, occupying exclusively their own lines of transport.

The treatment of the subject of canals during the last sixty years constitutes a blot on our reputation as a commercial nation. Three times has an agitation arisen calling for their revival. A Parliamentary Committee is appointed, takes voluminous evidence, arrives at the conclusion that the matter is one of great importance, and finally recommends that another body should be appointed with ample powers of deliberation. The Royal Commission of 1906, which sat for four years and published eight volumes of evidence and statistics, eventually recommended—not for action but for consideration—a scheme for the reconstruction of the four 'cross-ways' canals; but hardly was the last volume of the Report in the hands of the public when a Select Committee of the House of Commons (1918) threw cold water on the scheme and recommended minor methods of improvement. From all this it might be inferred that the matter is one of extreme difficulty, but that is not really the case; it is no more difficult than many questions that have been settled during the time this has been under discussion. The difference lies no doubt in this, that these were questions demanding speedy action, whereas the canals could be put aside for further consideration, and they have therefore been put aside.

The Select Committee of 1918 is undoubtedly right in

throwing cold water on the plan for continentalising our canal system at an expense of thirty or forty millions sterling. There is very little to be learned from French or German experience that is applicable to the condition of these islands, where there are no vast plains to be traversed and no large rivers to connect. The advocates of 100-ton or 300-ton barges rely entirely on continental experience. Putting that experience aside as inapplicable, there remains only the argument that the larger barges are more readily handled when the tidal portion of the journey is reached. Certain difficulties arise in dealing with a string of small barges in a rough tideway. That is true, but the answer is that, as a matter of fact, the difficulties are met and overcome; and it is certainly not worth while to embark on a large capital expenditure for the sake of avoiding them. So far as our own canal experience goes, trains of smaller barges are towed and managed more economically than separate barges of larger dimensions. On the Aire and Calder Canal thirty 40-ton barges are towed as a train and are managed by four men, whereas twenty-eight men are required for the same tonnage in separate barges. Substituting 25-ton or 30-ton barges for those at present in use, the same result might be achieved on any of the 'cross' canals when they are put in good working condition.

There are indeed certain special economies incident to a large-section canal, such as the possibility of maintaining a higher speed; but essentially all the advantages of water-carriage over road- or rail-carriage can be attained on our present smaller waterways. The advantages are these:

(a) The vehicle weight is much less; the railway truck weighs as much as the load it carries; the barge carries five or six times its own weight.

(b) The cost of construction of rolling stock is at least five times the cost of barges to carry the same load.

(c) The power required to draw a certain weight on the canal is only one-fifth part of the power required to draw the same weight on the rail.

(d) As to maintenance of permanent way, the cost per mile exceeds four times the cost necessary for canal maintenance.

(e) Subsidiary economies, not to be exactly estimated

but very real in their effects, are that canal traffic is carried on with the minimum of damage to goods, and that the capacity for extension of traffic is practically unlimited.

These are advantages which can all be realised on our existing canals without any radical reconstruction. On the Grand Junction route to the Humber all that is needed is the widening of the Watford locks, or the substitution of a lift with a few minor improvements, the total cost of which would probably not exceed 1,500,000*l*. What is needed here is not larger canals but regular traffic on the existing canals; and, if a capital expenditure of forty millions sterling is necessary to enable a 100-ton barge to traverse the system, it is quite clear that no private corporation would contemplate such an outlay for such a purpose.

The real remedy is to be sought elsewhere. When Stephenson laid down the Stockton and Darlington line, he had in his mind the idea that railway lines would be laid down throughout the country, and that private traders would use them. If the lines had remained in that condition, they would be in the state in which the canals now are. The railway companies found it necessary to become carriers and run their own trains. The canal companies must now run their own trains of barges according to a time table, and traffic will flow in to them as it did to the railways when they became regular carriers.

This necessarily presupposes the unification of canal management, but it by no means implies State ownership. There already exists in the Grand Junction Canal a body capable of forming the nucleus of an organisation which would gradually acquire the canals that are worth acquiring and working. Suppose the State were to lend to the company the amount necessary to repair their principal canals connecting Thames and Humber, to double the Watford locks, to erect requisite warehouses and equip the line for regular transport, on condition that the company should undertake to establish a regular daily service of trains of barges between Brentford and Goole, and upon the further condition that all excess profits of working should be devoted to the reduction of tolls. Two years' experience of the working would in all probability enable the company to formulate a plan

for acquiring and working other canals in like manner. There would be nothing in such a scheme to interfere with the private barge-owners, who under the name of 'bye-traders' or 'free-traders' are accustomed to use the canals. They would still be able to exercise their calling and they would profit by the change, for the provision of motor-power by the company would enable them to attach their barges to the train, at a cost less than the present expense of towage.

The form of traction is an engineering detail of great importance but need not be decided at once. As a speed of from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 miles an hour cannot be exceeded with advantage on narrow canals, horse-traction is not to be lightly set aside; and, if coal is to cost in future two or three times its pre-war price, horses would doubtless be more economical than steam. The figures of actual results given by Mr Bartholomew from his experience on the Aire and Calder Canal put the cost of horse-haulage at one-fifth of a penny per ton-mile as against one-seventh of a penny per ton-mile for steam haulage. The latter figure would now of course be considerably higher. The full measure of economy obtainable from steam traction is not shown unless a long train of barges can be towed at a fair speed by one tug. Under favourable conditions, mineral traffic has been hauled on the Aire and Calder at $\frac{1}{110}$ th part of a penny per ton-mile. This cannot be attained on our existing canals, but it serves to show the importance of conducting traffic by trains instead of isolated barges. It is quite within the power of our canal engineers to design a form of long and narrow tug, with a central paddle wheel protected on both sides, towing a string of barges closely connected stem to stern. Such an arrangement would avoid all injurious waves and would permit an increase of speed on the narrowest canal, while it would utilise to the full the power of the steam or heavy oil engine.

But in the meantime considerable economy might be effected by the use of mules instead of horses. The mule is capable of performing two-thirds of the work of a horse while consuming only half the provender, and in all probability a team of mules towing a train of narrow barges would be found more economical than any other form of towage at present available.

The objection raised by railway experts, that speed is essential to modern traffic conditions, rests partly on a delusion, and may be answered by the observation that, so far as goods traffic is concerned, the railway companies themselves do not fulfil the requirement. The average speed of a goods train in a cross-country journey falls short of five miles an hour. An experiment on this point was tried during the sitting of the Canal Commission in 1907. Lord Farrer and Mr H. F. Killick ordered two consignments of coal, one by rail and one by canal, to be sent from a Midland colliery to Godalming. The canal route passed over nine different navigations, and two and a half days were wasted in waiting for a tug, so that the conditions were decidedly adverse to the canal. Nevertheless the speed by rail worked out at one mile an hour, and the speed by canal 1.08 mile per hour. The cost worked out at 0.711*d.* per ton-mile for rail and 0.663*d.* for canal. Thus it appears that, even under adverse conditions, the canal is about as quick (or as slow) as the railway and costs less, while it is safe to say that with proper management the canal cost could be reduced to one-fourth of its present level.

There is one great advantage which canal has over rail, and that is that the barge can stop anywhere and take up or deliver anywhere on the line of route. Regular traffic on a canal in course of time encourages the growth of industries on the banks. Its tendency therefore is to distribute an industrial population along the line of route, in contrast to the tendency of the railway, which intensifies the crowding together of the industrial population in dense masses round a terminus or a large station. It is impossible to say how much might have been contributed to the well-being of our population if the canal companies had followed the example of the railway companies and established a regular goods service; it is quite certain that the financial results would have been such as to place them in a better position than are the railway companies at the present moment. For it is from the user of their land adjoining the waterway that a canal company should look to its ultimate profit. Tolls are a precarious source of revenue, and inevitably tend to extinction; but with each reduction in the tolls the advantage of contiguity

to the waterway increases and the adjoining land rises in value. Recent experience here and abroad tends to show that no inland canal is likely to pay directly, but that almost any canal can be made to pay indirectly.

These considerations point to one work of importance which might now be undertaken in the construction of new waterways. There is one part of England, and one only, which is supremely adapted for internal navigation, namely East Anglia. Rennie, Telford and Brindley designed no new canals for this region because they considered it already endowed by nature with navigable waterways; and so it was, and still would be, but for human neglect. Three rivers, the Welland, the Nene, the Ouse, drain an area larger than the Thames basin; and their water-supply is increasing while that of the Thames is diminishing. Time was when the ports of the Wash, Boston and Lynn, ranked next to London in importance; and on the Wash there might be made a seaport greater than either Antwerp or Hamburg. So far as the inland navigation is concerned, the works of primary necessity are not of heroic size, nor need they entail gigantic expenditure. About twelve miles of canal would connect Oakham with Stamford and Leicester with the Wash; a similar length of canal from Newport Pagnell to Bedford would connect the Grand Junction Canal with the Ouse; and the straightening and cleansing of the Nene river from Northampton to Peterborough would furnish a third route from the Midland manufacturing districts to the sea. The work would be of far greater importance to the trade of the country as a whole than the enlarging of the 'cross' canals, and it could be accomplished at a fraction of the cost. Here are five hundred miles of navigable waterway, along which local industries would develop, if assured of direct water communication both with the rest of the country and overseas. The difficulties in the way of its realisation are legal, not engineering. A mass of separate authorities, mutually antagonistic, have to be unified or swept away. The area must be dealt with as a whole, as a problem of water conservation, of drainage, of flood prevention, and of navigation; and the proper authority for the purpose seems to be

a body representing the County Councils of Huntingdon, Cambridge, Bedford, Northampton, Rutland, and Lincoln. The prosperity of these counties will be increased by the work, and they are primarily interested in its success. The Huntingdon Council showed its interest in the matter years ago by fighting a legal battle—unfortunately without success—in defence of the right of navigation on the Ouse. Why should they not now invite the other Councils to join them in submitting a plan to Parliament for reviving the water communications of East Anglia?

The provision of a new seaport in the Wash may not seem so urgent a necessity in the interests of Inland Transport; but, in fact, Inland Transport is inseparable from Ocean Transport, and in an island community the one must determine the other. The convergence of the three East Anglian waterways in the Wash points out the natural site for a seaport. Conversely the establishment of a seaport there will determine the flow of traffic and the growth of industry along the line of the three waterways. It is, in any case, high time that Britain had a new seaport, and a seaport specially designed not for ocean greyhounds and other passenger liners but for the ocean tramp and the small trader. Liverpool is becoming antiquated in its ways, and has neither time nor space to devote to the smaller items of trade. Manchester, splendidly equipped as it is, will shortly become fully occupied with the products of its own industry. The new developments on the Thames do but emphasise the necessity for a port which the smaller traders could have to themselves, where they would be free from the burden of tolls which have been swollen by the necessity of great engineering works required to accommodate vessels of the largest tonnage.

There is no reason why the tramp should pay for the ocean liner. All she wants is a good harbour where she can be speedily loaded and unloaded, and where she has not to pay port dues inflated by the requirements of more aristocratic vessels. The "ocean greyhound" may strike the popular imagination as the highest development of marine engineering, but its national importance is insignificant in comparison with that of the ordinary tramp; and the effect of altering our docks and harbours

to suit the needs of the leviathans is a serious tax upon our shipping trade as a whole. The Wash would provide a port which would be free from any temptation to entice these costly luxuries of ocean transport, and perhaps it would encourage what is one of our pressing needs at the moment—the revival of the sailing vessel.

The foregoing brief survey of our existing means of transport leads to certain general considerations. In the first place, the main objects to be attained are:

- (a) reduction in the cost of transport;
- (b) reduction in the amount of transport by the avoidance of all unnecessary re-handling;
- (c) regulation of routes separating swift traffic from slow, and the transport of heavy goods and raw material from the transport of light goods and passengers;
- (d) the utilisation, to their full capacity, of all existing means of communication; and
- (e) the discovery of new means of locomotion.

There is not one of these aims which could not be achieved by a Board of Control exercising absolute powers over inland traffic. State ownership of the means of transport would not in itself afford the slightest assistance towards the attainment of any one of these fundamental objects. It has been commonly supposed that the experience gained during war conditions has emphasised the necessity for State ownership. If so, such evidence is not yet forthcoming. What has been made known tends to the opposite conclusion. Economies in working, diminution of wasteful transport, diversion of traffic into more economical directions, have been effected, but they have been accomplished by arrangement with existing carrying powers or by regulating the purchase and sale of goods. For instance, the purchaser of artificial manure has been compelled to order from the nearest dealer instead of having it consigned to him from his usual merchant in a more distant county. Thereby, in this one trade alone, some hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling have been saved in avoiding unnecessary haulage, while the producer obtained his market and the consumer his supply, and no one was a penny the worse. But it will not escape observation that State ownership of the railways

would not have facilitated this result in any way. Such a result could have been attained only by the State exercising its powers under the Defence of the Realm Regulations and constituting itself the sole wholesale buyer and the sole retailer.

Nor is there any justification in the experience of other countries for the expectation that the railways would under State ownership be managed with more advantage to the community. Every measure of economy which the Government could adopt is within the power of the companies themselves; and it needs but the stimulus of Parliamentary pressure to persuade them to adopt it. If, for instance, the companies were told that no railway company need apply for further Parliamentary powers until it had utilised its own canals to their full capacity, the canals would be revived. State action is much more efficient when wielded in the form of control than in the form of management. The type of efficient control is the policeman who raises his hand at the cross-roads; no one would suggest that the municipality had better own the vehicles and conduct the traffic itself.

Furthermore, experience has shown that State ownership tends to increase working expenses. The Swiss railways now cost five times as much as they did when the Federal authority took them over. The same tendency is already discernible in France; and indeed it may be regarded as a general rule applicable to all industries. Even in Prussia we find the State coal-mines of Saarbrücken worked at a loss; the neighbouring private mines of Westphalia undersell them, while giving better conditions to the workers and dividing considerable profits. In our own country the Committee on Retrenchment report that

‘they have been impressed with the fact that, of all the numerous services managed by the Post Office, hardly one shows any profit except the letter post. The history of the telegraphs is most unsatisfactory; and, as regards the telephones the profit now derived from the whole system appears to be less than the payment which the National Telephone Company used to make by way of royalty to the State.’

A Board of Control, to be adequate and efficient, should be the very opposite of a large Government

department. It should rather resemble the Committee of Public Safety or the Venetian *Dieci*, being composed of a few persons only, having no staff, engaging in no correspondence or minuting, sitting continuously, acting in close co-operation with the general managers of all existing railway and other companies concerned in transport, and having absolute dominion over every kind of inland locomotion. Their general instructions from the State would be to order the diversion of any traffic which is found to interfere with the primary interests of the community, to direct goods to be conveyed between any particular points by one route instead of another, and the like. They would have in each important centre a representative to act as transport officer. They would receive and investigate complaints from all quarters, but they would enter into no discussion. Their orders would take the form, 'From and after . . . all mineral traffic between . . . and . . . shall be conducted by canal and not by rail,' or 'From and after . . . goods traffic on the main line between . . . and . . . shall be suspended between the hours of . . . and . . . every day until further notice.' But their more important function would be to collect information and to formulate a general plan for the better regulation of traffic generally throughout the kingdom.

For the first year or two their orders would probably be comparatively few and limited to points of detail. But the scope of their ultimate action would be far wider. With the experience acquired they would be able to decide upon measures of greater importance. They would be able to redistribute the whole railway traffic, separating goods traffic from express passenger traffic, perhaps closing portions of permanent way to one or the other class of traffic, and generally compelling the railway, canal and road systems to work together as one unified enterprise.

The mere existence of such a body as this would inevitably lead to the amalgamation of railway companies so far as their working was concerned, if not their ownership also. Such an amalgamation would be attended with important economies, of which the abolition of separate directorates would be the least. The Railway Clearing House with its machinery for tabulating

worthless statistics would naturally disappear. The maintenance of separate engineering shops for building locomotives at perhaps double the cost of private works would also disappear. The rival collecting stations and ticket offices would be merged into one. Advertising expenses and devices for attracting traffic from one line to another by rebates or otherwise would become unnecessary. All these objects are quite capable of attainment by the able body of men who already manage the lines; they need but a stimulus, and that stimulus would be supplied by the existence of a Board of Control.

There are two important points in which the direct assistance of the State is necessary. One is the discovery, trial and improvement of new methods of locomotion. Neither railways nor tramways are the last word in lines of communication; the future doubtless lies in different methods; but such methods are only to be thought out and worked out by prolonged application, extending perhaps over more than one lifetime. Such a task is not to be undertaken by voluntary enterprise, which can only be expected to exert itself on problems offering a speedy and substantial reward for a successful issue. The devising of a new luxury may safely be left to the speculative instinct, which sees its reward in the immediate future; but the man who should devise a new method of traction would be certain to reap no reward in his lifetime, while he would with equal certainty have to provide substantial funds during years of toil and anxiety.

There is need for improved methods of locomotion on the ground, at sea, and in the air. It is quite possible that methods have already been invented but remain unknown and untried in the records of the Patent Offices of our own and other countries. One or two experiments have already seen the stage of actual construction; but, promising as are the ideas, they are not likely to enter the second stage of improvement and development in detail unless they are subsidised by public funds. What is wanted is the allotment of certain funds for the purpose of assisting private inventors of new methods of locomotion to put into practice approved inventions and to improve their mechanical details. We

have a conspicuous instance of the good that can be done in this way by the grants made to Professor La Cour of Copenhagen by the Danish Government for the purpose of constructing windmills of different types, and of adapting his mills to the provision of power for different purposes. The result is that Danish villages are now being supplied with light and power, the cost of which would have been prohibitory if they had been compelled to depend upon coal.


With regard to canals, it will become necessary that their reconstruction and equipment should receive financial assistance from the State; but such assistance should be rendered only to those companies who are prepared to become carriers and who undertake to establish and run daily trains of barges on the whole extent of the system. Each grant should constitute a first charge on the whole undertaking, and should be coupled with the condition that all profits on working (after deducting such dividend as the proprietors have recently received) should go to the reduction of tolls.


With regard to roads, the Government grants already made and to be hereafter made ought to be supplemented by a small allocation for purely experimental work. Some work of this character has been done by local authorities even during the war period. Great advances appear to have been made, especially at Maidstone and Carlisle, toward solving the problems of surfacing, but there is much experimental work to be done, and many methods have to be tried before the production of an economical and durable roadway can be secured. It is possible, for instance, that the corrugation which sets in soon after construction might be avoided by a system of diagonal rolling instead of the to-and-fro rolling of the ordinary road-engine.

Experiments should also be directed to the kind of traffic which inflicts the greatest injury. The last experiments on this subject were made by Telford on the Holyhead coach route. He found that, for a coach speed of ten miles an hour, the horses' feet inflicted three times as much damage on the road surface as the wheels. As there is now but little rapid horse-traffic, this particular result is unimportant, except as indicating

that the problem of an improvement in horse-shoe construction might have a bearing on the life of our roads, as well as on the life of the horse. But the comparative destructiveness of different forms of tire is a similar question of undoubted importance. So likewise are the different methods of traction for heavy traffic; it is possible that the 'caterpillar' may supersede the wheeled steam waggon for heavy traction, and it is quite likely that it may do the less injury of the two. It would seem natural to suppose that the injury done by a tractor to the roadway must be proportionate to the load it is drawing. But that is not necessarily the case; an elephant could draw a hundred tons with less injury to the roadway than would be inflicted by an ordinary steam waggon drawing nothing but its own weight. Some experiments have already been made with a form of tractor in which the power is directed not to the rotation of a wheel but to the movement of a number of pedals which take the ground in the manner of elephantine steps. Such an experiment may contain in itself the germ of a more economical method of heavy traction and one much less injurious to the roadway than the grinding action of the wheel.

When all else is done, there will still remain problems of transport incapable of solution by direct State action. Such a problem is presented to the tramway companies at a certain hour every afternoon and to the railway companies at one o'clock on Saturdays. Such a problem can only be dealt with by an alteration in methods of business which would admit of the work being dealt with in shifts. Again, there is the very important question of the transport of goods in a half-manufactured state—a form of removal which has a most prejudicial effect on the ultimate cost of the manufactured article to the consumer. In the early days of the cotton industry in the East the cotton was conveyed from the plantations in Java to China with the seed adhering to it. Three-fourths of the consignment was then pure waste, no use being made of the seed. Then, when the cotton was separated and cleaned, it was forwarded by the Chinese in loose packages without compression, so that it occupied three times the space really necessary. Thus the cost of the raw material had been swollen by







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twelve times the actual necessary cost of transport. The extreme of economy can only be secured by all processes, down to the completion of the finished article, being conducted in the locality whence the raw material is extracted.

'Combination' is a word of sinister import in matters of trade; 'amalgamation' suggests the growth of a monopoly. Nevertheless there is a kind of combination which is almost entirely beneficial in its effect on the consumer; and such is the amalgamation which links into one undertaking all the successive steps in the career of a particular raw product from the ground to the ultimate articles for whose manufacture it is adapted. Let us suppose that a company owns its own ironstone mines, brings the ore in its own ships, unloads it on its own wharves, smelts it in its own furnaces, rolls it in its own mills, draws its own tubes, and constructs in its workshops the stoves, bedsteads, tools, and other articles ready for sale to the ultimate consumer. Such a company would occupy a position of independence not attainable by any manufacturer limiting himself to one branch of the trade. It would be in a great measure secure against unfair competition and indifferent to hostile tariffs. Capital invested in such a business would fulfil its primary function, which is to give stability to wages during all the fluctuations of trade. Furthermore, such a combination would reduce to a minimum the expense of transport and retransport of half-finished articles, and would deliver them to the consumer at the lowest price attainable.

It has been a rather unfortunate habit of political economists to talk about transport as though it were of almost equal importance with production, and to quote with pride the vast figures of railway traffic and the like. It is well to remember that transport is at best the overcoming of an obstacle or a series of obstacles; and, if any one of such obstacles can be removed, humanity is thereby placed in a better position.

JAMES CARLISLE,

Art. 7.—ST BARTHOLOMEW'S HOSPITAL.

The History of St Bartholomew's Hospital. By Sir Norman Moore. Two vols. Pearson, 1918.

MORE than two hundred years after the foundation of St Bartholomew's Hospital, the master, brethren and sisters claimed exemption from the payment of taxes. Their endowment was considerable, but insufficient to meet the expense of 'the sick poor coming into the hospital until well from their diseases, pregnant women coming in till able to get up after childbirth, the sustenance of the children thus born in the hospital till seven years of age should their mothers die, as well as various chantries and the maintenance of other alms-deeds, and the sustenance of the master, brethren and sisters.' This familiar story comes from the middle of the 14th century, the period of Crécy and Poitiers. The hospital of St Bartholomew is nearly eight hundred years old. Since the year 1123 it has looked on to Smithfield. Although the ancient buildings have gone long since, and the early constitution was rudely broken at the Reformation, its unbroken record of service is a more intimate part of the life and history of London than is the story of the Tower of London. The Conqueror's white fortress stood by the river in 1123 as it stands in 1919; but it was never part of London and has long ceased to have a part in the life of England. The strength of the hospital lay in something more enduring than stone. The citizens whose ancestors had seen its beginnings outside the walls in the days of the first Henry, took its work to themselves in the days of Henry VIII; and under their protection it resumed its ministry to women labouring with child, sick persons and young children.

The splendid volumes which Sir Norman Moore has prepared as a gift to the hospital are an addition to the history of London and, less directly, to the history of mediæval England. His is no perfunctory or laboured exercise. It is full, leisurely, informed by wide and gracious learning. Sir Norman Moore is an authority on the history of medicine and a Celtic scholar of distinction, but during the last thirty years of a busy

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professional life he has found time for this gradual compilation in honour of St Bartholomew's. When he resigned the office of Senior Physician at the end of 1911, he could write :

'I began my service in the hospital in 1872 as House Physician, and have ever since continued its servant as Casualty Physician, Warden of the College, Lecturer on Comparative Anatomy, Demonstrator of Morbid Anatomy, Lecturer on Pathology, Assistant Physician, Lecturer on the Principles and Practice of Medicine, and Physician.'

He is almost as familiar with the buildings and streets which once stood between Newgate and the bar of Smithfield as he is with the wards and offices of the existing hospital. He knows the history of each parcel of ground in the hospital's possession. He has not been content with long hours of study in the British Museum or among the muniments of St Paul's. He has traced the sites of forgotten London houses, and explored the Essex flats. He has made pilgrimages to places associated with the memory of early benefactors. How delightful such a study can be to a generous mind may be seen in the passage describing Sir Norman's visit to Beaumais, in Normandy :

'Richard de Beames or de Belmeis, Bishop of London, who aided Rahere [the Founder], was one of the great men of his time. He took his name from Beames, now Beaumais, a few miles from Falaise in Normandy. Beaumais is a scattered village built on lands which slope down to the river Dive; and on the higher ground stand the château, a building of the 16th century, and the church which was built early in the 12th. . . . Richard, Bishop of London, may have said Mass in this very church; and in grateful memory of him, as a benefactor of St Bartholomew's and of London, I left a bough of spindle wood, gay with crimson fruit, by the altar when I visited Beaumais. The orchards in which the houses of the village are embedded were bright with rosy apples, and the cheerful note of the green woodpecker was every now and then to be heard. A small corn-mill was worked by the Dive, the successor of that mentioned by Ordericus Vitalis. In a farmhouse there were a few tables spread for public meals. At one sat Agricola, whom I had seen at work in the fields with his mother. At another my

wife and I had breakfast. . . . The son of the house, a courteous and well-read man, waited upon us, and we talked of Beaumais and of the debt of gratitude which St Bartholomew's Hospital in London owed to Richard of Beaumais, the bishop who befriended our founder. "I knew," said the Norman, "that the lord of Beaumais had gone to the conquest of England with William, but that we had produced a Bishop of London was a detail of which I was ignorant."**

The history of the Hospital of St Bartholomew is divided into two periods, each of four centuries, by its legal re-foundation in January 1547, as the House of the Poor in WestSmithfield. The good citizens who persuaded Henry VIII to allow them to undertake the control of these ancient endowments had memories of the useful service rendered by the hospital to the community. They were, moreover, in some anxiety by reason of the lack of provision for the sick and vagabond poor in their streets. The new order imposed new civic obligations. And so, together with Christ's Hospital, St Thomas's and Bridewell, St Bartholomew's came under the direction of the Aldermen and Common Council of the City of London. The process of transfer lasted nearly ten years. At first the King preferred to revive the hospital on a limited foundation under the control of his own nominees. This unsatisfactory scheme lasted less than three years (1544-7), and gave way to the permanent administration based upon a covenant between King and citizens.

'The constitution under which the hospital is ruled to this day was established in 1547, and confirmed, with an alteration in but one important particular, in 1782. Most of the offices created by the Deed of Covenant of December 1546 and the letters patent of January 1547 exist at the present day. The treasurer, the almoners, the physician, the surgeon, the rentar, the steward, the matron and sisters, the porter bearing a figure of St Bartholomew on his staff of office, and the beadles with silver badges engraved with the hospital arms, are all parts of the present life of the hospital.'†

It would be easy to exaggerate the extent of the change. Municipal hospitals were common in mediæval

* I, 34-5.

† II, 191.

times,* and it was natural for men of 'charitable intentions and business habits' to keep together the scattered rents of the well-known foundation and to apply to their control the methods which they used in the administration of their own affairs. The hospital had long ago shaken off the authority of the neighbouring Priory of St Bartholomew and had shared in the civic as well as in the religious life of London. That it should continue to do so was not remarkable. There was nothing abrupt in the transition from the England of Henry V to the England of Oliver Cromwell. Against the background of slow change, the dissolution of the monasteries, the burning of martyrs, the battle of Naseby, even the execution of King Charles, seem anything but catastrophic. For most people mediæval is also Tudor England—a land of late domestic Gothic, panelled rooms, oak furniture, rich tapestries, of processions and quaint old customs; and one feels how easily the St Bartholomew's of Henry's foundation, as it is described in the 'Order' issued by the Lord Mayor in 1552, might have survived, like so many other mediæval hospitals and almshouses, as a charming relic of old England.

That St Bartholomew's has not merely survived, but grown into the noble institution described by Sir Norman Moore, is due to causes of which Henry and the citizens could have foreseen as little as the original founder. The condition of development was a succession of governors willing to adapt the customs of the foundation to meet the needs of a great city; but the growth of the hospital was due to the unrelenting claims of the new learning. The hospital was inspired by men who could give the best interpretation to the religious and charitable intentions of its founders, and worked for the advancement no less than the application of knowledge. It was swept into the service of a movement as fiercely disinterested as any monastic order. The most interesting pages of Sir Norman Moore's book are those in which he shows how St Bartholomew's shared in the advance of medical science, and describes the travels of Caius and

* See Miss Clay's 'Mediæval Hospitals of England' (London, 1909). Some passages from Riley's 'Memorials of London,' quoted by Mr Coulton in his 'Social Life in Britain' (pp. 502-6), suggest that in the 14th century London possessed a sort of municipal medical service.

Harvey and the efforts of Abernethy to organise the medical school.

Sir Norman Moore, however, fills the whole of his first volume and part of his second with the record of the hospital in mediæval times, when St Bartholomew's near Smithfield was but one of many hospitals dedicated to this saint, and had no very distinctive rôle in the study of medicine or the service of the sick. This part of his book is primarily a contribution to the history of mediæval London. With the exception of the Ordinances issued by the Bishop of London in 1316, there do not appear to be any details of distinctive interest regarding the daily life and administration of the hospital. It is rather surprising that more is not known of St Bartholomew's as a medical centre during the Middle Ages. Before the end of the 12th century it had acquired some fame for its cures*; and, as Sir Norman Moore has already pointed out in his lectures on the History of the Study of Medicine in the British Isles (London, 1908), John Mirfield, in the latter part of the 14th century, wrote his '*Breviarium Bartholomei*' in the neighbouring priory. Mirfield had access to a good medical library, and may be presumed to have left at least some of his books to the priory which had given him shelter. But there is no evidence that the hospital encouraged learning or possessed a medical library of its own or, indeed, many other books.†

* The legendary stories of early cures will be found in the '*Liber Fundacionis*,' of which Sir Norman Moore published the 15th-century English translation in 1886. He gives numerous quotations from it in the present work.

† John Cok, who compiled the cartulary in the early 15th century, also copied various well-known theological treatises, hymns, etc., in a MS. now in the British Museum (Add. MS. 10392). As Sir Norman Moore suggests, the works which he copied may have been in the hospital library, but it is more likely that they were in a neighbouring library. The copy of Gratian's decretals, mentioned on p. 108 of the second volume, surely belonged to the priory, and not to the hospital. A study of early medical manuscripts is required. Sir Norman Moore considers (i, 279) that, in the early 13th century, Isidore of Seville was the only writer upon medical subjects with whom students would be familiar. Another favourite writer was Gariopondus of Salerno, who died in the middle of the 11th century, and compiled a *Passionarium* found in mediæval catalogues. It is frequently styled '*Passionarium Galeni*,' and was printed at Lyons in 1526 under this title. Simon Bredon, a physician of the 14th century, who was himself for a time master of a hospital in Maidstone, possessed a

In the early deeds of the Augustinian priory of St Bartholomew the hospital is described as the 'hospital of the priory.' But Rahere, the founder of both, laid emphasis upon his intention to establish a hospital; and the 12th-century history of the foundation suggests that, from the outset, the hospital was under distinct management. At all events, from 1147, if not earlier,* it was governed by a master, who could be a layman; and in the reign of Henry II it was receiving endowments and privileges of its own. Sir Norman Moore would have done well to bring together in a separate chapter the records of the disturbed, yet very intimate, relations between the priory and the hospital. He gives the terms of the various compositions enforced by the Bishop of London between the 12th and 15th centuries, but a consecutive and critical narrative would have been valuable. It was fortunate for the hospital that it was able to establish its independence, for otherwise it would certainly have disappeared with the priory. Even in the 15th century the priory claimed (though in vain) the right to hold the keys of the hospital during a vacancy in the mastership and forbade the erection of an image of St Bartholomew in the chapel of the Holy Cross.

Thus, many years before the Reformation, the hospital had its own church, with bells and chantries, its own property scattered throughout London and the home counties, and its own tenants settled in the houses in its close. The history of the property is recorded in the cartulary, still in the hospital's possession, which was compiled by brother John Cok early in the 15th century; and some idea of its nature and extent early in the 16th

12th-century copy of Gariopondus. Bredon left the book to his Oxford college, where it remains, bound up with a 14th-century Seneca left by another donor (Merton MSS., C. 2, 1; Coxe, No. 250). A German visitor identified its author some years ago.

* In this year Thomas of St Osyth, the second prior, appointed Adam the merchant to the mastership and regulated the method of election of Adam's successor by the brethren of the hospital (Moore, i, 52). According to the cartulary, Adam was preceded by Hagno, presumably the priest to whom Rahere, the founder and first prior, granted the church of St Sepulchre (i, 26). There appears to be no reason for the identification of Hagno with Thomas of St Osyth, except Sir Norman's view that Adam was the first semi-independent master. Rahere or Thomas may well have entrusted the hospital to Hagno. Even in Rahere's time the hospital appears to have had its own seal (see the plate facing i, 26).

century may be obtained from the repertory and ledgers required under the new constitution, the ledger being the successor of the rent roll required by the ordinances of Gilbert of Segrave, Bishop of London, in 1316. In addition, Sir Norman Moore has made use of numerous original deeds and chirographs in the muniments of the hospital, of St Paul's and elsewhere. Sir Norman knows and loves his London so well that he is rather forgetful of the scientific outsider who is eager for generalised results. But if the student of the mediæval borough and city is wise, he will turn aside for a few days to follow Sir Norman in his leisurely and expansive survey of the St Bartholomew deeds.

In his book the author has put together the comments made during the last thirty years upon charter, deed or rent roll; but, as he rarely gives references, it is not always easy to tell whether his *obiter dicta* are allusions to well-known facts or fresh contributions to knowledge. The reader would have welcomed some assistance in this matter, if only, as John Cok says, for the refreshing of memory.* An amusing and well-informed guide in London topography, Sir Norman Moore has made some neat investigations into the origin of street names. For example, Vitry Lane, 'which extended from Smithfield towards Aldersgate on the south side of the hospital and between it and the city ditch,' owed its name to the family of William de Viteri (Vitré?), a 13th-century benefactor of the hospital. Shoe Lane or the Sholand is the *scolanda* or prebend.† On the other hand, most of Sir Norman's identifications, made independently from the St Bartholomew deeds, may also be found, more fully treated, in the useful Dictionary of London, prepared by the late Mr Henry Harben (published 1918). Thus, the connexion between the Queen's Soke and Queenhithe is clear from the customs in the Liber Albus. The correction of Stow's derivation of Wood Street is anticipated by Harben, who refers to easily accessible

* This is a case in point. In the short chronicle at the end of his cartulary, John Cok tells us that he was present at the coronation of Henry V on a very rainy day—a fact recorded 'for the refreshing of memory' (II, 39). Cok puts it very mildly. The weather was so extraordinarily severe as to cause much anxious speculation. See Wylie's 'Reign of Henry V,' I, 8-9.

† On the meaning of *scolanda*, see Round, 'Feudal England,' p. 105.

sources. Harben has also long notes upon the early forms of the names Basinghall and Grub Street.

Sir Norman Moore's work will be of most interest to those who are interested in the social and legal problems of municipal history. His vivid and humorous imagination makes him an invaluable collector and editor of documents which do not usually please. His little word-sketches are like the illuminated initials in John Cok's manuscript; this, for example, of a certain Adam Scott, warden of the chest of the fabric of St Paul's Cathedral, whose portrait

'remains upon his seal, and shows him in the hood and short coat which he wore when ascending the scaffolding and walking about the works of the choir of St Paul's, which was being rebuilt in his time, and [counting?] the workmen's wages for which he paid out of the funds under his charge.'

Or, again, take the more elaborate passage, on the indenture between the hospital and William, son of Simon of Rainham :

'It is remarkable that, after seven hundred years, both parts of this agreement, each with its seal, perfect as when its apposition was witnessed by the eighteen witnesses in the reign of King John, should be found in St Bartholomew's Hospital, its place of origin. How complete is the picture of an Essex farm in the beginning of the 13th century! It had fields of wheat, rye, barley, oats and beans; meadows yielding crops of hay, with horses and oxen to plough and draw carts. The farmhouse was small, and had stables and ox-sheds adjoining it, as well as a brew-house, an oven, and a barn. The crops were sent to London by the Thames; and the rent, which was paid in kind, and not in money, was delivered by a ship at the quay of the Hospitallers, which may perhaps have been on the Fleet, and thus nearer to St Bartholomew's than any quay on the Thames. It is a view of a settled country. The landowners advancing money for the tenant to improve the farm; the tenant a man of substance; the crops differing from those of our time in the presence of rye and the absence of roots. Most things were ruder, but the artistic seal of the tenant is a finer work of art than that of any man in Essex at the present day. On the broad waterway of the Thames are still to be seen ships of antique form, great barges with brown sails, conveying

Essex hay to the wharves and quays of London, just as they did the crops of William son of Simon in the time of King John' (i, 244-5).

These deeds are a quarry of information upon the trades, occupation and origin of Londoners in the Middle Ages, the variety of people who, outside the more specialised quarters, inhabited the London streets, and the rapidity with which houses changed hands or found new tenants. They throw light upon mediæval rents and will remind the scholar that much remains to be gathered from this kind of material to explain the evolution from the original burgage or ground rent, through the semi-feudal rent charges paid 'from the house,' to the rent paid 'for a house' occupied on a lease or annual tenancy.* In the 13th century a piece of land might be burdened with definite charges which could not be paid unless the ground were occupied by a house of a certain value. As the house decayed, rents would fall into arrear; and a point was reached at which the landholder would find it convenient to make a fresh start. He would perhaps advance money to the tenant for building, or remit arrears of rent on condition that a new house were built and kept in repair. As more durable houses were built (stone houses are frequently mentioned), more modern issues arose, such as rights of drainage or the right to an uninterrupted view.

As the centuries pass, the record becomes both more detailed and of more general interest. Even Sir Norman Moore's skill cannot restore the daily life of London in the 13th and 14th centuries. The picture of the citizens seeking a municipal graveyard during the Interdict, or the status of London Bridge, with its chapel dedicated to St Thomas of Canterbury, acting as a legal person, give exceptional relief to the processions of bishops, mayors, citizens. But towards the end of the 15th century a more varied movement is discerned, even as the story becomes more specialised. The hospital accounts themselves show the influence of world affairs. Richard Grafton, grocer, printer, chronicler, and in 1551 deputy

* The earlier history of this intricate process has been examined by Mr M. de W. Hemmeon in his 'Burgage Tenure in Mediæval England' (Cambridge, Mass., 1914).

treasurer of the hospital, reports a small benefit through the rise in the price of the angel, and a loss through the official juggling with base money. Fifty years or so later the hospital was able to invest money with the new East India Company, and, like so many of its benefactors, had an interest in enterprises beyond the sea. One such benefactor was Mr Benjamin Kenton.

'Benjamin Kenton, after whom a ward is also called, was a friend of Mr Treasurer Darker, and gave 50*l.* in 1770 and at his death 5000*l.* He had been a waiter at the Crown and Magpie tavern, and showed such civility and sagacity that, on a vacancy, a number of the customers bought him the tavern. He thrived there, but owed his large fortune to a secret in relation to India. This was not some state affair, nor the knowledge of a dark transaction with a rajah or nawab or of some intrigue among the directors in Leadenhall Street—no, it was how to bottle beer so that on the long hot voyage round the Cape the cork might not fly out.'

And the hospital was invited to benefit by perverted as well as by fruitful ingenuity. For in 1774 Mr W. Gardiner of Richmond, a contemporary of Mr Kenton, and a Lisbon merchant interested in astronomy, offered 2000*l.* to St Bartholomew's, 'as a sacrifice for God's having put it in his power to overturn Sir Isaac Newton's system.'

To return to the Middle Ages. The name of Miss Ethel Mary Portal, the donor of the plates in this book, will be remembered with gratitude by all its readers, for she has enabled Sir Norman Moore to enrich his work by facsimiles of about forty documents, and in most cases of their seals. The diplomatic and palæographic interest of any large collection of documents is great, if the observer is quick to notice small points of contrast and slight deviations from the normal. For Sir Norman Moore these things have the fascination (as he confesses) which they had for Addison's noble friend, who came to prefer the searching of rolls and records to the reading of Virgil or Cicero. He gives numerous examples of the use of antique gems as seals, notes the introduction of armorial seals and the significance of private as distinct from official seals. Here he points out that a seal is attached to a vellum tag cut from a discarded

computus roll, and there that the original seal has been attached to a later copy of the original deed.* 'A remission and quit-claim of Thomas son of Walter Niger of Barking and his wife Beatrice to Cecilia of Sanford is interesting (says our author), because, though it ends with the words "testibus istis" and bears two seals on vellum tags, no witnesses' names are written, and the space for them remains blank.' The significance of this omission, it may be remarked, lies in the fact that the names of witnesses were frequently inserted without their knowledge or in their absence, a witness being a person prepared to give credit to the fact stated in the deed, not necessarily one who had seen it executed.† In this particular case, it may perhaps be presumed that, as he was giving up something, Thomas son of Walter Niger was indifferent whether he had any witnesses or not. Perhaps he left this part of the transaction to Cecilia of Sanford.

Sir Norman Moore is equally interested in the writers of the documents, and has some delightful and suggestive pages on the clerks who attested last and sometimes state that they had written the deeds. William de Ripa, vicar of St Sepulchre, sometimes wrote the St Bartholomew deeds in the early part of Henry III's reign; and Alexander of Smithfield, a somewhat younger man, wrote a great many. Alexander wrote a beautiful simple hand; and his manuscripts may easily be recognised even if he does not describe himself as *scriptor* or write his name at all. 'The character of a handwriting depended not merely on the period but on the writer.' This was equally true of the professional copyists who worked side by side with the booksellers, bookbinders and parchment makers. Any one who turns over a number of mediæval books will notice the different methods of marking the 'quaterni' or gatherings. He may see indications of price and other marks which suggest that booksellers may have had their own methods of storing or identifying books. Certainly every copyist had his idiosyncrasies. John Cok, whose work we have already noticed, sometimes fell

* i, 188-9. The same is probably true of the charter reproduced at p. 89.

† Thayer, 'A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law' (1898), pp. 97 foll. Mr C. G. Crump has recently reminded students of this in, 'History,' April 1919, vol. iv, p. 47.

into the way of copying the handwriting as well as the text of the manuscript before him.

As he writes of Alexander of Smithfield, and of the bookshop of Michael the clerk on Ludgate Hill adjoining the church of St Martin, the pride of the old Irish writers seems to stir in the blood of Sir Norman Moore. He remembers how Eugene O'Curry, 'who might have been no more than a perfect transcriber of mediæval manuscripts, became learned in their contents.' 'It is right,' he continues, 'to think of all workers upon manuscripts and books as part of the world of letters.'

In our own day printers and photographers have helped Sir Norman Moore to prepare a beautiful book. He is not a perfect craftsman. He will summarise a document on one page and print it in full several pages later. He will explain some allusions at length and pass by others. He is inclined to play the wilful amateur, and write about the 'Earl of Mortaigne' or 'Moreton' instead of the simple and correct 'Count of Mortain.' He is sometimes a little too fanciful, forgetting that in the reconstruction of the past, fancy and imagination are poles asunder. But the specialist who is seriously annoyed by these defects will be a very arid specialist indeed. Rather he will envy the author his easy style and his apt and kindly learning. It is good to think how this active, busy, many-sided man, face to face each day with the tragic wastage of a great city, has found joy in studies so often despised and more frequently misunderstood. He has shown that the interest in the past of still living things can become a part of our daily duty towards them and can help us not to grow weary in doing it.

F. M. POWICKE.

Art. 8.—HOME RULE AND LABOUR IN CATALONIA.

WHEN the King of Spain entrusts a political leader with the task of forming a new Cabinet, he sometimes hands him an undated royal decree dissolving the Cortes. This document is of paramount importance in Spanish politics. To have or not to have *el decreto* makes all the difference between a long life or a brief one to a Ministry. The President of the Council can easily with that paper secure a majority in the Cortes; for he only needs to date it, publish it, and fix the time for a fresh general election. In such an election the Cabinet inevitably wins, for the Minister of the Interior makes the *encasillado*—that is to say, he distributes posts to the deputies in the interest of the Cabinet. In this work he is successfully helped in the provinces by that all-powerful personage (the equivalent in Spain of the American boss) called *el cacique*.^{*} Excepting in the few cases in which the *cacique* himself is an opposition candidate and must be respected, the majority of votes in a constituency is generally, by some means or other, obtained by the Government.

During the late war only one general election took place—that of 1918. The Government made such a profusion of promises that a few had to be kept. It should be added that Señor Dato, whose Cabinet left power shortly before, had pretty well advanced the labour of the *encasillado*, naturally to his own advantage. The result was that the Government ran the risk—a rare occurrence in this country—of being defeated. Nevertheless, a small majority was secured by Señor Garcia Prieto, President of the Council; and Señor Dato obtained a fair representation of about 100 deputies.

Count Romanones, as Prime Minister in the late Government, controlled the votes of scarcely thirty deputies. Nevertheless it was his first task to get Parliament to approve the budget; for Spain, for several years, has had no budget voted by the Cortes, and the Government has had to depend, for meeting its financial obligations,

^{*} *Cacique* is a word which the Spanish conquerors of the 16th century took from the Indians of Mexico and the Antilles. It means an Indian chief, lord of a small territory.

on royal decrees authorising the use, for a limited time, of the old budget, or on demands of credits addressed to the Council of State, which has not always a clear right to grant them. Such a situation was of course most irregular. It was complicated by grave disturbances, notably by the agitation called *sindicalista* in Catalonia (labour troubles, threatening a revolutionary outbreak), and by a similarly anarchical state of affairs in Andalusia and other districts.

It was in these circumstances that the question of autonomy for Catalonia arose. The claim for this was not presented to Count Romanones, but to an ephemeral Cabinet led by Señor Garcia Prieto. The Catalanian *Mancomunidad* (an official body created by Señor Dato) claimed home rule for Catalonia and came to Madrid to demand it, after having secured the votes of a great number of Catalanian Municipalities. Señor Puig y Cadafalch, president of the *Mancomunidad*, said to Señor Garcia Prieto, upon handing him the petition: 'If we cannot return to Barcelona with a satisfactory answer, allow us to return, at least, with some hopes.' Señor Garcia Prieto replied that he would give the matter careful attention; but no sooner had the commissioners taken the train back to Barcelona than he published the petition. This caused a tremendous sensation and alarm in all Castile. The Catalonians were openly accused of aiming at the independence of their province and its separation from Spain. Charges of treachery and hypocrisy were made against them. Garcia Prieto resigned, and scarcely had Count Romanones taken the oath at the Palace and formed his Cabinet, when a great concourse paraded the streets, shouting 'Death to Catalonia,' and heaping upon the Catalonians insults like those so lavishly bestowed on the revolted Cubans from 1895 to 1898.

The demonstrators stopped before the building of the Presidency, and a Committee delivered to Count Romanones the protests drawn up by several Chambers of Commerce and the representatives of industrial interests in the rest of Spain, with the exception of the Basque provinces, which are themselves claiming home rule. The number of demonstrators has been variously estimated at from 40,000 to 100,000; at all events the gathering was large and influential. Romanones

answered that no Spanish Government would ever allow the separation from Spain of a part of the national territory, and promised that the matter should be solved by the Cortes. The Cortes met shortly after, and the Catalonian question was immediately taken up. The Catalonian deputies, with exceptions—such as that of Señor Maciá, who openly declared himself in favour of the complete separation of Catalonia from Spain, which he stigmatised as moribund, and a few others belonging to other parties—attended, firmly united in the purpose of supporting the project of the *Mancomunidad*. A few days after the session began, the Catalonian leader, Señor Cambó, rose in the Chamber, and announced, to the great surprise of all, that the Catalonian deputies, seeing the hostile attitude of the assembly—which had warmly applauded a speech made by Señor Maura—were going to withdraw in a body, rather than allow a long and futile discussion to take place, with the inevitable result of the rejection of their petition. Thereupon he walked out, followed by the deputies of Catalonia and the Republicans who had joined them.

Romanones protested, and announced the Government's decision to settle the question. He appointed an 'extra-Parliamentary Commission,' including the most important politicians of all parties, Señor Maura among them, to frame a scheme of home rule for Catalonia. But the *Mancomunidad* was not satisfied with such a step. It declared that no Home Rule Bill for Catalonia would be accepted, if it were not drawn up by the Catalonians themselves; and it met at once to prepare another scheme, called *estatuto*, for submission to the Cortes. This was done. The two bills were prepared, showing, of course, important differences. That of the 'extra-Parliamentary Commission' is a fair grant of liberal institutions and rights, but of course from a Spanish point of view, and allowing for the keeping of an important part of the control of Catalonian affairs in the hands of the Central Government. The scheme of the *Mancomunidad* is almost the constitution of a new state, free and independent, allowing a minimum of interference by the Spanish Government in the local administration. The Catalonian deputies returned to the Cortes to defend their bill. The Government insisted upon the

primary necessity of approving the budget, and much time was lost in futile discussions; then suddenly, on Feb. 21, 1919, Count Romanones, without any previous warning, read a royal decree suspending the sessions of the Cortes *sine die*.

The Catalonian deputies took this decision quietly. It should be borne in mind that the political agitation in Catalonia in favour of home rule is principally inspired by a patriotic institution, the *Lliga Regionalista*, which includes among its members Señores Cambó, Rodés, Ventosa, most of the other Catalonian deputies, and Señor Puig y Cadafalch and the members of the *Mancomunidad*. The *Lliga* has carried on for many years, at Barcelona and throughout Catalonia, an energetic campaign for the official recognition of the Catalonian language, on the same footing as the Castilian. The *Lliga*, in a word, says that Catalonia is not a Spanish province, but a nation; and its active and enthusiastic propaganda is essentially national. No sooner had the *Mancomunidad* presented its petition to Señor García Prieto, than the national character of the home rule move became evident. Catalonian flags waved over all Barcelona. The people sang everywhere, and on the slightest provocation, the hymn *Els Segadors*, a song which reminds the Spaniards of the terrible slaughter of Castilians made by the Catalonians on the 'bloody day of Corpus Christi' (*el Corpus de Sangre*), as they name the revolt at Barcelona which caused the war in the time of Philip IV.

'From the bad Spanish Government; from the incapacity and poverty of the Spanish state,' says Señor Rovira y Virgili in his book on *El nacionalismo catalan*, 'the Castilians of Castile and all other Spanish subjects suffer. But the Castilians of Castile do not suffer the imposition of another language, of other laws, of another culture, of another spirit; and this imposition, in a word, is what constitutes our national question.' The Catalonians claim that they are citizens of the ancient kingdom of Aragon, of a different race from the Castilians, with a brilliant and glorious history of their own. They feel proud of their past, of their prowess at sea, of their conquest of Majorca, of their long dominion over Sicily, of the deeds of their heroic sea-captain Roger de Lauria,

of the craft and shrewdness of their King Ferdinand praised by Machiavelli, of their wars with France and their struggles against the infidel. In spite of the fact that Dante wrote in the 13th century of *l'avara povertà di Catalanni*, they claim to have been in the Middle Ages as wealthy and prosperous as they are now. Spaniards elsewhere allege that, if Catalonia became independent of Spain, a prohibitive tariff imposed by the Spanish Government would be enough to ruin her, for the tariff at present protects Catalonia, and permits her to sell throughout the kingdom, without competition, her cloths and the other products of her industry. Perhaps this is true; but the Catalonians ascribe their prosperity, not to the Spanish tariff, but to their own capacity and energy, which, in spite of Spanish misgovernment, have made them rich. And in this they are right. They do not need Spain, if they can secure other markets; and the advantageous position of Barcelona on the Mediterranean should render such an expansion easy.

'Catalonia,' says Melquiades Alvarez, a sane Spanish politician from Asturias, 'has a right to be autonomous, and attend to her own economic affairs, because she has suffered too much from the backward and reactionary spirit of the Spanish administration.' Alvarez does not believe that home rule would bring about the separation of Catalonia from Spain; and many other impartial Spaniards think with him. The problem, consequently, is not solved, nor are the demands of Catalonia satisfied. The settlement has been merely deferred.

While the Catalanian deputies were talking about home rule and their rights in the Cortes, and the anti-Catalonian propaganda was raging furiously at Madrid, the people at Barcelona hissed and stoned a Spanish vaudeville artist, Mary-Focella, who dared to sing at a theatre there a couplet ending 'Long live Spain.' Riots and grave public disorders took place; encounters with the police resulted in several deaths and other casualties; and the Government suspended the constitutional guarantees. But, at the same time, the public troubles in Barcelona assumed another aspect, which has frightened even the Catalanian home rulers and induced them to be somewhat more prudent.

The *Lliga* is a political association, and its purpose is to secure for Catalonia an autonomous government with the least possible interference from Spain. But the majority of its members belong to the middle class; its directors are nearly all well-known bourgeois; and they have impressed on the *Lliga* a conservative character, even a decidedly Roman Catholic one. The wealthy merchants, the owners of large Catalonian factories, the members of the liberal professions (lawyers, physicians, engineers, architects, etc.), who form the majority of the *Lliga*, are not the only representatives of public opinion in Catalonia. Still more numerous, and organised against them, are the working classes. Barcelona is a big industrial city; and the large majority of its labouring population is not composed of Catalonians. The rest of Spain contributes much more than Catalonia to the number of its working men; and the Galicians, Asturians, Biscayans, Andalusians, and even Castilians (without reckoning the French, Italian, Germans and Russians), outnumber the Catalonians in the factories. This was one of the things that strengthened Señor Lerroux in Barcelona when he opposed the *Lliga* there, and organised the Republican Radical party. But after Señor Lerroux's electoral victories over the *Lliga*, and notably since 1909, Barcelona gradually changed, and in a few years became, from a centre of political conspiracies, a hot-bed of revolutionary anarchism.

In 1909 took place the violent outbreak called 'the bloody week' (*la semana sangrienta*), because the city was in the hands of the populace for seven days. It was then that Francisco Ferrer, who propagated anarchy in Catalonia and founded *La Escuela Moderna*, was arrested, submitted to a court-martial, and some months later shot at the fort of Montjuich. Like all violent repressions, this caused a revival of anarchical ideas and organisations; the result being that, after many years of alarming agitations before and after 1909, the working classes, much to the prejudice of the *catalanistas* or partisans of the *Lliga*, combined to form at Barcelona a very formidable anti-bourgeois force. They are organised by trades, each one calling itself a syndicate, and having at its head a group of their leaders. All syndicates meet when necessary and follow the direction

agreed upon at the meetings. The greatest solidarity exists. When one trade strikes, the others not only contribute to support its members, but strike also in sympathy with them, if it is so resolved. All workingmen contribute to their syndicate weekly sums, varying according to their salaries; and the amounts they gather in this way are said to be very large, something above 150,000 pesetas a week. Extraordinary collections are also made; and all these funds appear to be honestly and ably managed.

But these syndicates, like similar organisations abroad, are not devoted exclusively to obtaining for the working classes better pay and better conditions of labour. Following the principles established by Francisco Ferrer, they are violent and aggressive. The working men who do not submit to their organisations are the victims of a relentless persecution, and even, in extreme cases, are murdered. The employers have to observe strict rules laid down by the employees, and are deprived of the right of entering their own factories during working hours, and even of administering them. In some factories, principally those that have a large credit and many purchasers, the employees meet weekly to discuss the amount of work for the next seven days, the order in which it is to be done, and the terms of delivery. Notwithstanding these and many other grave concessions which, as a rule, they have tamely made, the employers go in fear of their lives. According to the newspapers, during four months, over one hundred employers have been assassinated; and by employers, at Barcelona, are meant not only the owners of the factories themselves, but the higher employees of a technical character, such as engineers, directors, etc.* The last known affair of this kind is the wanton murder of the director of *La Canadiense*, a company for providing water

* The trials at Barcelona, early in the present year, of certain persons accused of murdering factory managers, had results which might have been foreseen. The first trial ended rapidly in the acquittal of all persons arrested and their immediate release. This is what usually happens in criminal proceedings against *sindicalistas* at Barcelona; for the jury, it is affirmed, is either frightened or bribed. So it happened years ago when the Government had to proclaim martial law, and it cost immense efforts to try, sentence and execute Rull, a noted anarchist and bomb-thrower.

power from the river Ebro to many of the factories, and thus named because all its capital is drawn from Canada and Great Britain.

While the Catalonian deputies raised the question of Catalonian home rule in the Cortes, the *sindicalistas* created a dangerous situation at Barcelona. Strike after strike took place; and the city was deprived of gas and of electric power, which caused the stoppage of the tramways, and was threatened with a loss of its water supply. The Government reinforced the garrison, sent troops from Madrid, and showed decision in the maintenance of public order. At the same time they made attempts at reconciliation. Señor Morote, under-secretary to the President of the Council of Ministers, acting under instructions from Count Romanones, succeeded, in February last, in making an arrangement with the strikers of *La Canadiense*, which, according to the Government, settled all the troubles connected with that company. The company and the Government accepted all the demands of the *sindicalistas*—the eight hours' day; the immediate suppression of martial law in Catalonia; the demobilisation of the strikers belonging to the army; the increase of salaries, according to the rates asked; the payment of wages to the strikers for a fortnight of February, and the whole month of March, as if they had worked; and a pledge not to take any action, directly or indirectly, against the strikers. Other concessions of less importance were also made. Thereupon the strikers announced that work would recommence at once. Señor Dato and his party accused the Government of weakness, but could do nothing beyond publishing some articles in their Madrid organ, *La Epoca*; for the Cortes were closed.

In spite of this apparent pacification, the Syndicates shortly afterwards (March) declared a general strike at Barcelona. All trade and traffic were paralysed. Even the banks closed, owing to a strike of their employees. The Government issued a royal decree, stating again that Barcelona was in a condition of war and, at the same time, suspending the 'constitutional guarantees' throughout Spain. It thus appeared that Count Romanones had definitely failed in his efforts to reach an agreement with the *sindicalistas*. It was rumoured that

the renewal of the struggle was due to the refusal of the Military Governor at Barcelona to release certain working men who had been arrested under martial law long before Romanones' agreement with the syndicalists was made. The fact remains that the strikes continued. At the same time, Romanones could not venture to summon the Cortes, though this was the only way of obtaining from the deputies an approval of the budget. The unwillingness of all parliamentary groups to unite in support of the Government thereupon became evident.

According to Señor Lerroux, in a document published without the permission of the Press Censor, a pretext for resigning, in these difficult circumstances, was supplied to Count Romanones by General Milano del Bosch, the Military Governor referred to above. This General, without authority from the Central Government, expelled, or threatened with immediate expulsion from Barcelona the Civil Governor and the Chief of Police. Romanones thought that to maintain these two officials in their places would mean a serious conflict with the military; and for this reason he resigned, advising the King to call Señor Maura in his stead, and thus to satisfy the wish and choice of the Army.

On April 17 and 18 a notable change in the Ministry took place. To the general surprise, the King appointed Señor Maura President of the Council of Ministers; and Maura chose for his Ministry those who, more or less directly, had worked in his administration in 1909, the one exception being the Minister of State, Señor Gonzalez Hontoria, a member of Count Romanones' party, and a mild friend of the Allies during the war. Señor la Cierva, who in 1909 was Minister of the Interior, and is generally accused of being mainly responsible for Ferrer's execution, was appointed Minister of Finance. The news was received with great indignation by the Liberals. Moreover, the announcement was made that the King had granted to Señor Maura the coveted *Decreto* dissolving the Cortes; and a few days thereafter, the Cortes were summoned, and the fact of their dissolution was made known to them. Maura called for new elections. Those for the Chamber were fixed for

June 1, those of Senators for June 15, and the meeting of the new Cortes for the 24th.

A general strike of telegraphic operators now took place throughout Spain, as a protest against the new Government, especially against Señor la Cierva. But the Government soon re-established the service, and punished the principal strikers with the loss of their positions. The Liberal leaders, Monarchists and Republicans (or Chiefs of the *izquierdas*) then endeavoured to arrive at some decision, in case the Government should hold the elections without restoring constitutional rights and the liberty of the press. Both had been suppressed by Romanones, on account of the socialistic troubles; and the press censorship was continued in full force by Maura, who refused the demand of the *izquierdas* to restore the Constitution. In reply, they resolved to consider the forthcoming Cortes as *facciosas* (that is, unlawful, and revolutionary), as they were to be elected under Government pressure.

Meanwhile, in Catalonia, new political enemies arose against the *Lliga regionalista*. The 'Monarchical Union' (*Unión Monárquica*) was founded at Barcelona, with the evident purpose of providing a standing force against the home rulers. That Union was composed principally of Catalonians, intimately connected by business and friendship with certain Castilian elements. It advocated liberal measures for Catalonia, but, at the same time, strengthened her union with the Spanish Monarchy. The *Lliga* energetically opposed the Unionists. Cambó and Puig de Cadafalch were again to be heard speaking of the 'Catalonian nation' and of 'Catalonia's rights to home rule,' while, whenever the Monarchical Union was referred to, enthusiastic audiences shouted 'Down with the traitors.'

The elections eventually took place. The definite results are as yet (June 10) unknown, but it is evident that the proportions of parties, with small and unimportant variations, is similar to that existing in the Cortes before the dissolution. Although serious charges were made against Señor Maura, his Minister of the Interior, Señor Goicoechea, has not been guilty of any gross abuses. Perhaps the only real error made by the Government was that, two days before the elections

took place, a solemn religious festival was held. This was interpreted generally as a political act, and irritated the Liberals of the extreme parties. It was the inauguration at Cerro de los Angeles, not far from Madrid, of a monument erected to the 'Heart of Jesus Christ.' The Government attended; and the King read a warm message (which, according to *La Acción*, Señor Maura's organ in the press, the King wrote himself), enthusiastically praising the Catholic religion, and declaring, as the monument also declares, that Spain is 'devoted' to the faith. The Pope sent his blessing, formally bestowed by the Bishop of Madrid, to all persons attending the ceremony.

Señor Maura's religious ideas are well known; he is strongly Roman Catholic, and so is a large majority of his followers. But Spain, although a Catholic country, is not a religious one. The Spaniards are Clericals or Anticlericals; and ecclesiastical divisions are wider and deeper than the political. Among the Liberal Monarchists, like Romanones, Alhucemas, Alba, etc., the so-called Catholics—Clericals in fact—are in a large majority; while among the Republicans and Socialists, all are rabid Anti-clericals. The ceremony at Cerro de los Angeles made them so indignant, that on the 1st of June they went in a body to the polls, and elected six deputies in Madrid. Under the electoral law, the majority cannot have in that city more than six of the eight deputies. The other two are allotted to the minority; in this case one of the two was a Maurista and the other a Monarchical Liberal.

In the rest of Spain the results of the elections, so far as they are known, indicate but a slight difference between this Cortes and its predecessor. Maura and la Cierva have no majority of their own, and are in a situation very like that of Romanones in the preceding Cortes. They are followed by about 112 deputies, a very small number in a Parliament of 409. But, since they are united with Señor Dato's representatives, numbering perhaps 110, they are able to count on a small majority. Besides, for approving the budget (which, as already explained, is an urgent necessity) the Government may have other assistance even from the supporters of Romanones (about 50 in number), and those of the

Marquis de Alhucemas (75 or less); and this in spite of the declaration made by them both, as members of the *izquierdas*, that the present Cortes are *facciosas*.

The Catalanian home-rulers have lost some two or three deputies to the Monarchical Union, but have still, when united with the deputies of the Basque provinces, twenty or twenty-one representatives. In fine, no party has an absolute majority; and the Government depends on the support of Señor Dato. Both the Marquis de Alhucemas and Count Romanones have governed under similar conditions. In Spain, the Cortes, after all, are not necessary. We have seen that, when a Government does not find the Cortes easy to deal with, it can suspend the sessions for an unlimited time—a measure called, in the political slang of Madrid, *el cerrojazo*, or the lock-out. The problems which face it are those which Romanones had to deal with. There is no budget approved by Parliament; the working classes are excited, mainly by the extremely high price of food-stuffs; and in some places, such as Catalonia, Labour organisations are threatening. Everybody recognises that the situation is grave, and that some great trouble must happen soon; yet nothing comes of it. One Government succeeds another, always with the same negative result. The situation is grave, and it does not concern Barcelona alone. It extends to all Spain, to Castile, to Galicia, to Asturias, to Andalusia. The people are in terrible poverty, and, even where they can get work, frequently do not earn enough to live upon. The question is not for them one of law, or justice, or right, or country, or political ideals, but merely one of food. At Barcelona, where they can join, and collect funds, and even tyrannise over their employers, they are like princes, and to a certain extent happy; but in other parts of Spain they are driven by famine to revolt. Since the time of Cato the Censor, we know that stomachs do not reason. The Catalanians, who are able politicians and read the signs of the times, have good cause, therefore, to be silent for the moment.

What Señor Maura will now do it is easy to foresee. He will try, in a few sittings of the Cortes, to have the budget approved. Immediately after this, he will close the Cortes, because a summer vacation is required to

allow of the Royal trip to San Sebastian and Santander. Until the end of September or the middle of October the Parliament will be dispensed with, and so it does not matter in the least whether the Government has a majority or not. The life of the Ministry is assured until next winter. What more is wanted? The Catalonians, the Socialists, the *Sindicalistas*, the country labourers in Andalusia, can wait. The Spanish method of eliminating political disputes is to let them grow old until they are forgotten. And, if one day there comes a national disaster, as in 1898, the Spaniards accept it by simply declaring that its time had arrived.

After having ruled Spain for many years and restored the Bourbon dynasty, Canovas del Castillo, who was a great student of Spanish history, concluded that the best Government this country ever had was that of Philip IV and his Minister, the Duke of Olivares. The King and his Minister were very unlucky, and had powerful enemies to contend with—Richelieu at the beginning, Cromwell at the end. But neither Philip nor his favourite did anything to provoke France or England. If only they had been more fortunate, Philip IV would have left to his son, Don Carlos II *el hechizado*, a prosperous nation. But the King devoted his time to pleasure, to hunting, to love intrigues, to conversations with artists and poets. The Minister succeeded in making himself rich. For the great problems threatening the nation they cared as little as possible. Olivares thought that their solution consisted in winning time. All those problems he put off, and if, in consequence, time brought disaster instead of success, the fault was, of course, neither his, nor that of his master!

JOSÉ DE ARMAS.

Art. 9.—THE POETRY OF LAURENCE BINYON.

1. *The Four Years—War Poems collected and newly augmented.* By Laurence Binyon. Elkin Mathews, 1919.
2. *Lyric Poems.* By Laurence Binyon. Mathews, 1894.
3. *Porphyryon and other Poems.* By Laurence Binyon. Grant Richards, 1898.
4. *Odes.* By Laurence Binyon. The Unicorn Press, 1901.
5. *The Death of Adam and other Poems.* By Laurence Binyon. Methuen, 1904.
6. *London Visions.* By Laurence Binyon. Collected and augmented. Elkin Mathews, 1908.
7. *England and other Poems.* By Laurence Binyon. Elkin Mathews, 1909.

And other works by the same.

THE poetical output of Laurence Binyon is considerable. It comprises some twelve volumes, containing, if reprints are included, over 1000 pages. Apart from its mere bulk, it would be impossible to give an adequate account of it in a single article, owing to the width of the poet's range and the high quality of the greater part of the verse. What is proposed here is something much more modest—to run over the more important of his poems and extract from them what appears to be the principal message of the poet, but not from any narrow didactic or moral standpoint, for which we English have such an overwhelming weakness. Our quest on the present occasion has a broader aim. To put it in a nutshell, it consists in attempting to discover and define the poet's attitude towards life. For every poet is in love with life, as indeed we all are; but the poet's experience differs from that of ordinary mortals, in being at once more intensely particular and also more intensely universal. He is so intensely himself that he is also part and parcel of ourselves as well. This is indeed the supreme paradox of spirit. The greater its oneness, the more it is shared by others. Shakespeare is pre-eminently Shakespeare because he is half the world besides.

From one point of view Laurence Binyon strikes one as a pilgrim. He has tried many *genres*, and in most he has been successful. But he has tried them, not as the average woman tries various ready-made costumes in

the hope she may find something to suit her. He is too fine an artist to ignore the fact that it is not enough to adopt a style; one must also adapt it. Or to take another metaphor—the plagiarist is the John Gilpin of style. He is absolutely at the mercy of his 'mount.' Whereas, for the true poet, whatever style he may adopt, epic, lyrical or what not, style is a high-mettled 'thorough-bred,' which in spite of its previous training he must break in for himself. It is true there is a fine academic tradition about much that Binyon has written. Until his recent war poems, in more than one of which he has exhibited an interesting metrical freedom, he has shown himself a conservative alike in metrical form and vocabulary. But, while he has been a more or less scrupulous observer of the rules of the 'haute école,' there has been nothing actually conventional about his handling of his Pegasus.

To come back to the pilgrim idea. One receives throughout his poems, the impression of an explorer rather than an interpreter of the law, of the seeker after truth rather than of one with a ready-made message to be delivered *ad nauseam*, like Wordsworth in his later years. He has rather impressions, intimations, intuitions to record than any cut-and-dried dogma that will save the Universe. There is about his poetry a sense of the open door, of the soul that seeks inspiration and illumination rather than one which radiates infallibility. Perhaps in this attitude of proving all things and holding fast to that which appears to be true in his eyes, he is a real child of his times, born in that iron interim and interregnum, when the theories of a thousand years have gone down or are going down wholesale in a world-wide catastrophe of war and revolution and their still more alarming consequences. This fluidity of instinct finds its parallel in the rise during the same period of the theory of the *élan vital* of Bergson, which lays stress on instinct rather than reason, on a dynamic Becoming rather than on an eternal and immutable *status quo*. In the present article, therefore, we have largely dealt with the poems in the chronological order in which they have appeared, as it would seem to furnish the most satisfactory method for exploring the growth of the poet's thought especially on the metaphysical side.

In the course of his pilgrimage Binyon has frequented many shrines. In 'London Visions' one feels the influence of Matthew Arnold, and to a less extent of Wordsworth. In others Milton and Keats have to a certain extent inspired him. One predominant characteristic is observable throughout his poems. It is his inclination for musing and reflexion. Occasionally this thoughtfulness has the effect of making him work out too fully an idea that has caught his fancy. A little compression in such cases seems desirable. Again, this thoughtfulness seems at times to become too self-conscious. It leads to a restraint and reticence in his verse which contrasts strangely with the *Sturm und Drang* of the louder-voiced poets of the day. It shows itself very markedly in the absence of climax in the concluding verses of the majority of his poems. Like the Greeks, Binyon prefers to end on the soft pedal. White light rather than white heat appears to be his ideal. There is an equableness about his verse that recalls the equableness of Sophocles.

Apart from certain verses privately printed, the first volume of Binyon's poems appeared in 1894. The poems it contains are illustrative of that dignity of thought and word which is the hall-mark of all his writings. There is about them, in fact, a remarkable maturity, which is often lacking in the early work of young English poets. The fondness for musing mentioned above is already in evidence, yet it is neither puerile nor trivial. Noteworthy, too, is a certain pictorial gift, exercised sometimes with broad fresco-like effects, at other times with a pre-raphaelite faithfulness—an early revelation, in fact, of the future fine critic of Western and Eastern painting, for Binyon as a writer on the fine arts is but little less celebrated than Binyon as a poet.

As these early poems are less known than they ought to be, we propose to make quotations from three of them. Moreover, these quotations will exemplify certain sides of his poetry to which we shall refer later. The first, from the fine 'Requiem for A. S. P.,' reveals the reflective powers of the poet.

'Too much hadst thou of pain, and fret, and care;
Yet surely thou wast meant for joy: to whom
Life that had given thee days so hard to bear,
Could still yield moments of so rare a bloom.

'That longing in me which can never sleep,
To live my own life, to be bravely free,
What is that longing but the passion deep,
The sweet endeavour, to be true to thee? . . .

'Austerely fair, the vast cathedral, filled
With February sunshine, marbles old,
Pillar on pillar, arch on arch revealed:
The light, the stillness, on my grief took hold;

'Hushed within those gray walls, that could not change,
When kneeling sorrow heavenly comfort hears;
Appeased by their eternal strength, that, strange
Itself to pain, permitted human tears.'

Truly a fine epitome of that final farewell in which grief and consolation are so strangely intermingled.

The second quotation is from 'Recollections of Cornwall,' and is in a pictorial vein.

'Ah, that wild slope beyond Penzance,
Where, deep in heather, drowsed we lie,
Till on us steals the fairy mist
And makes a blank of sea and sky;
Blots out the distant Lizard coast,
And steals across the silent bay;
Saint Michael's Mount becomes a cloud,
And dimly wanes the lingering day.'

The third quotation is from 'Niobe,' the forerunner in that epic and narrative field that the poet cultivated later with such success in 'The Death of Adam,' and above all in 'The Death of Tristram' and 'Penthesilea.' The poet tells how, in answer to the prayers of Niobe, the Olympians came down to sleep-enchanted Thebes and buried her children.

'But on the tenth day the high Gods took pity,
And in the fall of evening from their seats
In heaven, came down toward the silent city,
The still, forsaken ways, the unechoing streets;
And through the twilight heavenly faces shone.
But no man marvelled; all yet slumbered on. . . .

'And while stars gathered in the lonely blue,
They buried them, with haste and nothing said;
Feeling, perchance, some shade of human years,
And what in heaven is nearest unto tears.'

It is, however, as the poet of London that Binyon first made his mark. Others have sung of London in various aspects, notably Wordsworth in his splendid sonnet; while Westminster Abbey has inspired more than one noble poem. But, with the exception of Henley, Buchanan, Davidson, and the more popular ballad-mongers, no one has made the various sights of London more peculiarly his own than Laurence Binyon. He had seized and captured the very *genius loci* of the place—so impalpable and yet so real. 'London Visions,' together with the 'Praise of Life,' originally appeared as three separate numbers in Mr Elkin Mathews' 'Shilling Garland,' in the goodly company of Henry Newbolt's 'Admirals All,' Stephen Phillips' 'Christ in Hades,' and Robert Bridges' 'Purcell Commemoration Ode.' Most of these 'Visions,' collected in one volume, were republished in 1908.

The poems have sometimes the vigour and realism of a Strang etching, at other times they recall the vaporous atmospheric effects of Whistler. 'Red Night,' which is a fine description of a nocturnal London fire, possesses the qualities of both. It is also reminiscent in parts of Schiller's 'Song of the Bell.' Many of the pieces deal with work-a-day themes, as roadmenders, Salvation lasses, the Hyde Park reformer, the toy-seller, the rag-picker and all the flotsam and jetsam of Whitechapel High Road at night. Binyon has in fact done for the humbler folk of London what François Coppée did for the submerged tenth of Paris. But the most significant poem from our particular standpoint is that entitled the 'Threshold,' which opens with a splendid description of the glories of the full-flooding Thames at sunset. The poet recalls the youthful Thames of the upper reaches.

'Far from these paven shores, these haughty towers,
Where wave and beam glorying together run,
As though they would disown those cradling bowers,
And gushed immediate from the molten sun.'

But soon passing into a reflective vein, the poet, as he

becomes at one with Nature, hears 'a voice from the deep heart Of all things speaking to the heart of men.' It tells him that, in spite of the disappointment and dejection that change and decay and personal failure may engender, 'placid earth remains, a mirror for thy hundred moods.' Though one small sphere must necessarily fail to interpret the 'full choir' of the multitudinous orbs, yet that far-off music can alone finally content us. Life is continuous and one; only union with the heart of life can satisfy a 'spirit freed' and with its 'spirit wed.'

An even finer poem is 'The Statues.' To the poet the statues are those outcasts and derelicts that haunt the public streets and squares, inevitable products not only of the civilisation of our own times but of all ages, crippled Caryatides that seem, as it were, indispensable to the support of its structure. These the poet looks on *sub specie æternitatis*; and, while the sculptor's chief preoccupation is to breathe life into the inanimate marble, Binyon has been equally successful in the opposite task of petrifying these forms of flesh and blood and endowing them with the qualities of lifeless stone, while at the same time preserving all that is permanent in their humanity. Addressing the passers-by he says:

'They haunt the shadows of your ways
In masks of perishable mould;
Their souls a changing flesh arrays,
But they are changeless from of old.

'Their lips repeat an empty call,
But silence wraps their thoughts around.
On them, like snow, the ages fall;
Time muffles all this transient sound. . . .

'When sages, star-instructed men,
To the young glory of Babylon
Foreknew no ending; even then
Innumerable years had flown,

'Since first the chisel in her hand
Necessity, the sculptor, took,
And in her spacious meaning planned
These forms, and that eternal look;

'These foreheads moulded from afar,
Those soft, unfathomable eyes,
Gazing from darkness, like a star;
These lips, whose grief is to be wise.

'As from the mountain marble rude
The growing statue rises fair,
She from immortal patience hewed
The limbs of ever-young despair. . . .

'There is no bliss so new and dear,
It hath not them far off allured,
All things that we have yet to fear
They have already long endured.

'Nor is there any sorrow more
Than hath ere now befallen these,
Whose gaze is as an opening door
On wild interminable seas.'

The subject of the main poem in 'Porphyryon and other Poems,' published in 1898, is the description of a monk's long quest after an apparition of magical loveliness he has once beheld; 'The Supper,' another long poem, might well be regarded as a pendant of 'London Visions.' It describes a supper given by one of the idle rich for his amusement to a set of wastrels and outcasts collected at random. Neither piece is without interest, but from the point of view of our article another poem, 'The Renewal,' must be regarded as 'pivotal.' Passing from Autumn, that strews 'On silent paths the perishing pale leaves, Fallen, like thoughts the heart no more believes,' into the realm of Spring, the poet addresses the Soul of all souls, the Lord and Master of that creation which is ever proceeding.

'How shall my too full heart, my stammering tongue,
Render thee half the song which thou hast sung
Into my being, by no web of words
Hindered, and fluid as the note of birds?'

Once possessed of this spirit of creative evolution, he has no use for that 'secure philosophy' 'that would so easily untie the knot Of this hard world.' 'How,' he asks, 'should the universal heart be known To him that can so hardly read his own?' for sympathy, not

intellect, is the key. Only he can read the riddle who can enter into the heart of all things, 'torn with their hunger, thirsting with their thirst.' Pain, delight, and thought disappear 'as colours perish into perfect light'; the poet is only conscious of

'One infinity of life that flows
From the deep ocean-heart that no man knows
Out into these unnumbered semblances
Of earth and air, mountains and beasts and trees;
One timeless flood which drives the circling star
In furthest heaven, and whose weak waves we are,
Mortal and broken oft in sobbing foam,
Yet ever children of that central home.'

The 'Odes,' published in 1901, contain work of somewhat unequal value. If 'Amasis' telling the story of Polycrates' ring is too direct a challenge to Schiller's ballad and, in spite of its merits, lacks the breathless rapidity and doom-like inevitableness of the German poem, on the other hand, the opening piece, the 'Dryad,' has all the virginal purity and freshness of a descriptive chorus of Euripides, while 'The Death of Tristram' is one of the finest things that Binyon had so far written. It is a bold thing for a young poet to trespass on the territory of the writer of the 'Idylls of the King,' but, thanks to its simplicity and sincerity and its dramatic power and passion, the poem holds its own with the overwrought daintiness of many of those pocket epics.

'The Death of Adam' (published in 1904) belongs to the same category as 'Niobe,' 'Porphyryion' and 'The Death of Tristram.' It has many of the qualities of epic poetry—simplicity, breadth of treatment and a certain spaciousness that recalls Milton and the 'Légende des Siècles'—but the verse lacks at times the rapidity and sweep of rhythm one looks for in an epic poem. It is certainly inferior to 'Penthesilea' (published in 1905), a poem which goes with a swing from start to finish. Any one reading the two poems aloud cannot fail to mark the difference. There are no *langueurs* or *longueurs* about 'Penthesilea.' The poem deals with the coming of the Queen of the Amazons to Troy and of her death at the hands of Achilles. The poet lives over again and

makes us live the sad days in Troy that followed Hector's death. The reflective element is, as it should be, almost entirely absent. The workmanship is rich but never overwrought, a happy medium between the somewhat Spartan plainness of 'The Death of Adam' and the over-elaborateness of the Tennysonian Idyll. Another fine piece in the volume containing 'The Death of Adam' is 'The Deserted Palace,' written in the sumptuous style of Keats, and should certainly be included in any select edition of the poet's work.

In 'England and other Poems' (published in 1901) the opening poem is an invocation to England to be true to herself. In 'Sirmione,' the favourite haunt of another poet, Catullus, the sight of a starlight night provokes the reflexion that, for all their magnificence, they, the stars, are 'dead, all dead! 'Tis but the beauty of Medusa's head Gleaming on us in icy masks.' But the poet's soul indignantly repudiates the idea. 'Light to light answers, even as heart to heart, And by their shining we in them have part,' for 'light, life and love are one!' This again suggests that heroes are the stars in the night of time, while in the future there shines yet another galaxy composed of those who shall fulfil all the things in which we come short—who 'shall into strong towers build The stones we bled to gather'; and that these two hosts 'the mighty dead and mightier unborn,' undivided commingle. 'Time is rent away; There is no morrow; no, nor yesterday,' in that transcendental sphere.

'Mother and Child' again contains some remarkable ideas. Thus the poet, musing over the infinite variety that exists between flower and flower, finely asks:

'What secret purpose infinitely wrought,
Each in its lovely kind and character,
These breathing creatures in the light astir,
Articulating new an endless thought
That still with some last difference must refine
The likeness it had sought?
Some bloom to mateless glory will unfold,
A grace undreamed some airy tendril twine,
Some leaf be veined with unimagined gold.'

And this tendency to differentiate, as Wordsworth

saw in his 'Intimations of Immortality,' produces likewise that gradual severance of the growing child from 'the vague twilight that keeps' him 'kin to all the unconscious race' and makes him a self apart—a separation that the mother herself with sad foreknowledge lives through, because it also betokens her own.

Other noteworthy poems are 'Ruan's Voyage,' a Norse legend of the Rip Van Winkle kind related with much spirit; a fine ballad on the Battle of Stamford Bridge, so full of vigorous movement and alertness, one hopes that Binyon may again essay this difficult *genre*; and the lovely 'Bab-lock-hythe,' which is redolent of the charm and magic of the upper Thames.

With 'Auguries' (published in 1913) we come to a volume which, more metaphysical than the preceding ones, enables us to enter still more fully into the laboratory of the poet's deeper thought. The first poem, a Prelude of an Evening, reaffirms the oneness of Life. 'Malham Cove' contrasts in striking language the towering rock above the cave and the river that issues below. The rock represents 'a barrenness knowing not change nor date nor event, a strength without speech'—'yet stronger than speech,' a veritable 'stature of Death,' towering above the water which with its music calls to the poet to follow, for here is his own heart. And the poet yields to the charm and becomes as it were one with the river. A storm arises and through its apocalyptic gloom the rock transfigured appears as Earth the Titaness, who through her very sternness and wildness tempers and hardens the souls of her children. The storm passes, and the poet, once more identifying himself with the river, and indeed with all rivers, proclaims the common message, 'We move, we are ever beyond, we change, we die; We laugh, we live, to follow, wilt thou not dare?'; and the poet accepts the challenge. In his heart 'is a flowing no power can bind, For his thought there is not a close, nor for his soul an end.' Nay, life and home have no other meaning than 'to be poured out as a stream, or a song.' In other words, πάντα ρᾶ; and we are part and parcel of the eternal flux of things.

'The Mirror' raises the problem, where are the beauties of the past, the snows of yester-year? Are they

as completely abolished as the reflexions of the mirror, 'beauty's relic and oblivion,' 'the soul and mystery of emptiness'? And yet what might not the mirror recall? Not merely the eyes that gazed within it seeking its oracle, but the very soul behind them, wraiths and apparitions of all the passions of mankind. Earth herself has her mirror, the moon, that 'sorceress of million nights,' 'inspirer and enchantress of myriad hearts,' yet sightless, deaf; 'pity she has made, but none has had.' Nay, does not this soulless glass of Mother Earth mirror forth also the ultimate fate that shall overtake her and all her teeming life, reducing her to 'emptiness, night within night, immense and issueless.' Yet this is not the final answer. The soul that hath worn the 'sweet attire' of earth yet 'dwells in the glory of God's desire,' 'itself the end no end discerning,' transfuses world upon world, 'till all the Universe be wrought Into its far perfecting thought,'—till the microcosm of man's mind and the microcosm of the Universe become as it were the single 'mirror of God, pure and alone,' that sees and is seen, knows and is known.

In 'The Tiger Lily,' a brilliant poem that invites far longer quotations than it is possible to give here, the poet addresses the Tiger Lily at evening as 'a seven-throated Flower of Fire,'

'Sombring all the shadows near thee,
Dost still, as if the night did fear thee
Glory amid the failing hues.'

He feels a strange influence arising from it and exclaims:

'O cold to touch, to vision burning,
What power is in thee so to change
And my familiar sense estrange?
Thou seemest born within a mind
That has no ken of human kind; . . .

'Yet like some word of splendid speech
Beyond our human hearing's reach'—

which, could we catch it, might well be the key-word of the riddle of the Universe.

The poet tries to penetrate the secret of the flower's existence by dreaming 'his dark heart to earth,' and

resigning his senses one by one, hoping by his intellectual *κρηδισις* to attain his aim, even as one might seek to learn the secret of the lilies of the field. Was there no pain or travail that went to its making, long before 'man was in his own shape'? 'Far, far, thou seemest as the evening star,' he cries; and yet the flower exercises over him a strange fascination, answering to some 'unmated' want in his soul, holding some of the mystery of his own being 'secretly yet splendidly unfolded.' The whole poem reminds one of one of those Japanese prints in which the artist has striven to enter into and reveal the very soul of the flower.

No attempt to sum up the message of Laurence Binyon can afford to ignore 'The Secret,' a very remarkable poem, which so far has only appeared in magazine form in the 'English Review.' The poem consists of two parts. In the first part the poet, sunk in reverie, learns that, though he pass through endless vicissitudes of the worlds and ages, yet

'In the end I must return,
To the something alone that in each of us breathes and sleeps,
Profound, isolate, still,
And must brave the giant world, and from hour to hour
Must prove its own will;
To this self, unexcused and unglorified, drawn
From its fond shadows, and bare,
Wherein no man that has been, none that is or shall be,
Shares or ever can share. . . .

'Alone and abandoned of all familiar uses,—
Itself the only place
It knows,—a question winged, barbed and burning
In the answerless frost of Space.'

Has the utter loneliness of self amid the outer loneliness of things been ever better described? It recalls the sublime eloquence of Pascal. Apostrophising the stars and the night around, he cries,

'I am strange to you, O Stars! O Night, I am your exile,
I have no portion in you.
Though you shall array your silences against me,
I know you and defy.—
Though I be but a moth in an abyss of ages,
This at least is not yours, it is I!'

The vision changes. The poet finds himself back in the days of his youth, in the month of May, lying in the 'glowing shade,' his 'very body drenched with a speechless joy' whose cause he could not divine. 'The sky was poured in singing rivers of blue,' 'like a shaking of heavenly bells Was the sound of the leaves in the tower of branches blown!' The poet continues:

'But I knew not where my soul was; in that hour

Neither time nor place it knew!

It was trembling high in the topmost blossom that drank

Of the glory of airy blue;

It was dark in the root that sucked of the deep earth; . . .

It streamed in the sun's desire.'

It was not the bird, but 'the bird's bright wayward swiftness,' not the flowers, but their flowering, not the singer, but the song. The poet touched his own flesh, only to find it strange, and yet earth and sky cried, 'It is you'; and then, unable to tell his thought from the green of the grass, his bliss from the blue of the sky, the poet asks himself, using the language of St Francis, 'Who is not my brother, and who is not my sister?' 'Have I passed you by, nor perceived how luminous in you all infinity lies?'; and, penetrating the unnumbered hearts of all things, he realises that his own share in all, being neither 'alone nor afraid,' but throbbing in the life that can never be destroyed 'in the things Time never made'—or, in other words, in the universal *élan vital*.

Under the title of 'The Four Years' Binyon has collected the numerous war poems in which he has recorded the varying moods and sensations through which many of us have passed during that long period of national stress and strain. The simple dedication at the beginning to Richard Henry Powell, 2nd Lieut. Cinque Ports Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment, serves as an admirable proem to the whole.

'Strong, loyal-souled, full-hearted, blithely brave,

Only remembering love knows all he gave:

Beautiful be the stars above his grave.'

In this volume Binyon has come by his own, not as the poet who revels in the pomp and circumstance

of war, but rather as the interpreter of that cultured England which, *audax omnia perpeti*, has dared to suffer and to think, and by thinking has reached those ultimate truths that alone can bring abiding consolation.

By a happy inspiration he has reprinted certain earlier poems which notably, like 'Thunder on the Downs,' heralded the coming storm. The opening war poem entitled 'The Fourth of August' will always remain as a living document of the emotion that swept through the nation at the outbreak of the war.

'Now in thy splendour go before us,
Spirit of England, ardent-eyed,
Enkindle this dear earth that bore us,
In the hour of peril purified.

'The cares we hugged drop out of vision,
Our hearts with deeper thoughts dilate.
We step from days of sour division
Into the grandeur of our fate.

'For us the glorious dead have striven,
They battled that we might be free.
We to their living cause are given;
We arm for men that are to be.'

Truly the trumpet call of that wonderful army that sprang as it were by a miracle from the soil when Englishmen suddenly realised the country was in danger!

This splendid overture was soon followed by two masterpieces in which the poet revealed himself as the spokesman not merely of the cultured but of all classes—or rather of the whole nation. 'To Women' and 'For the Fallen' are inscribed for ever on the heart of England. As regards the first, who has hitherto ever so well described before the woman's part in war?

'Your hearts are lifted up, your hearts
That have foreknown the utter price,
Your hearts burn upward like a flame
Of splendour and of sacrifice.

'For you, you too, to battle go,
Not with the marching drums and cheers,
But in the watch of solitude
And through the boundless night of tears.

'Swift, swifter than those hawks of war,
Those threatening wings that pulse the air,
Far as the vanward ranks are set,
You are gone before them, you are there!

'And not a shot comes blind with death
And not a stab of steel is pressed
Home, but invisibly tore
And entered *first* a woman's breast.'

Equally if not indeed better known is that wonderfulthrenody for the fallen in which the poet who in his early 'Requiem for A. S. P.' had expressed so touchingly his sorrow for the loss of a beloved friend, now utters in unsurpassable verse the sorrow of a whole nation for its dead:

'With proud thanksgiving, a mother for her children,
England mourns for her dead across the sea.
Flesh of her flesh they were, spirit of her spirit,
Fallen in the cause of the free.

'Solemn the drums thrill: Death august and royal
Sings sorrow up into immortal spheres.
There is music in the midst of desolation
And a glory that shines upon our tears. . . .

'They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old:
Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn,
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We will remember them.'

But it would need a separate article to do justice to the volume, which contains over sixty poems. Here we can only allude to a few of the more striking, as 'The Antagonists,' with its fine analysis of the soul of France going forth to battle, and 'The Bereaved,' which is a splendid variant of the poem 'To Women,' and in which the lingering suspense and anguish of those at home for those at the front are depicted in immortal verse. These are perhaps the most poignant stanzas of a poem one would like to have quoted in its entirety.

'Oh had we failed them, then were we desolate now
And separated indeed,
What should have comforted, what should have helped
us then
In the time of our bitter need!

'But now, though sorrow be ever fresh, sorrow
 Is tender as love; it knows
 That of love it was born, and Love with the shining eyes
 The hard way chose.'

Other noteworthy poems are 'The Deportation' with its subdued yet striking realism, 'The Arras Road,' 'Cambrai,' 'An Incident at Cambrai,' and 'Fetching the Wounded' with its Rembrandt-like night effects. It is not for nothing that the author was for months a stretcher-bearer in a French clearing station. In some of these the metre literally throbs with war rhythms that even more than the words recall to the reader the very mood and sensations of the scenes the poet is depicting. Here he has, time after time, let himself go with the happiest results, notably in 'Gallipoli,' which moves with the freedom and sweep of a Pindaric ode, while in 'Stonehenge' the static grandeur of the unchanging past and the bustle and vigour of the young artillery horsemen is most happily reproduced in the varying rhythms. And finally there is one grim little poem in *vers libres* entitled 'Hunger' which appears to us a brilliant success in that most difficult of all 'genres':

'I come among the people like a shadow.
 I sit down by each man's side.

'None sees me, but they look on one another,
 And know that I am there.

'My silence is like the silence of the tide
 That buries the playground of children;

'Like the deepening of frost in the slow night,
 When birds are dead in the morning.

'Armies trample, invade, destroy,
 With guns roaring from earth and air.

'I am more terrible than armies,
 I am more feared than cannon.

'Kings and chancellors give commands;
 I give no commands to any;

'But I am listened to more than kings
 And more than passionate orators.

'I unswear words and undo deeds.

Naked things know me.

'I am the first and the last to be felt of the living.

I am Hunger.'

Laurence Binyon, as we suggested at the outset, is a many-sided poet. 'The Death of Adam,' 'The Death of Tristram' and 'Penthesilea' all testify to his power to revivify and recreate the past, just as 'London Visions' bears witness to his power to show the poetry underlying the commonest and most sordid lives of to-day. His supreme sense of beauty is illustrated by the 'Dryad,' while his feeling for external nature is exemplified by 'Bab-lock-hythe,' by 'Château Gaillard,' and many passages in 'London Visions.' All this poetry represents a very wide sympathy, ever sure, though at times it might be more intense. The underlying emotion is, in fact, unduly sacrificed to a *penchant* for reverie and reflexion, 'sicklied o'er,' one might say, 'with the pale cast of thought,' if the expression were not too strong. But, when this reflectiveness is quickened, as it were, by the breaking-through of the fires of passion below, then, as we have seen in the analysis of such poems as 'Sirmione,' 'The Mirror,' 'The Secret' and others, the poet achieves a rare clairvoyance and insight into the heart of things, extending to mere animate nature as in 'The Tiger Lily,' or even to inanimate things as in 'The Statues,' and the description of the rock in 'Malham Cove.' He becomes in fact the seer, with a real message to deliver, even if, as we see, it is of a somewhat metaphysical nature.

And, lastly, in his war poems he becomes the mouth-piece of English culture under the duress of war, interpreting its deepest emotions and giving as it were the answer of its truest and best to the Sphinx-like riddle of Death, rising in his supremest moments to the spokesmanhip of the whole nation in those two immortal poems, 'To Women' and 'For the Fallen,' while his verse grows ever more subtle and plastic as it becomes more and more attuned to the infinite modulations of suffering and anguish which form as it were the minor key of the music of war.

We have not infrequently heard Binyon compared

to Wordsworth. There is obviously in both a common bent towards meditation and reflexion and a desire to explore and interpret the mystical *arcana* of Nature. But the parallel may be carried still further. 'The Four Years' probably finds its closest prototype in literature in the Political Sonnets of the Lake Poet. Each is, in fact, a sort of intermittent diary of some of the chief psychological moments through which the English nation has passed in the two greatest wars in its history. It is interesting indeed to compare the supreme *Leit-motiv* in each case. In Wordsworth's poems the chief stress is laid on liberty. In Mr Binyon's it is rather the pathetic side which is uppermost. The spirit of the former is the spirit of the French Revolution. The spirit of the latter is that of Stoicism tempered by Pity. Both poets in fact, in their best war poems, have been the true interpreters of their time and their nation, and both have thereby secured for themselves immortality.

But if Wordsworth, especially the Wordsworth of the earlier period, may be regarded under certain aspects as a prototype of Binyon, the later Wordsworth may also serve with his growing prolixity as a warning example to the latter. The French have a hard saying, 'Qui ne sait pas se borner, ne sait jamais écrire.' Binyon writes with such apparent facility and abundance, that one feels at times the need for concision and compression. His failing is not Dryden's neglect to blot, for the workmanship is uniformly good, but a neglect to eliminate not so much the superfluous as the superabundant. The poet, as Pindar learnt early, must not sow from the sack.

CLAUDESLEY BRERETON.

Art. 10.—RAILWAY NATIONALISATION.

1. *Railway Transportation: Its History and its Laws.* By Arthur T. Hadley. Putnam, 1886.
2. *The Case for Railway Nationalisation.* By Emil Davies. (Bibliography.) Collins' Nations Library, 1913.
3. *The Case against Railway Nationalisation.* By E. A. Pratt. (Bibliography.) Collins' Nations Library, 1913.
4. *Railway Working during the War.* [Cmd. 147.] 1919.
5. *Report of the Royal Commission to enquire into Railways and Transportation in Canada.* Ottawa, 1917.
6. *Historical Sketch of Government Ownership of Railroads in Foreign Countries.* By W. M. Acworth. Washington, D.C., May, 1917.

No country has ever nationalised its railways as the result of deliberately weighing the respective advantages and disadvantages of private and public ownership. Belgium, soon after its separation from Holland in 1830, was led to decide for State ownership mainly by the fear lest its railways should come under the control of Dutch capital. Prussia in the early days built State railways to serve the poor provinces to the east of Berlin, because private investors were not prepared to build them. After 1870, Bismarck nationalised the whole of the lines for two main reasons, of which the foremost was military and the second the desire to establish State control over an important factor in the national life. Switzerland acquired its railways in 1898; and again, as in Belgium, the main reason was that the control of the principal companies was passing into foreign hands. The bulk of the Italian railways were inherited from the various States that were absorbed into United Italy; but in 1885, after an elaborate investigation, the Government leased all the lines to three companies for a period of sixty-three years, with a break at the end of each twenty years. During the whole currency of the lease there were constant disputes between the lessor and the lessee, till finally, being unable to obtain a satisfactory revision of terms, the Government, suddenly and not without reluctance, cut the knot that it had failed to untie, and in 1905 assumed possession, as by the provisions of the lease it was entitled to do. In 1907 Japan followed suit,

partly for military reasons, and partly because the terms of the concessions prevented the Government from making the reduction in rates which was regarded as necessary in the general interest of the country. Finally, in 1908, yielding to the persistent agitation of the *Etatistes*, M. Clemenceau promised to nationalise the Western Railway of France. The majority of the Chamber, excluding, however, the bulk of the representatives of the districts affected, approved. The Chambers of Commerce—in France they are official bodies—of every town in the country of more than third-rate importance protested. The Senate held out for six months, but finally, by a majority of three only, submitted to M. Clemenceau's threat that he would resign, if he were not permitted to fulfil his promise. And, while in all the countries mentioned (with the exception of Belgium, which before the war was seriously considering the propriety of abandoning State railways after seventy years' experience), the policy of national ownership had, speaking generally, the support of public opinion, in France it was promptly recognised that the change was not for the better. Before the war it used commonly to be said that the experience of State management of the Western Railway had postponed any discussion of the extension of the policy for a generation.

If it be true, as a matter of history, that nations do not decide to nationalise or to refrain from nationalising their railways, on the ground of experience of what other countries have done or are doing in different circumstances, or of what they themselves have done in the past under different conditions, nor yet on the grounds of abstract theory, the usual arguments *pro* and *con* become mainly academic and need not be elaborated. They can be found stated at length in numerous books, a few of which are mentioned at the head of this article.

The arguments in favour were summarised in an elaborate *exposé des motifs* prefixed to the Prussian Expropriation Law of 1878. This summary may be further summarised thus:—

‘Various abuses are inseparable from private management, namely,

- (1) The existence of numerous concerns of doubtful solvency and restricted capacity of service ;

- (2) Abuse by the concessionaires of their privileged position;
- (3) Opposition to desirable reforms;
- (4) Complicated and arbitrary variations in their methods of organisation;
- (5) Chaos of tariffs;
- (6) Quarrels and waste resulting from the fierce competition of numerous separate administrations.

'The State system of unified management offers the following advantages :—

- (1) Avoidance of the construction of competing lines;
- (2) A reduction in the numbers of officers and staff and in the amount of correspondence;
- (3) Unification of tariffs and train schedules;
- (4) Simplification of dealing with damage claims;
- (5) Provision of interchange stations;
- (6) Better use of equipment;
- (7) Avoidance of duplications of service and of round-about routing of traffic, which result in higher operating costs and consequently higher rates.'

Over against the Prussian conclusions we may put those of the Italian Royal Commission, which was enquiring at the same time as the Prussian Ministry was reporting, and published its proceedings in seven quarto volumes in the year 1881. They are summarised as follows by Hadley (*op. cit.*, p. 223) :—

'1. Most of the pleas for State management are based upon the idea that the State would perform many services much cheaper than they are performed by private companies. This is a mistake. The tendency is decidedly the other way. Private companies can do for their patrons many things which the State cannot; but it is doubtful whether the State would be justified in doing anything of the sort which private companies cannot. The State is much more likely to tax industry than to foster it. And, when it attempts to tax industry, it is more omnipotent and less responsible than a private corporation.

'2. State management is more costly than private.

'3. The political dangers would be very great. Politics would corrupt the railroad management, and the railroad management would corrupt politics. These effects have already been seen in actual working. Changes of rates are made for the sake of influencing elections.'

These Reports are now nearly forty years old. It is the firm belief of the present writer that the additional experience attained since then strongly confirms the conclusions of the Italian Commission. One caveat ought, however, to be entered: generalisations from the experience of one country cannot be applied without qualification to other countries where conditions are fundamentally different. Prussia is—or rather was—a country despotically governed by officials ultimately responsible to the King; and they controlled the railways as absolutely as they did the Army and the Navy. Prussians instinctively submit to authority. The same thing is true of Japan. Prussian railways, it should in fairness be acknowledged, have been moderately successful. To discuss where and how far they have succeeded is beyond the scope of this article; but their success, such as it is, has been due to the fact that they have been managed by an efficient and autocratic Civil Service. The third argument of the Italian Commission against State ownership should then be qualified by some such introductory words as: 'In a democratic State, where Parliament is supreme, and where an ill-informed body of voters ultimately controls policy.'

Reverting to the point already emphasised, that nationalisation is always a question, not of historical precedent or of abstract argument, but one that has to be decided at some immediate juncture according to the practical necessities of the moment, perhaps I may be forgiven for introducing a personal note. The railway problem has been in the forefront of political discussion in the United States for a good many years. In consequence of a Presidential message in December 1915, Congress appointed a joint Committee of both Houses to investigate the whole subject with special reference to the question of Government ownership, and its history in other countries. I was asked to prepare and submit to the Committee an historical sketch of Government Ownership of Railroads in Foreign Countries. What I wrote was only a sketch compressed into some sixty pages. It was as objective as I could make it; and, so far as I am aware, no fact or figure in it has been challenged. But I did not attempt to suppress my own reading of the

facts, that in a democratic State the balance of argument is strongly against Government ownership. My paper was hardly completed when, in the late autumn of 1916, I was appointed by the Canadian Government as a member of a Royal Commission to report on the general problem of transportation in Canada, and especially as to the acquisition of railways by the State. After some months spent in the study of the conditions on the spot, I signed a Report recommending that the Dominion Government should take over the whole of the railways in the country with the exception of those belonging to the Canadian Pacific Company; and this, in face of the fact that Canada had had a long experience of Government railways, that the financial results had been deplorable, and that for that result the intrusion of politics was primarily responsible. Facts are stubborn things. With the strongest prepossession against the course which we ultimately recommended, my colleague and I—for the third member, the Chairman of the Commission, dissented—came to the conclusion that the facts and figures of the case proved that two great railroad companies, controlling some 15,000 miles of line between them, were unable to maintain an independent existence, and that their undertakings must be transferred to the Government, which alone could carry the burden. I shall have a word to say later on as to the subsequent action taken by the Government.

I have told the foregoing story, not for the sake of vindicating my own personal consistency, which is quite unimportant, but because the Canadian experience is very strictly germane to the situation in which the English railways are at the present moment. Before the war, with a long career of moderate financial prosperity behind them, the English railways had already a very serious problem in front of them. The staff, who were receiving an average wage of slightly over 28s. a week for work, which after all even in the lowest grades is not entirely unskilled, were profoundly discontented. Large advances in wages were imminent and, if dividends were to be preserved, could only be met in two ways—by considerable increase in rates and fares, and by far-reaching economies in operation. Traders were fiercely opposed to any increase in rates; and the experience of

1913, when small concessions to the companies only got through the House of Commons with difficulty, even though a definite Government pledge had been given, had shown pretty clearly that Parliament sympathised with the traders rather than with the companies. As for economies, there was no sign that they were likely to be effected on any considerable scale. To carry them out implied an amount of harmony and co-operation between the companies that was not apparent. The staff were certain to object strongly to their life-long habits being disturbed. The traders were equally certain to resist the withdrawal of facilities, however economically unjustifiable, which they had long enjoyed.

Upon this state of things the war suddenly broke in. Within a few hours the Government took control of the whole railway system under an Act of 1871, which empowered His Majesty 'in case of emergency' to take possession for one week, and to retain such possession from week to week 'so long as the Secretary of State shall by warrant under his hand certify that the emergency continues.' The Act provides for arbitration under the Land Clauses Acts to settle the amount to be paid to the companies in full compensation for any loss or injury they may have sustained by the exercise of these powers. But actually it was agreed in advance that the amount of compensation (ignoring elaborate details) should be a sum equivalent to the net revenue of the companies for the year 1913, roughly 46,000,000*l*.

Under this agreement, which neither the contracting parties nor the legislature which authorised it expected to be more than temporary, the railways have been run for nearly five years. So far as finance is concerned, they will be continued under it for another two years by the Ways and Communications Bill now passing through Parliament. The White Paper recently published shows in outline what has happened during the period of control. Government traffic has been carried free. The companies have retained their receipts from ordinary traffic, and out of these receipts have paid their working expenses. And to this net operating income the Government has added each year whatever sum has been required to make up the guaranteed revenue available for interest and dividends.

Broadly the history has been this. Dealing first with revenue:—The receipts from passenger-train traffic remained for the first half of the period at the pre-war level. As the result of the 50 per cent. increase in fares in January 1917, they are now far higher—70,000,000*l.* as against 54,000,000*l.* in 1913. Goods-train traffic has remained practically stationary in value. It was 69,000,000*l.* in 1913, and for the last four years it has varied between 71,750,000*l.* and 75,000,000*l.* But the estimated value of the Government traffic carried free rose from 10,000,000*l.* in 1915 to 42,000,000*l.* in 1918. The upshot is that, reckoning, not in tonnage or number of passengers carried, but in value, and assuming that everything and everybody carried had been paid for, the total revenue earned rose steadily and rapidly from 130,000,000*l.* in 1915 to 178,000,000*l.* in 1918, an increase of 27 per cent.

But, during the same period, working expenses rose from 85,000,000*l.* to 131,000,000*l.*, an increase of 35 per cent. And even this is not the worst. The working expenses include allowance made for deferred maintenance of road and rolling stock—that is, for repair work overdue, which, owing to the lack of men and materials, could not be carried out. And, having regard to present costs, it is very doubtful whether the allowance is sufficient. Further, the wage increases which began in 1915 only reached the final figure of an average of 33*s.* at the end of 1918; and the eight-hours day and other important concessions were only granted in 1919. So the working expenses for the current year will show an immense increase over those of the previous year. Moreover, the value of Government traffic will have fallen from 42,000,000*l.* by at least one-half.

On the whole, the probability is that, for the year 1919, far from the railways earning a net revenue, their gross receipts, which will include those from Government traffic (which since April 1 is being charged for), will fall some 20,000,000*l.* short of their out-of-pocket working expenses. And on the top of this comes the entire net revenue guaranteed to the shareholders. The Budget estimate made early in this year was that the railways would cost the Exchequer 60,000,000*l.* in the financial year 1919–20. If the country gets off for as little as this, it is quite as much as can be hoped. The most sanguine

cannot suppose that the companies, if left to themselves, could for many years to come get back to solvency.

In the phrase of President Cleveland, 'We are confronted with a condition and not a theory.' What are we to do about it? Is the Government to continue, for an indefinite future, to guarantee to the companies a net income which they cannot possibly earn? The strongest argument that was used in France for the nationalisation of the Western Railway was precisely that it was, in French phrase, *une régie désintéressée*, that is, a concessionaire guaranteed a larger revenue than it had ever earned or was ever likely to earn, and lacking therefore the hope of commercial profit necessary to stimulate its energies. In view of the circumstances, the argument is undoubtedly of considerable force here also. But there is much more than this. If equilibrium is to be restored, if the railways are to recover their 1913 position and again pay their way, this result can only be attained by changes that will, one may say without exaggeration, be revolutionary. On the one hand, receipts must be largely increased. On the other hand, expenses must be cut down with a strong hand. Let us deal with the two points separately.

We may reasonably expect that, once the transition period is over and the country settles down to work again, the natural growth of traffic will bring in a considerable increase in revenue. Traffic was growing steadily, though somewhat slowly, before the war. Had the normal rate of growth continued, the gross receipts of 1919 would have been some 10,000,000*l.* above those of 1913. Further, the working classes, not merely soldiers, but all those who have been employed in munitions and other war work, have moved about as never before. They have acquired the travelling habit; and, with the increase in wages, they are not likely to unlearn it. As for goods traffic, it is enough to say that our capacity for the production of steel has increased by something like 30 per cent.; and every ton of steel means four or five tons of ore, coal and limestone. And the vast new factories, equipped with the latest machinery, are not going to stand idle.

But all this, though something, is not nearly enough.

There is no question that goods rates will have to be drastically raised. Sir Eric Geddes indeed suggested in the House of Commons that an increase of 70 or 80 per cent. would be necessary to restore equilibrium. Without supposing that anything of this kind will be attempted, at least at a single stroke—Sir Eric Geddes declared that it was unthinkable—we must assume that a very serious increase is imminent. That passenger fares can be further raised is out of the question. Indeed, judging from the attitude of the public and the House of Commons, it is very doubtful whether the present scale can be long maintained. But this much is clear, that higher fares and higher rates will cause bitter discontent and opposition such as no private company could hope to stand up against. That the higher charges are made on the authority of the State for the direct benefit of the taxpayer, is the only ground on which we can expect them to be submitted to.

The same line of reasoning applies to the reduction of expenses. Economies on a large scale can only be effected by drastic changes in method. In the fabric of habit which they have laboriously built for themselves, our railways and their customers can remain no longer. Other countries have already gone through a process of reconstruction that we have postponed too long. In America, in spite of ever-rising costs, the railway companies staved off a rise in rates for many years by economies in operation. Huge engines, hauling trains carrying net loads of 3000 to 4000 tons; enormous freight cars, crammed to the roof with 30 or 40 tons of freight,* made it possible to earn a profit on hauling traffic three miles for one penny. It is safe to guess, in the absence of statistics, that the charge made here is not less than three times as much.

Now nobody supposes that it is possible, or would be profitable, for us in this small island slavishly to copy the methods of the United States, or that any changes in method would enable English railways to live on rates charged on the American scale. But it is urgently necessary to move in the same direction, even if we do not

* A photograph of a coal car lately built by the Pennsylvania Railroad has just reached the writer. It is constructed to carry 112 tons of coal.

attempt to go so far. We shall need to alter permanent structures, bridges, tunnels, turn-tables, weigh-bridges, all over the country; and to get rid of the restrictions which prevent the free movement of standardised rolling stock anywhere and everywhere. Having done that, we must build new engines and new trucks of the maximum dimensions which the experts think suitable to English conditions; and having built them, we must learn to load trains and trucks to their maximum capacity. Nor is this, be it observed, only an internal railway revolution; it affects every works, every colliery, and every dock in the country. Wherever the railway lines penetrate, sidings will have to be shifted, turn-tables enlarged, colliery screens raised, new tipping appliances installed at the coal staithes, and so on. Further, long trains of fully-loaded trucks mean less rapid dispatch of traffic. English traders have grown accustomed to getting at goods rates what in every other country is charged for as express service. Can one imagine all the important trading interests in the country, manufacturers, merchants, coal-owners, ship-owners, dock commissioners, and so forth, submitting meekly to such drastic alteration in their hereditary methods of doing business at the bidding, and apparently for the benefit, of the railway shareholders? Is it not certain that in every Chamber of Commerce, in the newspapers, and in the House of Commons, there would be such a storm of protest that the companies would be forced to bow to it and abandon their projects of reform? Nevertheless, the need of reform is urgent and imperative. The only force that can put it through is that of the Government, acting with the full authority of the State and for the direct pecuniary benefit of the taxpayer.

The same considerations apply to passenger traffic. It is inevitable that we shall have to forgo many of the luxuries to which we have been accustomed hitherto. To have a long string of porters drawn up shoulder to shoulder to wait the arrival of a main-line express at a terminus was no doubt very convenient for the passenger; but it was always extravagant; and hereafter, when the porter, instead of 20s. a week for a ten-hours' day, is paid 53s. a week for an eight-hours' day, it will be out of the question. And what about train services? Before the

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war the first-class passenger almost expected a compartment to himself, while even the third-class passenger who failed to get a corner felt a distinct grievance. During the war we have had to travel packed like sardines; and, though war pressure will no doubt be relaxed, we shall never recover our old amplitude of space. Fewer trains will mean more intermediate stops, and consequently slower journeys. Further, the adoption of the eight-hours' day must lead to early closing of unimportant stations, cutting off the first and last trains on the country branches, and many similar reductions in facilities formerly given. Of course, passengers will protest and petition, and the State alone can face and overcome their recalcitrance.

At this stage it will doubtless be said by those who on principle object to State management—and at the present moment they probably comprise five-sixths of the upper and middle classes throughout the country: 'What is the use of talking of economy? The Government with its bureaucratic, dilatory, red-tape methods, will dissipate through inefficiency all the theoretical economies on which you lay stress.' That there is a great deal in this argument as a general proposition, I should be the last to deny. But once more we are confronted with conditions and not a theory. Government management is not always dilatory and inefficient. Our Generals and Admirals have not infrequently given a good account of themselves in the stress of actual fighting. And the new Ministry of Transport will have to conduct a very definite campaign, and to fight hard and long to conquer the appalling deficit of 60,000,000*l.* sterling (a sum equivalent to an income tax of 1*s.* 8*d.* in 1*l.*) which they are up against at the present moment. It is to be assumed that the common sense of the English people will grasp the fact that, subject to the general approval of Parliament, the railways must be an almost autonomous service, conducted on other than Civil Service methods, and left to work out their salvation with something of the same freedom which the Home authorities concede to Commanders in the field.

A similar point of practical politics at the present moment is this. That State employment as a rule implies what has been called 'the Government stroke'—a

smaller output per man than is obtained by the private employer—is doubtless true as a general principle. The principle does not apply to the railway service at the present moment. Rightly or wrongly, not only the railway staff but the whole body of organised labour have made up their minds that railways as a public service ought to be run as a State undertaking. That railway men will only continue to work for private companies reluctantly and half-heartedly, is abundantly clear. It is more than possible that they may refuse to work at all unless we accept their point of view, which undoubtedly is—though the capitalist classes have hitherto failed to grasp the fact—that the service of the State is more dignified; and that the profits of the workman's labour should accrue to his mates and the public at large rather than go to swell the profits of the capitalist, whom he firmly believes to be normally 'bloated.'

There are other lines of argument tending to nationalisation as an *interim* at least, though not necessarily as a permanent policy. There is general agreement that the era of competition is at an end. But it has left us with a machine that cannot be worked under a non-competitive system until it has been taken to pieces and reconstructed. Any one looking at a Clearing-House map of England, on which the lines of the separate companies are marked in different colours, will see how inextricably the various systems cross and interlace. The North Western is at Carmarthen, Leeds and Newark; the Midland stretches from Yarmouth, Lowestoft and Cromer on the one side to Swansea on the other; and so on. This *morcellement* of territory is as great a hindrance to economical railway operation as the similar partition of French peasant holdings into scraps here and there is to economical agricultural production. Millions upon millions of train-miles—and the train-mile is the unit of railway expenditure—can be saved by cutting off the excrescences and intrusions, and operating our railway system as a moderate number of self-contained regions after the pattern that has prevailed in France since the dawn of French railway history. Now, for the State to promote and force through the necessary exchanges and truncations of the various lines, while leaving them in the hands

of their present owners, would be an unending task. If, on the other hand, the State takes possession of the whole, leaving the shareholders to look to it alone for proper compensation, the thing becomes a matter of merely internal administration.

Nor is it the railways only that are involved. Our favourite habit of deciding each question as it arises, not in accordance with a definitely thought-out policy, but on the narrow facts of the individual case, has landed us in an utterly illogical position in respect of various other transport undertakings. About half the canals of the country are in the hands of the railway companies; and in not a few cases the railway canals form the only access for the private canals to important traffic points. The common belief that this state of things is due to the superhuman cunning and wickedness of the railway companies is entirely unsupported by history. But the fact remains; and the conclusion is irresistible that, if we are to have a logical organization of transport, the railway canals must be surrendered by their present owners and co-ordinated with the remainder under a single unified canal department.

The same thing holds in reference to ports and docks. At present we have three systems. Sometimes, as in London and Liverpool, the ports and the docks are both controlled by a public authority. On the other hand, sometimes, as at Folkestone and Newhaven and some of the Scotch ports, the railway company not only owns the docks and piers, but is also the harbour authority. More commonly there is a mixed system, under which there is a public harbour authority, while some or all of the dock accommodation within the harbour limits belongs to railway companies, as is the case in the great ports of Southampton and Hull and Newcastle. Now, no one would attempt to defend such a system on abstract grounds. Further, such a shifting of the old course of traffic as must be implied in the transition from competitive to non-competitive railways ought to be carried out in the interest of the country as a whole; bearing in mind, at the same time, the reasonable claim of each individual port that it shall not be condemned to starvation. It would appear that only by entrusting

the matter to a single over-riding authority can this double end be attained.

Yet another argument may be adduced, which is not without considerable weight. It will hardly be questioned by those who know what was happening in other countries that before the war English railway management had got into a rut. There is no need to blame any one, or to specify particular instances. But the fact is that, even when reforms and improvements were accepted as desirable, they failed to get carried through, or at best were carried through in a half-hearted manner. One reason for this is easy to see. So long as railways were competitive, an enterprising manager knew that, if he disturbed old habits and established methods on his own system, his staff might resist, and his traders might transfer their custom to a rival line. The result was something like stagnation. A clean break with the past has from this point of view considerable advantages. Further, the English railways have not hitherto recruited for their service more than a few men of wide general education. Natural capacity is there in full measure. But men who go to work as lads of fourteen or sixteen—as has hitherto been the case with the great bulk of those from among whom administrative positions have to be filled—cannot be blamed, if their vision is more circumscribed than that of a man whose education has been carried forward up to university standard. It may be assumed that public service, with a wide career open to those who 'make good,' will enlist men of the same standard as crowd at present into the examinations for the first-class Civil Service. And whatever anybody may think of Civil Service methods and the deadly influence of a purely office routine on organising efficiency, it cannot be denied that the Civil Service at the present moment can command the pick of the brains of the country.

For all these practical reasons the present writer is convinced that, things being what they are here and now, railway nationalisation, not necessarily as a permanent, but at least as an *interim* policy, must be accepted as the best course open to us at the moment. Even if we were to refuse to accept this theoretic

conclusion, we can hardly get away from the conviction that the result is practically inevitable. Railway proprietors, who, if their property was handed back to them, would be face to face with an almost hopeless financial situation, naturally desire it. The organised working classes are determined to have it. And where is an effective opposition to come from? Mere mental hostility does not command votes. The trading classes unquestionably dislike the idea of nationalisation. But they dislike high rates still more. And it is clear that it is only by the abolition of competition and the consolidation of all the railways into one unified system or group of systems that large-scale economies can be effected. Unification on a non-competitive basis in private hands would never be tolerated by public opinion.

Proceeding, then, on the assumption that nationalisation has to come, there remain for consideration two points: How is the process to be carried through? and what is the form that the new organisation should take? The Ways and Communications Bill, which has now passed through Committee stage in the House of Commons, as originally introduced gave the Minister powers by Order in Council to acquire railways and other transport undertakings, and to operate them himself or lease them to operating companies. But the whole of these powers were withdrawn before the Second Reading. As the Bill now stands, the position is that the existing temporary possession under the Act of 1871 will continue for a further period of two years, with, however, this important difference, that, whereas till now the management and operation have, subject to the exigencies of the public service, substantially remained in the hands of the companies themselves, for the next two years the Directors and officers are required to obey the direction of the Minister in reference to the rates and fares to be charged; the salaries and wages to be paid; the working or closing of any lines or stations; the carrying-out of alterations, additions and improvements; and the introduction of co-operation by running powers or common use of lines, of rolling stock, repair shops, etc. Any permanent settlement will have to be made by Act of Parliament hereafter.

It is quite clear that all the above-mentioned alterations and rearrangements would never be made as a temporary measure; they can only be introduced as part of a logically thought-out and complete scheme. Now, if a man, proposing to occupy a house, decided to pull down a wing here, to add on an additional storey there, and to rearrange the whole interior, common sense would dictate that he should come to terms with the owner before starting the work. It would seem that the Minister is in the same position here. His first task will be to make such a settlement with the proprietors as will leave him free to deal with their property as he thinks best. This can be done in two ways: by out-and-out purchase, or by guarantee. A guarantee can take two forms: a guarantee of an aggregate amount to a company as a whole, leaving to the Directors the apportionment among the different classes of stock-holders; or a guarantee to each class of stock-holders separately. To an out-and-out purchase, implying the issue of many hundreds of millions of stock, with the possible liability of finding large additional sums in cash, we may assume the Chancellor of the Exchequer would, in present circumstances, refuse his consent. There remains the guarantee. And the difference between the two forms is very much a matter of practical convenience; for to fix the amount of a guarantee as a whole, it would be necessary to estimate, with some approach to accuracy, the reasonable claims of the several classes of stock.

What the total amount of the guarantee is likely to be no one can estimate in advance. But certain broad considerations naturally suggest themselves. There will certainly be persons, representing a voting power by no means negligible, who will urge that the purchase price of undertakings, which not only have no net revenue but are actually being carried on at a serious loss, should be a derisory sum. On the other hand, the English people are not only just but generous, and may be trusted to appreciate that English railway shareholders have deserved well of their country. They have invested a sum of 1,300,000,000*l.* of solid money—there is probably as little ‘water’ in English railway stocks as in any important class of investments in the world—and not only have they done this without State help,

but the State has been responsible for saddling them with a serious burden of unnecessary expenditure. They have never received more than a very moderate return on their investment; and they have provided for public use a transport machine which, with all its faults of duplication, and though not a little out of date, has yet proved itself so efficient that the strain of carrying 40 per cent. more traffic than it was ever designed for has failed to break it down.

There is also another consideration. Under authority of Parliament, given either directly or through delegation to the Chancery Division of the High Court, hundreds of millions of Trust funds have been invested in railway debenture and preference stocks. In equity no Government can disclaim a responsibility for the result of its own action. Nor could any Government afford to do so in its own interest. It is difficult to imagine what would be the effect on Government credit of any attempt to deal harshly with the owners of Trust securities. On the other hand, all Trust securities are not in the same class. A man who bought even first debenture stock of a great company took a security inferior, as shown by the market price, to Consols, because he counted on thereby getting a better income. And the same applies, *a fortiori*, to a man who bought second preference stocks of some small railway. It would be unreasonable to give to a man who bought such a stock—yielding, say, 4 per cent.—when he might have bought Consols, a Government guarantee of his full present income in perpetuity; for that would be giving him something which at the outset he deliberately refused to pay for.

Ordinary stocks stand in a different position. They are bought as much on the basis of prospective as of present income. Expectations have been grievously disappointed; and, to some extent at least, the holders must expect to take the consequences. Their property has deteriorated in value, not, broadly speaking, through any action of the Government, but, like many other undertakings, through the fortune of war. They have been hit by two things: a rise in wages, and a rise in the cost of material. It may fairly be urged that the rise of wages would not have been so great as it has been, had not the Government interfered. But it cannot be denied

that much the larger part of the rise only corresponds to the rise that has universally taken place under private employment. As for the rise in the cost of materials, Government action is in no way responsible for it.

Another matter will need consideration. The value of the shares of two companies, each paying the same dividend, may be very different. One company has its plant in first-rate condition, facilities provided in advance of traffic, and large reserves in cash; another company may only be paying its dividend by a process of what the American calls 'skinning the property.' All this will have to be taken into account before fixing the guarantee. The conclusion of the whole matter seems then to be that, whereas the guarantee for pre-ordinary stocks can be fixed on general principles, that to be given to ordinary stocks must be a matter of investigation and bargain adjusted to each individual case.*

Assuming the whole financial situation worked out and settled, and two years will not be too long for so complex a process, then—though doubtless in practice the two things will go on alongside—we come to the question of the reorganisation of the material property and the staff that must operate it.

The material property—dealing here with railways only—may be divided into two parts, the fixed and movable plant respectively. With regard to the former, the passing-away of a system of competition obviously implies an immense amount of reorganisation. In the first place, the small independent systems, the Hull and Barnsley, the North Staffordshire, the Cambrian and the like, will simply disappear. Further, the *réseau*—

* Frequent reference has been made in the Press to the Act of 1844, which has been described as the 'Shareholders' Charter.' Briefly it may be said (1) that the Act is wholly inapplicable to existing conditions; (2) that in the whole course of public proceedings, ranging from the Royal Commission of 1865 down to the Rates and Charges Acts of 1891-2, it has been described or treated as unworkable; and (3) that, if it were applied, the results would be disastrous to the shareholders. In effect the Act provides that the shareholders shall be given twenty-five years' purchase of the net profits on the average of the three years preceding the purchase. If a purchase were made in 1921, the three years would be, 1918, showing a net profit substantially the same as the present guaranteed income, and 1919 and 1920, in each of which there will be a loss.

the 'network,' to use the convenient French phrase—of each of the great companies will have to be made into a real net, covering a certain definite region of the country, and no longer projecting, starfish-wise, into the territory mainly occupied by another. To make this scheme workable, there will be much physical rearrangement required. Junctions between rival routes that approach but do not meet will be made wherever traffic can be more conveniently served thereby; duplicate stations will be closed, sometimes very much to the convenience of passengers; exchange sidings, no longer required when the traffic is in one hand throughout, will be abolished, and so on. Another group of changes will be forced on by the immense increase in labour cost. When to man a roadside signal-box on a main line there are required, not two men each at 30s. a week, but three men each getting 63s., we must expect to see a great extension of automatic signalling. Again, in the goods yards and goods sheds mechanical appliances will be largely introduced to save man power.

Rolling stock will be pooled throughout the country; all private ownership of railway wagons will come to an end; wagons for the use of an individual colliery will be supplied out of the common stock from the most convenient point; and the appalling waste of capital implied in the construction of superfluous wagons and superfluous sidings to hold them, and of working expenses in the unnecessary sorting and hauling of empty trucks, will be very largely reduced. For the first time it will be possible to decide, after scientific study of all the factors involved, and free from the obstruction of vested interests, what is the type of wagon best suited for normal English traffic. To the layman this may sound a small matter, but no railway man will question that it involves a sum of money running into millions per annum. Then there comes the question of standardisation. Every railway company has naturally and properly adopted the types of construction which it believed best suited to the special circumstances of its own individual line. But every manufacturer knows what the economy of mass production means; he also knows that, though a standard article is always the result of compromise, the sacrifice

of some small amount of special adaptation is much more than compensated by the vast economy attained.

The reorganisation of staff is also in large degree a question of mass production. There are at present as many chief engineers as there are companies, each with his own staff of assistants, draughtsmen and clerks. A large part of their work can be concentrated in the office of a single 'engineer of standards' at headquarters. At present each chief engineer, to take one instance, designs his own bridges and puts out his own specifications for tender. In future, one must suppose, there will be in the office of the Engineer of Standards a Bridge Section, which will keep a set of standard specifications, one or other of which will be fit for adoption in all but exceptional cases, so that batches of the same type, identical in dimensions, rivet-holes and so forth, can be ordered at the same time. The same thing applies to rolling-stock construction. Individual companies have at the present moment sometimes from twenty to thirty different types of locomotives. A much smaller number of types—perhaps a dozen—might well suffice for all the needs of the United Kingdom. If, instead of one company having to manufacture all the types that it needs, Crewe, let us say, were given an order for 300 of one type, while Swindon undertook to turn out the whole requirements of another type, it is easy to see what the resulting economy would mean.

Of course the programme here sketched implies not two years, but a very much longer time, during the whole of which the question, whether it is in the long run cheaper to work the existing plant to the limit of its useful life or to scrap it for the sake of uniformity, will constantly come up. But this is a problem that every manufacturer has to face every day in the week. And the Ministry can go ahead with the conviction that Parliament, which passed without a division the Second Reading of the Ways and Communications Bill, has definitely declared for a policy of unification, and will not revert to the picturesque diversity of the past.

Force of circumstances seems to prescribe, in principle at least, the interior organisation of the new Ministry, and the manner in which its central control will be exercised. The Ministry will settle policy, lay down

general principles, and fix standards. The executive work will be left to the new regional organisation which must be built up, on the nucleus of the existing organisation of such of the great companies as continue to exist.

In reference to the matter which is likely to rouse more public interest than any other, the revision of rates and fares, Parliament has, by an amendment of the Bill as originally introduced, provided that the Minister shall refer the question for advice and report to a Committee of five or six persons—a judicial member nominated by the Lord Chancellor; two representatives of trading interests nominated by the Board of Trade; and two or three members nominated by the Minister himself, one to represent transport interests, another to represent labour, and a third who may or may not be added at his own discretion. The Committee are to enquire and take evidence, publicly or privately as they may decide, and report to the Minister. But the Report will not be a public document, and the Minister will not be bound to follow the advice of the Committee.

It is to be remembered that, as has been said above, the entire scheme of the Ways and Communications Bill is temporary and transitional. The task assigned by it to the Minister is, in the first place, to transform the old competitive system into a new unified system, and then to prepare and submit for the approval of Parliament a scheme for the management of the unified railways hereafter. The country is committed to unification, which implies temporary nationalisation. To nationalisation as a permanent policy it is not committed. But the private and almost wholly autonomous companies, as they have existed hitherto, are things of the past. The management passes under the tutelage of the State. If the companies continue to exist, it may be that they will become, as in France, India, Holland, and formerly in Italy, lessees of the State, strictly controlled by the covenants of their leases. The advantages of some such system are obvious. There would be less danger of political interference with the actual management; and the lack of flexibility, enterprise and promptitude, commonly regarded as inevitable in a Government machine, would be avoided. On the other hand, railway history

shows no instance where the relations of lessor and lessee have been harmonious. In Italy, as has been said, they became impossible, and the lessor re-entered into possession. In France there has been constant strife between the Ministry, complaining that the companies were not living up to their obligations, and the companies, complaining that the Ministry was exceeding its functions. In India railway policy is at this moment in the melting-pot, and no one yet knows what new system will emerge.

There are two other methods by which it is possible for a public authority to retain full control, and yet at the same time to avoid the responsibility of direct management. In Germany, before the war, not a few of the great municipalities entrusted the management of undertakings of public utility, gas, water, electric light, tramways, and so forth, to a company in which the Municipality held shares sufficient to make it an important if not a predominating shareholder. The system is understood to have worked satisfactorily. The public authority protects the public and gives the company the benefit of its superior credit, while at the same time the benefits of private enterprise are preserved; and, what is perhaps even more important, the company organisation interposes a buffer which absorbs the shock of political pressure. The same system was introduced in Mexico, while Mexico was still an organised community, by Mr Limantour, the brilliantly able Finance Minister of President Diaz; and it worked successfully for a good many years. The Government acquired at small cost a holding of deferred common stock in the National Railroad Company, which, while offering no prospect of a dividend, gave them the majority vote in a stockholders' meeting. The Directors, an ordinary Board of business men, managed the undertaking, and were left substantially free to manage it, subject, however, to the knowledge that the Government could at the next annual meeting vote them out of office.

Canada is at this moment setting a new precedent. Since the early days of Confederation, the Dominion Government has owned and operated a railroad, the Intercolonial (about 1800 miles in length) in the Maritime Provinces. The management has been a byword for

extravagance. The fairly substantial earnings have been insufficient even to cover actual expenses. It is hardly disputed that this result has been due to political interference. More recently the Government itself built and has till the other day operated the National Transcontinental Railroad, from Montreal to Winnipeg, another 1800 miles. Concerning this railroad, one fact suffices. It was estimated to cost \$35,000 a mile; it did cost \$90,000, without providing anything for rolling stock. The Royal Commission, as has been said already, recommended that, in spite of this experience, the State should take control of another 15,000 miles of railway then in the hands of private companies. The Government has acted on this recommendation. It has already acquired the whole of the common stock of the Canadian Northern, with over 10,000 miles of line, thereby securing absolute control of the undertaking. It is at this moment negotiating terms on which the Grand Trunk and the Grand Trunk Pacific shall be taken over also.

The chief interest of this proceeding lies in the question how the Government proposes to manage this huge concern—with control of 20,000 miles of railway. The Commissioners, mindful of the baleful influence of politics in the past, proposed that the management should be vested in a body of Trustees, to be originally appointed in the Act of Parliament by name, but subsequently to be self-perpetuating; in other words, nominating their own successors, the Government having power to reject but not to change the nominees. This recommendation, deliberately designed to make the management independent of Parliamentary interference unless and until the system was altered by a new Statute, has not been accepted in full. But the Government and Parliament have gone a considerable distance in the direction proposed. By an Act just passed there has been constituted a Dominion Railway Company, with a Board of Directors composed of business men of high position, with powers of management as full as those vested in the Board of an ordinary commercial company. This Board is already managing the Canadian Northern; the two lines hitherto controlled by the political Minister of Railways, the Intercolonial and the Transcontinental; and the Grand Trunk Pacific. It is understood that it will assume the

management of the Grand Trunk also as soon as the negotiations for the transfer are completed.

Of course it will be said that this is only a paper protection against politics. The members are appointed by, and must take their orders from, the Government, under pain of dismissal. This is no doubt true, but it is, after all, inevitable. Parliament, as representing the public, is and must be supreme. If Members of Parliament determine not merely to settle broad policy, which they clearly should do, but to put their fingers into the actual management, which all experience proves they cannot do without disastrous results, and if they are permitted by their constituents to have their way, then it must so be. But Canada at least points to a way in which it is theoretically possible to get the advantages of State ownership without the disadvantages of State management. When the period of reconstruction is over, we may do well—substituting, to meet English conditions, say, six or eight companies for one single company—to consider whether we cannot follow the Canadian precedent of administration by boards of business directors. With this difference, however. In Canada the Government is the sole shareholder, and naturally therefore appoints the entire Board, and will take all the profits when there are any. Under Canadian conditions this was inevitable. But here in England things are different. If half a dozen of the great companies are kept alive during the transition period, it may prove desirable subsequently to bring them back to active life as operating companies, with Boards partly of official nominees, partly representative of the shareholders. In other words, to adopt a scheme similar to that of the German municipalities, by which the private shareholders are rewarded for successful management by some agreed proportion of the net profits above their guaranteed net income.

W. M. ACWORTH.

Art. 11.—RECONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES.

WHEN the armistice of Nov. 11 brought the active war to a conclusion, the United States had not reached the climax of its military and economic effort. Nineteen months after the declaration of war America had increased its total armed forces on land and sea from 293,000 to 4,339,000. There had been transported overseas, by the joint efforts of the British and American navies, an army of 2,053,347 men, of whom 1,338,169 had been in action by Nov. 11. The economic mobilisation, which had proceeded but slowly during the first year of the war, was greatly accelerated in the early spring of 1918, and had nearly reached its culmination in November, although its results in the form of an abundant flow of all necessary supplies and munitions would not have been fully manifest until the spring of 1919.

The United States was hardly more ready for peace and the resumption of normal life in the fall of 1918 than it had been prepared for war in the spring of 1917. The American people as a whole had suffered but little; its losses, although distressing, were insignificant in comparison with those of its associates in the war. The war-time restrictions, relating mainly to food and fuel, had not been of such severity or duration as to cause depression. The rewards of labour and agriculture were greater than ever before in the history of the country; military service was still, to the majority of men in the army, a novel experience rather than an intolerable burden; enthusiasm for the war had not abated, but on the contrary had been greatly increased by the successes of the summer and fall; in short, the country was not tired but was only conscious of its rapidly increasing strength and was eager to exert it to the utmost.

The end of the war brought the nation face to face with a variety of problems, some of which, such as the military and economic demobilisation, the re-employment of labour, and the readjustment of industry, grew directly out of the war, while others were old problems seen in a new light or presented under greatly changed conditions because of the lessons and experiences of nineteen months. To this latter group belonged such

questions as the disposition of the railroads, the formulation of a shipping policy and the development of commerce and industry, and the whole series of problems centring about labour, including the relation of labour to capital and industry, the control of immigration, matters of public health and welfare, and the new direction of education.

No general or systematic preparation had been made for facing or solving the problems of readjustment. In the fall of 1918 two plans were proposed in Congress, neither of which came to a vote; one of these plans called for the appointment of a Congressional Committee on Reconstruction, the other provided for a Federal Commission on Reconstruction to be appointed by the President. The latter, which was understood to have the tacit support of the Administration, called for enquiries into such problems as the financing and development of the merchant marine, the development and direction of foreign trade, the readjustment of industries to normal production, the redistribution and employment of labour, the advancement of technical education and industrial research, the supply and distribution of food-stuffs and raw materials, the conservation and development of natural resources, the organisation of the railroads, telegraphs and telephones, and the reorganisation of the governmental departments and bureaus.

Questions which in the early fall of 1918 seemed not to be pressing came, however, to the front when Congress assembled for the new session on Dec. 2. It had been expected that the President would present a more or less definite programme of reconstruction, but the programme was indefinite, even to the point of vagueness. With regard to readjustment in general he appeared to deprecate the idea of any systematic and comprehensive survey or treatment of the many problems involved:

'So far as our domestic affairs are concerned, the problem of our return to peace is a problem of economic and industrial readjustment. That problem is less serious for us than it may turn out to be for the nations which have suffered the disarrangements and the losses of war longer than we. Our people, moreover, do not wait to be coached and led. They know their own business, are quick and resourceful at every

readjustment, definite in purpose, and self-reliant in action. Any leading-strings we might seek to put them in would speedily become hopelessly tangled, because they would pay no attention to them and go their own way. All that we can do as their legislative and executive servants is to mediate the process of change, here, there, and everywhere as we may. I have heard much counsel as to the plans that should be pursued and personally conducted to a happy consummation, but from no quarter have I seen any general scheme of "reconstruction" emerge which I thought it likely we could force our spirited business men and self-reliant labourers to accept with due pliancy and obedience.'

By way of justifying this view, the President proceeded to point out that there were already many agencies in existence, such as the Council of National Defence, the War Industries Board, the War Trade Board, the Food and Fuel Administrations, the Departments of Labour and Commerce, which had, during the war, been the centres of unified and co-operative action; and that, by reason of their special knowledge of conditions, they were better able than any newly created organisation to 'mediate the process of change' in their respective fields. Furthermore, the President remarked that already, during the period of three weeks that had elapsed since the signing of the armistice, there had been rapid progress in the return to a peace footing, a progress that 'promises to outrun any enquiry that may be instituted.'

Probably the President was correct in his estimate of the situation. A comprehensive enquiry, like that conducted by the British Ministry of Reconstruction, if undertaken as a preliminary to demobilisation and readjustment, would undoubtedly have served a most useful purpose, but by December the return to normal conditions was already well under way, and the existing agencies were endeavouring, not without a certain degree of success, to cope with the situation. It is worth while to review rapidly the process of this return during the first six months following the armistice.

The plan formulated by the War Department of the United States for the demobilisation of its armed forces differed from that followed in Great Britain and in

France, in that it was based chiefly on military considerations. The moment the armistice was signed, all draft calls were cancelled and drafted men *en route* to mobilisation centres were, so far as possible, returned to their homes without having been mustered in. Certain classes of troops, starting with the Development Battalions and including the conscientious objectors, the industrial furlough men, the Students' Army Training Corps, the Officers' Training Schools, the Spruce Production Division, the railway troops, dépôt brigades, and replacement camps, were designated for immediate discharge. The return of troops was begun at once, many transports being turned back in mid-ocean.

The General Staff set as the maximum rate of demobilisation, to be attained as soon as possible, the return from over-seas of 310,000 per month, and the discharge of 30,000 men per day, until the army should be reduced to a temporary force of 500,000 men. By Jan. 1 over 670,000 men had been discharged, and 123,000 of the expeditionary forces had been returned to the United States. At the end of six months more than a million men had returned from France, and a total of 2,101,000 men had been discharged.

In order to mitigate such industrial disturbance as might arise from the rapid release of so many men various measures were taken. In the first place, men (such as coal-miners) urgently needed in industry or required to relieve distress in their families were given priority in discharge. On the other hand, men who had no employment in sight were allowed to refuse discharge until such time as they were assured of positions. A bonus of \$60 was paid to each man upon leaving the service, and he was allowed to retain and wear his uniform. Of especial importance, however, were the efforts of the Federal Employment Service in the Department of Labour, aided by the Council of National Defence, the State Councils of Defence, and municipal agencies, to secure employment for discharged soldiers. Special employment bureaus were established in industrial centres, and representatives of the Federal Employment Service were maintained in all the demobilisation camps, where they rendered direct and effective aid to the men about to be discharged. Thousands of men who had left

their positions but a short time before the armistice were able to return to them, the Federal Government, in this respect, setting the example by reinstating former members of the classified Civil Service. Efforts were also made to provide 'buffer' employment. The Government on Nov. 19 ordered all work on Federal buildings to be resumed; and the States, counties, and municipalities took up again the programmes of building and construction that had been interrupted by the war. In this way the winter passed without developing an alarming situation, although in January and February unemployment increased over a rapidly extending area.

The demobilisation of war industries and of war material proceeded even more rapidly than that of the armed forces. All Sunday or overtime work on Government contracts or in Government-controlled plants was at once stopped. The War Industries Board immediately removed or modified the restrictions that had been placed on a great variety of materials, especially those used in building, construction, and agricultural operations. The War Department had outstanding thousands of contracts aggregating over \$5,000,000,000, and a huge accumulation of supplies and materials which would not be needed after the cessation of hostilities. In order to terminate the contracts without disturbing conditions they were grouped in three classes: those that should be carried through to completion, those that should be tapered off, and those that should be cancelled at once. Contractors were called upon to prepare statements showing raw material on hand, work in process, finished articles ready for delivery, and special cost items. These statements were checked by the War Department's Central Boards of Contract Review, and were then referred to the local or district boards, composed of representative business men, engineers, and legal and cost experts, whose function it was to reach a fair settlement with the contractors. In case of disagreement between a local board and the contractor, the latter could appeal to the Board of Contract Adjustment of the War Department in Washington, and in case of further disagreement he could have recourse to the United States Court of Claims. Provision was made for immediate payment to the contractor of seventy-five

per cent. of the minimum agreed upon, in case such payment was necessary to enable him to switch his plant over to peace work. By the end of May over ninety per cent. of the contracts had been terminated.

On the whole, it must be acknowledged that the transfer from war work to peace work took place with a minimum disturbance of labour conditions, notwithstanding the large amount of unemployment during the winter months already referred to. The Federal Employment Service acted for those discharged from war work as it acted for those discharged from military service. During January and February it referred nearly a million workers to positions, and most of this number were definitely reported as placed. The fact that the winter was one of the mildest on record, with a correspondingly early spring, facilitated the process. Many factories, notably those of the automobile makers, which had been turned over very largely to war work, switched at once to peace work, and were in urgent need of labour to enable them to deal with the large accumulation of private orders.

The disposal of nearly 2,000,000,000 dollars' worth of surplus supplies and materials was undertaken by the Surplus Property Division of the General Staff, created for that purpose. Vast stores of surplus supplies were sold to foreign Governments; large amounts, especially of building materials, were requisitioned by other departments of the Government or were sold to State and municipal institutions. Such materials and supplies as were placed on public sale in the United States were, after conferences with the industries or businesses most concerned, offered in such quantities and under such conditions that they were readily absorbed without having an unfavourable effect upon the market or upon production. By the end of May one-eighth of the surplus had been disposed of at prices representing eighty-eight per cent. of the cost.

Restrictions and regulations of all sorts affecting daily life, business and manufactures were removed as speedily as possible. A week after the signing of the armistice, the food and fuel regulations respecting wheaten bread, sugar, and 'lightless nights' had been withdrawn, and the voluntary press censorship agreement

had been terminated. Inasmuch as these regulations were those that most directly affected the average citizen in his daily life, their withdrawal marked sharply the transition from active war to presumptive peace. Of more importance, though less apparent to the multitude, was the removal or modification of restrictions on manufactures and business. Restrictions on non-war products, especially building and construction materials and implements, were removed immediately. By Nov. 20 practically all priority ratings had been revoked; and by the end of December the War Industries Board disappeared, such of its functions as were appropriate to peace times being transferred to permanent departments.

The regulations of the War Trade Board respecting imports and exports were modified more gradually; every week lists of articles that might be imported or exported without licence were published; but the blockade continued in force, and the Government still needed much shipping and cargo space for the supply of the forces overseas and for their return to the United States, as well as for food shipments to the hunger areas in Europe. Consequently control over ocean-borne commerce could not be relaxed at once.

The Capital Issues Committee, whose function it had been to decide upon issues of securities by industrial and other corporations in order that the investment power of the nation might not be diverted to non-war enterprises, was disbanded at the end of December. Numerous other war boards or committees ceased to exist within a few weeks of the signing of the armistice; and the Fuel and Food Administrations reduced their staffs to a minimum and greatly narrowed their various activities. Price-fixing agreements or regulations were for the most part terminated by the end of 1918, although later an unsuccessful effort was made, under the auspices of the Department of Commerce, to fix the prices of basic commodities in order to facilitate the resumption of buying. By June 1 the process of demobilisation, both military and economic, was rapidly approaching completion, and the resumption of normal activities was well under way.

With the signing of the armistice the country began

to give earnest if somewhat belated attention to the problems of readjustment; and there at once began a series of 'reconstruction' conferences and congresses. Most of these were held under the auspices of various civic bodies, such as the National Municipal League, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Academy of Political Science, the American Public Health Association, the National Popular Government League, in which were discussed every conceivable problem of readjustment, political, economic, and social, as well as a multitude of reforms for which the times were believed to be propitious. The conference which attracted most attention was that of the Governors and Mayors, which was held at Washington, in March, upon invitation from the Department of Labour. The sessions of this conference were marked by striking differences of opinion, but in the end some ten conclusions were agreed upon, the more important of which were these:

Aliens advocating or plotting the overthrow of the Government should be deported.

The Government should expand and improve the railroad systems while they are under its control.

There should be no price-fixing by the Government, but instead the publication of full information respecting fair prices.

There should be no reduction of wages or of standards of living.

The Federal Employment Service should be continued.

The holding of natural resources by speculators should be prevented.

The agency of the national Government which has devoted most attention to readjustment in all its phases is the Council of National Defence, which, shortly after the armistice, organised a Reconstruction Research Division, the purpose of which is not to formulate policies but to analyse and investigate the problems of readjustment and to secure all possible information relating to them. One of its most helpful activities is the preparation of a bulletin entitled 'Daily Digest of Reconstruction News' which it distributes to governmental agencies. In general, its function is to facilitate co-operation among the various departments and offices

of the national and State governments, and to render possible a better co-ordination of activities. In most of the States, the investigation of reconstruction problems has been organised by the State Councils of Defence or by special commissions appointed for the purpose; and similar enquiries are being conducted in some of the larger cities. The practical results of all these conferences and investigations are still problematical, but they indicate a keen interest on the part of the general public and an earnest desire to make the future better than the past.

It remains to survey rapidly and in their general aspects a few of the major problems and plans of readjustment now before the country, and to indicate some of the changes which have been brought about or hastened by the experiences of the war.

Of all the problems pressing for solution none is more urgent or immediate or more in the public mind than that presented by the railroad situation. In his message to Congress of Dec. 2, the President stated that it was this question that was causing him the greatest concern. The railroads of the country were taken over by the Federal Government at the end of 1917, and have since been operated under Government control. The legislation under authority of which they are operated provides that the Government shall pay to the railroad corporations a rental equal to the average of the last three years' earnings; and that the roads shall be returned to their owners not later than twenty-one months after the proclamation of peace. The problem before the country is, in its essential character, the choice between public and private ownership. It is complicated by various factors, the first of which is that of mere size. The railroads of the United States are the property of 2905 companies, organised in several hundred systems, operating 397,000 miles of road, employing 1,700,000 persons, with outstanding securities to the amount of about \$19,000,000,000. Another factor is the weakness of many of the roads; a third is the enormous increase in operating expenses during the war, owing in large part to advances in wages. Down to May 1 the Government had incurred a net loss of nearly \$500,000,000

on its operation of the roads; and it seems likely that this loss will increase.

Various proposals have been put forth by the different interests. The first Director-General of the Railroads, Mr McAdoo, proposed in January last that the Government should retain the roads for a period of five years, during which time a great number of improvements and economies could be effected, and opportunity would be afforded for working out a permanent railroad policy in the light of ample experience in unified control and operation.

The Director-General's plan, which was understood to have the support of the Administration, did not necessarily imply ultimate ownership by the Government, although it was generally believed to tend in that direction. Another plan, which advocated immediate and complete ownership by the Government, was offered by the organised employees of the railroads. This proposal may be summarised as follows:

(1) The roads to be acquired by the Government at a price to be determined by judicial proceedings; and securities to be issued to an amount sufficient to cover the cost of purchase and to provide the required amount of working capital.

(2) The roads to be leased to, and operated by, a private corporation organised under Federal charter and having no financial investment in the enterprise.

(3) The employees of this corporation to be divided into two groups: (a) the executive and managerial employees; (b) the wage-earning employees.

(4) The corporation to be controlled by a Board of Directors, of which one-third should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, one-third should be elected by the employees of group (a), and the other third should be elected by the employees of group (b).

(5) The corporation to pay all operating expenses, and to set aside each year such sums for maintenance and renewal and for a sinking fund as the Government should direct.

(6) The net earnings to be divided between the Government and the corporation; any profits accruing to the corporation to be distributed as dividends to the employees of groups (a) and (b).

(7) Rates to be reduced whenever the profits of the Government should equal or exceed five per cent. of the gross operating revenues.

Other plans have been proposed by the railroad executives, by the Interstate Commerce Commission, by the owners of the railroad securities, and by members of Congress and others. Most of these plans are opposed to Government ownership; and in this respect they undoubtedly reflect the general opinion of the country. While differing in details, the plans offered agree in certain essentials, such as private ownership, management and operation; consolidation into a few strong systems, so grouped as to be competitive but without wasteful duplication of facilities; regulation by the Government with respect to rates, issues of securities, service, safety and welfare; assurance by the Government, either in the form of a guarantee or through the establishment of rates, of a fair return on the capital invested adequate to attract new capital.

In his message to Congress of May 20 the President declared his intention of returning the railroads to their owners at the end of the present calendar year. The Congress now sitting must, therefore, endeavour to solve the problem.

Less difficult were the questions connected with the Telegraphs and Telephones. These were taken over by the Government on July 31, 1917, a measure which has since been regarded less as a necessary exercise of the war powers of the President than as a first step towards ultimate ownership by the Government. This purpose was made clear in the annual report of the Postmaster-General, in which he strongly urged that the wires should be acquired by the Government and incorporated in the postal service. A bill to this effect was introduced into Congress, but the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads substituted for it a resolution directing that the telegraphs and telephones should be returned to their owners by the end of the present year. In his message on May 20 the President announced his intention of returning the wires at an early date, but urged upon Congress the consideration of legislation 'which may tend to make of these indispensable instrumentalities of our modern life a uniform and co-ordinated system.'

Probably no American industry or enterprise has undergone a more radical change during the war than the construction and operation of the Mercantile Marine.

After the Civil War the capital and labour of the country were chiefly drawn to agriculture and industry; and for half a century the shipping devoted to foreign commerce did not greatly exceed a million tons. A rapid increase took place, however, during the first years of the European war, until by April 1917, it aggregated somewhat more than two million tons. From that date until the armistice the building of ships was, next to raising and equipping a military force and producing food, the principal business of the nation, with the result that on Nov. 11, 1918, the total gross tonnage of the American merchant fleet had risen to 6,000,000 tons, of which 3,000,000 tons were new construction. Since the signing of the armistice further construction has brought the fleet to nearly 7,000,000 gross tons; and, if the present programme of the Shipping Board is carried out, there will be next year approximately 11,000,000 gross tons of ocean-going steel ships under the American flag.

Quite as important for the future is the growth of production facilities. Before 1917, the United States had about seventy ship-yards; at present there are 341 yards with 1284 launching ways. Along with this growth there has been a corresponding increase in the number of trained ship-yard workers and in the personnel of the Mercantile Marine.

Most of the new fleet is owned, and practically all of it is at present operated, by the Government, through the Shipping Board. The specific problem before the country is the disposition of the vessels and the formulation of a policy which shall insure a future development adequate to the nation's needs. Here again, as in the case of the railroads, public opinion seems clearly to favour the principle of private ownership. The chairman of the Shipping Board has presented a plan which has met with much favourable consideration, and which perhaps has as good a chance as any other plan of being adopted. His proposal may be briefly summarised thus:

The ships to be sold to American citizens at the current world-market price, on the basis of immediate payment of twenty-five per cent. of the purchase price; the remainder to be paid in instalments over a period of ten years, the Government holding a mortgage on the unpaid balance, and charging interest at the rate of five per cent.

The purchaser to insure his equity in the vessel with an American marine insurance company, the Government carrying insurance in its own fund, but for the purchaser's account and at the market rate, covering the part of the vessel for which payment has not been made.

Vessels thus purchased not to be transferred to foreign registry without express permission of the Government.

Each purchaser operating in the foreign trade to incorporate under Federal charter; such charter to forbid the issue of stock in excess of the payments actually made on the property, to forbid the issue or transfer of stock to an alien, and to require that one member of the Board of Directors shall be named by the Government and draw no salary.

The Government-named directors of the various companies to meet periodically in Washington, where they will constitute an official body to confer with and advise the Shipping Board or other designated governmental agency upon matters affecting the development and welfare of the Mercantile Marine.

A Merchant Marine Development Fund to be constituted out of a certain part of the payments made by the purchasers to the Government for interest and insurance, such part to represent the difference between the commercial rates charged and the actual cost to the Government of credit and insurance.

The Development Fund to be used in the establishment and development of new trade routes or in other ways for the promotion of the merchant marine.

Until sold, all ships to continue in Government ownership and operation.

The growth and distribution of foreign commerce is closely associated with the development of the merchant marine. The increase in American trade from a total of \$4,241,000,000 in 1914 to \$8,874,000,000 (two-thirds of which were exports) in 1918 is due in part to the sharp rise in prices, in part to the vast amount of food-stuffs that were shipped to Europe, but also in part to substantial gains in trade, especially with South American and Asiatic countries. Whether the gains made during the war will be held is uncertain, but every effort will be made to secure them. Early in 1918, with a view especially to promoting trade with South America, legislation was enacted legalising combinations for the purpose of engaging in the export trade, a measure

unpleasantly suggestive, it must be confessed, of the German cartel. The Department of Commerce, with its system of commercial attachés, has been engaged in gathering all possible information respecting opportunities for trade, economic conditions in foreign countries, and related matters; and this information is placed at the disposal of American business men in the form of carefully compiled bulletins. The Department of State (Foreign Affairs) has recently organised a Division of Economic Intelligence, the purpose of which is to investigate all matters affecting foreign trade, in order that the policies of the Department may be formulated in the light of full knowledge respecting the interests of American commerce.

A temporary measure for furnishing direct aid to commercial enterprises was adopted in March, when the War Finance Corporation was authorised to make loans, under certain conditions and upon proper security, to corporations engaged in foreign trade. The fields in which extension of trade seems to be most eagerly sought are South America and Asia. Early in June a pan-American commercial congress was held in Washington for the purpose of promoting commercial relations; while about the same time announcement was made of the organisation of a large concern to be known as the American Foreign Trade Corporation, modelled somewhat after the Hudson's Bay Company, for the purpose of trading in the Near East with Constantinople as a base.

It is clear, however, that, whatever may be the development of foreign commerce, imports must constitute a relatively larger share of the total than during the last decade. Not only will the new American-owned vessels endeavour to bring back full cargoes on their return voyages, but the United States has become a creditor country to such a degree that imports must for many years be accepted in partial payment of capital and interest. In his message to Congress of May 20 the President said :

'There are many points at which we can facilitate American enterprise in foreign trade by opportune legislation, and make it easy for American merchants to go where they will be welcomed as friends rather than dreaded as antagonists. America has a great and honourable service to perform in

bringing the commercial and industrial undertakings of the world back to their old scope and swing again, and putting a solid structure of credit under them.'

In the field of industry the war has brought about certain notable changes. In addition to the adoption of better methods of production and the growth of a spirit of co-operation among manufacturers, the most striking development has been the prodigious expansion of small or hitherto insignificant industries. Thus, to mention the most important cases, the production of ferro-manganese and other ferro-alloys has tripled since 1913; the chemical industries, especially the manufactures of dyestuffs, which in 1913 barely supplied ten per cent. of the domestic demand for artificial colours, have developed to such an extent that in 1918 they supplied all domestic demand and contributed to the export trade products to the value of \$17,000,000. The growth of shipbuilding has already been described. In 1913 the United States produced no potash and imported 283,000 tons, mainly from Germany; in 1918 potash to the amount of 60,000 tons was recovered from the dust of blast furnaces and cement works, and the eventual output is estimated at 500,000 tons. The German domination of certain industries by means of patents or stock-holding or infiltration, the extent of which had by no means been realised, has been shaken off through the operations of the Alien Property Custodian. Of new plans for the future, one of the most promising is for the better utilisation of the sources of energy by means of a network of lines for the transmission of electric power to all parts of the country, linking up the coal and oil fields and the principal sources of water power.

The problem immediately before Congress with respect to industrial development is the extent to which the new manufactures shall be protected by a customs tariff. While it is hardly probable that the Republican majority will endeavour to return to the high tariffs of former days, it is clearly the intention of Congress to follow the President's recommendation to favour the development, by means of protective duties, of such industries—especially the manufactures of dyestuffs and allied products—as are necessary to the life of the

country in times of emergency. The President has also asked that means be provided for defence, by the application of retaliatory duties, against hostile and discriminatory legislation on the part of other countries.

During the war the chief agricultural developments were, as in industry, expansion, adoption of better methods, and the growth of a spirit of co-operation. The outstanding fact at the present time is the prospect of a record crop of wheat, for which the Government has guaranteed a price of \$2.26 per bushel. The most interesting proposal with respect to agriculture now before the country is the plan drawn up and laid before Congress by the Department of the Interior for co-operation between the national Government and the States to enable discharged soldiers and sailors to settle on reclaimed lands. With the expansion of the States from sea to sea there is no more free land to serve as a panacea for all ills; but it has been estimated that nearly 300,000,000 acres of unsettled land in all parts of the country are available for cultivation after reclamation by irrigation, drainage, stump-pulling, or soil treatment. It is proposed to employ returned soldiers and sailors in reclamation work until they have earned enough money to enable them to make the first payment for farms on the land which they have been reclaiming, and to facilitate their settlement in groups or colonies. The proposal is similar in its intent and general features to the plans already adopted in Canada and in other parts of the British Empire. Many of the States have already made provision for co-operation with the Federal Government; and it is expected that Congress will take favourable action at an early date.

In the field of labour there have been many interesting and significant developments. The most important of these are: (1) the creation by the Government of effective administrative machinery, such as the Employment Service, the War Labour Board, the Committee on Vocational Education, the Working Conditions Service, and many other branches and services; (2) the general recognition, especially by the Federal Government, of the programme of organised labour as respects rights of organisation and of collective bargaining, hours and conditions of work, labour of women and children,

standards of wages, etc.; (3) the organisation in different parts of the country of local or State Labour Parties, which include in their platforms such policies as State insurance against disability, old age and unemployment, the Government ownership of public utilities, the progressive taxation of wealth, and the extension and democratisation of education; (4) a well-defined movement to secure for labour a greater part in the control and earnings of industry. Without entering into a discussion of these developments, it may be remarked that the position of organised labour in America has been greatly strengthened during the war. Always more conservative than British labour, it has come by many to be regarded as the best defence against socialism and the more radical I.W.W.

Of the many other problems of a special character confronting the people of the United States the two which are perhaps most distinctly American are the control of immigration and the effort to 'Americanise' the alien. It seems probable that immigration will be greatly restricted, perhaps altogether prohibited for a period, and that thereafter the conditions of admission to the country will be much more severe. 'Americanisation,' or the process of education by which it is hoped that the aliens may be better assimilated, is rapidly taking on the proportions of a campaign, the success of which is vital to the welfare of the nation. It is clear that the 'American experiment' is not yet concluded; to many it seems that it has only now reached its most critical stage; but the true American is optimistic by nature and faces the future with a confidence not greatly disturbed either by the shrieks of radical partisans or by the vehement protests of those who look only backward

WALDO G. LELAND.

Art. 12.—MORE DOUBTS ABOUT SHAKESPEARE.

1. *The Genealogist* (new series), Vol. VII, pp. 205-8; Vol. VIII, pp. 8-15, and pp. 137-146; three papers by James Greenstreet, entitled, '*A Hitherto unknown writer of Elizabethan Comedies*'; '*Further Notices of William Stanley, 6th Earl of Derby, K.G.*'; and '*Testimonies against the accepted authorship of Shakespeare's Plays*.' Bell, 1891, 1892.
2. *Sous le Masque de 'William Shakespeare'*; *William Stanley VI^e Comte de Derby*. By Abel Lefranc. Two vols. Paris: Payot, 1918-19.

THERE survive among the Domestic State Papers at the Public Record Office three news-letters, all in the handwriting of a London shipping merchant named George Fenner and bearing the same date, June 30, 1599. All were addressed by the writer to his foreign agents, of whom one lived at Antwerp and two at Venice. Each of the three missives professedly supplies a substantially identical budget of miscellaneous political and social gossip with some slight internal variations of detail. The presence of the letters among the State Papers shows that, although they appear to read quite innocuously, they were intercepted by the English Government on a suspicion of unseasonable communicativeness or duplicity of meaning.

Into his letter to his Antwerp correspondent Fenner slipped, amid a crop of political and social rumours, this isolated statement: 'Therle of Darby is busyed only in penning comedies for the commoun players.' The writer sent the same piece of abrupt irrelevance to one of his Venetian correspondents, merely substituting 'our Earle of Darby' for 'therle of Darby' and omitting the adverb 'only.' The sentence found no place in Fenner's third letter, which he addressed to his second Venetian agent on the same day.

In 1891 James Greenstreet, an industrious archivist and record-agent, first published in the '*Genealogist*' (in the earliest paper cited above) Fenner's twice retailed report that the Earl of Derby was in 1599 busy play-writing for the 'common' or public stage. No reference was given to Fenner's third news-letter which ignored

the matter, nor did Mr Greenstreet mention that Fenner specifically declines to vouch for much of his epistolary gossip, which comes, he warns his correspondents, 'from private talk in Court and city' and often amounts, he admits, to mere 'fable' about affairs of which 'nothing is certainly known.' Such cautious reservations discourage indiscriminating reliance on Fenner's chatter, which may, after all, be intended to convey intelligence other than that lying on the surface of the words.

Mr Greenstreet sought in vain any substantive corroboration of Fenner's statement about the Earl of Derby's playwriting activity. The Earl in question was William Stanley, sixth holder of the title, who, born in 1562, succeeded his brother Ferdinando on April 16, 1594, and lived inconspicuously till Sept. 29, 1642. There is evidence that he modestly shared the cultured tastes of his family and of his class. He occasionally patronised literature, the drama and music. An unimportant piece of dance-music—'a pavin made for the Orpharion'—was printed with his permission (in 1624) under his own name in a music-book composed by Francis Pilkington, a 'chaunter' of Chester Cathedral. The Earl's 'pavin' is the sole concrete surviving sign of his artistic accomplishment.

Compared with the records of a score of contemporary peers and of other members of the Stanley family, whose names and work are familiar to students of the literary or artistic life of the period, the sixth Earl's accredited literary and artistic pretensions are indefinite and insignificant. Certainly no play in print or manuscript bears his name as author. Neither theatrical nor literary records of contemporary or of subsequent date enrol the Earl among playwrights. Nevertheless, out of the solitary slender thread of Fenner's irresponsible and ambiguous gossip, and in spite of all the negations of probability offered by the ascertained facts of the Earl's public and private career, Mr Greenstreet spun a confused and barely coherent web of mystifying conjectures and fanciful coincidences, which led him not merely to the conclusion that the Earl of Derby was a voluminous playwright but also to the stranger inference that the Earl's dramatic labours included all the plays hitherto associated with the name of William Shakespeare. It

is charitable to assume that Mr Greenstreet sought in a rash moment 'rather commendation of wit in being able to hold argument than of judgment in discerning what is true.'

Mr Greenstreet died on Nov. 4, 1891, just after completing a third paper in support of his wild fantasy. So far as I can learn, his so-called discovery attracted no attention at the time of its publication. After his death all the notes and memoranda which preserve his 'evidences' were presented by his widow to a personal friend, the late Garter King, Sir Alfred Scott Gatty. Ten years ago Sir Alfred invited my reluctant acceptance of Mr Greenstreet's manuscripts as a curiosity of research. The bundle of papers is, in my view, a mass of shallow critical fopperies; it remains in my possession.

Twenty-eight years have passed since Mr Greenstreet delivered his unheeded message. A few months ago M. Abel Lefranc, professor at the Collège de France, who has won a general reputation as writer and lecturer on the literature of the French Renaissance, entered the Shakespearean arena as a champion of the dead archivist's neglected revelation. The professor claims by means of 'une réunion extraordinaire de concordances, d'inductions et de faits positifs' finally to establish Mr Greenstreet's attribution of the Shakespearean drama to the Earl of Derby's pen.

M. Lefranc's literary credentials give him a far better title to a hearing than that enjoyed by Mr Greenstreet. Yet it is as Mr Greenstreet's disciple that M. Lefranc avowedly joins battle. He not only allows Mr Greenstreet the full honours of discovery, but draws from his published pronouncements the arguments and proofs which he deems to be most relevant to his purpose. M. Lefranc enmeshes himself inextricably in the snares of his English master. 'Le point du départ de nos recherches' is (M. Lefranc admits) the gossiping sentence in Fenner's news-letters of 1599, which Mr Greenstreet brought to light in 1891. It is true that M. Lefranc works on a wider canvas and in a broader literary light than his predecessor's attainments allowed. He expands Mr Greenstreet's sketch of the Earl and of his family connexions, but he produces no witness to the Earl's

indulgence in playwriting apart from the news-letter of 1599. He only succeeds in picturing a nobleman who, after a long foreign tour around which much unverifiable legend has grown, settled down to the normal life of a *grand seigneur*. We learn how the Earl, who divided his time between his vast landed property in Lancashire and the Court in London, was long harassed by a family lawsuit, which presents features of legal and historical interest. But neither of literary proclivities, nor of distinctive traits of character has M. Lefranc more positive information to convey than Mr Greenstreet had already brought to our notice.

The Earl's handwriting—in the Italian script—was graceful and flowing. A far larger number of surviving specimens than M. Lefranc knows is described in Mr Greenstreet's unpublished papers. No less than sixty-four of the Earl's autographs bearing date between April 2, 1594, and July 10, 1640, are extant in public or private archives. But all these documents belong to the dry and formal category of official or business routine. None shows any trace of literary style or of distinctive personality. M. Lefranc's case seeks support in vain from the Earl's extant correspondence.

In point of fact M. Lefranc bases his argument on something very different from documentary testimony. He relies on an assemblage of vague and ill-digested coincidences between scenes and characters in a few—a few only—of Shakespeare's plays, and scenes and characters with which M. Lefranc (treading in Mr Greenstreet's footsteps) thinks the sixth Earl of Derby to have been familiar. Although M. Lefranc, in his search for analogies, strains his vision to the uttermost, he ignores a great mass of Shakespeare's work because he can detect in it no affinity with the actual or possible experiences of Lord Derby. The character of his critical method may be inferred from his enunciation at the outset of this question-begging postulate:

'Presque tout le théâtre Shakespearien, à une ou deux exceptions près, se déroule dans les cours des rois ou chez les grands de la terre. Jamais les milieux princiers et aristocratiques, leurs idées, leurs sentiments, n'ont été compris ni décrits avec une pénétration plus intime, plus nuancée. . . .

Partout, nous le sentons, spécialement dans les pièces politiques, c'est un membre d'une aristocratie qui parle et qui traite les choses en noble éclairé avec les conceptions propres aux membres des classes dirigeantes.'

It is not always easy to keep a straight face while one examines examples of those alleged coincidences or 'concordances' between facts of the Earl's biography and features of the Shakespearean plays with which M. Lefranc, with eager and easy assurance, reinforces Mr Greenstreet's original deduction. In plays on themes of English political history where, according to M. Lefranc's postulate, Lord Derby's experiences should stare us out of countenance, our attention is directed to such coincidences as these.

In Shakespeare's 'Richard III,' the dramatist introduces the sixth Earl of Derby's ancestor, Thomas Lord Stanley. It is a matter of undisputed history that the startling transference of Lord Stanley's allegiance from King Richard to Henry of Richmond just before the battle of Bosworth contributed very materially to Henry's victory and Richard's defeat in that decisive engagement. Shakespeare, with his keen eye for dramatic effect, not unnaturally lays somewhat greater stress than the chronicler Holinshed on Lord Stanley's eventful machinations. It is this circumstance which leads M. Lefranc to infer that the sixth Earl of Derby seized an occasion, when at work on the play of 'Richard III,' for airing his family pride and piety. M. Lefranc does not appear to be acquainted with pre-Shakespearean plays on the tragedy of Richard III, in which Lord Derby's ancestor is treated on lines barely distinguishable from those followed in Shakespeare's piece. M. Lefranc's fantastic plea, if it be entertained at all, must assign those pieces also to the sixth Lord Derby's pen.

The tragedy of 'Richard II' furnishes our author with an even more delusive link with his hero. John of Gaunt and his son Henry Bolingbroke loom large in this play. Both characters are emphatically identified with the place-name Lancaster. And is not Lancaster, M. Lefranc triumphantly asks, the capital town of the county where the Earl of Derby's estates lay?

It is, nevertheless, only just to admit that, although

M. Lefranc is convinced that Shakespeare's 'histories' are compounded of Lord Derby's political wisdom and aristocratic sentiment, he does not find in them quite so many or quite such clear indications of that nobleman's personal associations and experiences as in some of the non-political Shakespearean plays. M. Lefranc's *pièces de resistance* at his feast of dialectical scraps are 'Love's Labour's Lost' and 'The Tempest.' These dramas admittedly hold very significant places in the dramatist's achievement. With the first of them the dramatist began his great career and with the second he ended it.

To 'Love's Labour's Lost' M. Lefranc devotes much attention, and he develops with fresh and interesting detail a view which I think that I was the first to propound very many years ago. Where there is so much to divide us, it is pleasant for me to find myself in agreement with M. Lefranc in believing that the dramatist in 'Love's Labour's Lost' lightly travestied some identifiable episodes of current French history. The scene of the play is laid in Navarre; and all the chief characters, both men and women, are French. Several of the men are named after famous living Frenchmen. 'Love's Labour's Lost,' according to M. Lefranc, could only have come from the pen of one who had personally mingled in contemporary French society. The actor Shakespeare, on this disputable showing, is deprived of all responsibility for the piece. Lord Derby in his early manhood, when he was known as William Stanley, had spent three years in France on the grand tour; and Shakespeare is not known to have crossed the English Channel. Although there is no positive evidence of his presence in Navarre, Stanley may well have visited that Court, where Elizabethan travellers were always welcome.* In M. Lefranc's eyes

* In other connexions M. Lefranc treats as authentic testimony of the first importance a ballad of doubtful date and origin which was first printed (at Liverpool) some sixty years ago under the title of '(Sir) William Stanley's Travels.' The ballad tells us no more of Stanley's experience of France than figures in the following stanza, which M. Lefranc does not quote:

'Then first Sir William travell'd to France,
To learn the French tongue and to dance;
He tarried there not past three years,
But he learnt their language and all their affairs,'

'Love's Labour's Lost' is an embodiment of the political and social observations which Lord Derby had made while a sojourner in that hospitable little kingdom.

One cannot admit any substantive justification for the suggestion. M. Lefranc is everywhere hampered by the narrow limits of his studies in Elizabethan literature. He is here oblivious of the well-known fact that many Elizabethan playwrights besides the author of 'Love's Labour's Lost' dramatised current episodes of French history. Often they imported into their work far more telling topical touches than appear in Shakespeare's comedy. George Chapman produced a whole series of plays in which he dramatically interpreted the political and social life of contemporary France. There is no evidence that Chapman was ever in that country. The same opportunities of studying current French affairs were open to the author of 'Love's Labour's Lost' as to George Chapman. Lord Derby's French experience has in itself no bearing on the question of authorship.

But M. Lefranc claims corroboration of Lord Derby's authorship from another quarter. Stanley was accompanied on his French tour by a tutor or governor named R. Lloyd (the Christian name is uncertain). One Richard Lloyd published in London in 1584 (while Stanley's tutor, be it noted, was absent from England), 'A briefe discourse of . . . the Nine Worthies.' A pageant or masque of the Nine Worthies is devised in 'Love's Labour's Lost' by the comical schoolmaster Holofernes. Hence M. Lefranc (developing one of Mr Greenstreet's most grotesque fancies) infers that Holofernes is Lord Derby's caricature of his tutor Lloyd. The legend of the Nine Worthies was, through many generations, a common theme of crude popular drama in Mediæval and Tudor England. It was therefore frequently staged in so active a home of popular drama as was the city of Chester from the 13th century onwards. M. Lefranc detects a peculiar significance in the 'concordance' that the city of Chester was not far distant from Knowsley, the chief seat of the Derby family.

M. Lefranc envelopes 'The Tempest' in a similar mist of haphazard coincidences which are too shadowy even to merit the epithet 'specious.' Here M. Lefranc's argument chiefly revolves about Shakespeare's princely

magician and poetic philosopher Prospero. Unquestionably Lord Derby included among his acquaintance Dr John Dee, the notorious Elizabethan astrologer, alchemist and spiritualist. Dr Dee was popular in society; and Lord Derby was one of many peers who admitted this far-famed student of pseudo-science to social intimacy. When 'The Tempest' was written, Dee had been dead for some four years. But M. Lefranc recognises no obstacles in his path. In the person of Prospero he detects a close and literal study by the Earl of Derby of the exploits and personality of his Lordship's necromancing friend. Professors of varied kinds of magic figured in the Elizabethan drama; and Prospero is a poetic idealisation of no uncommon dramatic type. To ordinary vision, there is singularly little resemblance between Shakespeare's ethereal magician, with his incorporeal attendant spirit Ariel, and Dr Dee, the materialist practitioner of the black arts. Dr Dee was powerless without an abundant paraphernalia of magic mirrors, divining crystals, wax tablets, charms and furnaces; and he had at his command, not one familiar spirit or demon, but a whole squadron, although he could rarely communicate with any of them save through the clumsy medium of a hired 'seer' or 'skryer.' M. Lefranc is undismayed by such discrepancies between the methods of Prospero and Dr Dee. Did not Dr Dee at one time hold converse with a spirit called Annael and at another time with one called Uriel? M. Lefranc forgets that these familiars were only two of a crowd with whom Dee claimed unholy communion. But Ariel, according to M. Lefranc, is the Earl of Derby's dramatic fusion of the two names, Annael and Uriel. This theory of M. Lefranc's may be fitly capped by the allegation that Ferdinand, the young hero of 'The Tempest,' is christened after the Earl of Derby's late brother Ferdinando. M. Lefranc omits to mention that the romantic prince is designated by the dramatist 'son of the King of Naples,' in whose family, as in all royal families of Spanish descent, the name Ferdinand was the commonest of appellations.

M. Lefranc's tangled argumentation is indeed of near kinship with Fluellen's proverbial illogicality:

'I tell you, Captain, if you look in the maps of the 'orld,

I warrant you shall find, in the comparisons between Macedon and Monmouth, that the situations, look you, is both alike. There is a river in Macedon, and there is also moreover a river at Monmouth. It is called Wye at Monmouth; but it is out of my prains what is the name of the other river, but 'tis all one, 'tis alike as my fingers is to my fingers, and there is salmons in both.'

Or, by way of another illustration of M. Lefranc's logic, one is tempted to recall the corroboration tendered, by a companion, of Jack Cade's claim to aristocratic descent. Cade asserts that his father was the eldest son of Edmund Mortimer, Earl of March, was stolen by a beggar-woman, and became a bricklayer. Thereupon his sapient friend Smith the Weaver confirms the demagogue's pretension with this luminous outburst:

'Sir, he [i.e. the elder Cade] made a chimney in my father's house and the bricks are alive to this day to testify it; therefore deny it not.'

M. Lefranc's long book claims to be constructive. It aims at establishing Lord Derby's authorship of the Shakespearean plays. But the author necessarily prefaces his constructive demonstration with a brief exercise in destructive criticism. The destructive premiss which gives his constructive conclusion its essential point is enunciated in these uncompromising terms:

'Les ouvrages dramatiques et autres qui ont été joués et publiés, depuis les dernières années du XVI^e siècle, sous le nom de l'acteur William Shakespeare, de Stratford-sur-Avon, ne peuvent en aucune manière avoir été composés par ce personnage.'

Not more than 89 out of M. Lefranc's 655 pages are devoted to the destructive portion of his thesis; and that part seems to me even wilder than the more generously planned constructive section with which I have already dealt. M. Lefranc takes for granted that all the authentic and unquestioned data of Shakespeare's biography present him in the sole light of a rigorous man of affairs, pressing poor debtors harshly and with all his attention absorbed by a materialist ambition to amass property. I cannot admit that this is the sum-total of our authentic and unquestioned information

touching the native of Stratford, whom his friend and critic Ben Jonson hailed as 'Sweet Swan of Avon,' whose epitaph in Stratford Church presents him to his neighbours as the greatest man of letters of his or any day, and whose collective writings were given to the world without any sort of questioning by two actor friends, themselves beneficiaries under the Stratford burgess's will. It is useless, even if space allowed, to detail the omissions which leave M. Lefranc's account of Shakespeare's career a virtual blank. The gist of the matter is that our author is unconcerned with the facts of biography or bibliography or literary history. With almost fanatical heat, and at every hazard, he upholds an æsthetic theory of poetic composition and of poetic personality, which he declares to be irreconcilable with Shakespeare's acknowledged experiences, or rather with that fragment of Shakespeare's experiences, which he elects to notice.

The æsthetic discrepancy between Shakespeare's life and work, which drives M. Lefranc into ecstasies of paradox, has stirred in past and present critics of established repute no qualms of doubt about the authorship of his plays. Yet instead of pausing to enquire whether his own difficulties may possibly be due to some flaw in his æsthetic outlook, M. Lefranc summarily pronounces Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon to be incapable of writing poetry or drama, and to have been fraudulently wearing through three centuries stolen or borrowed laurels. Nor, as we have seen, is M. Lefranc content to leave vacant the throne from which he claims to drive the veteran occupant. He arbitrarily fills the empty chair of honour with the strange candidate of Mr Greenstreet's choosing. Nothing that is known of the Earl of Derby's character and exploits gives him that peculiar kind of qualification for the position which M. Lefranc's own æsthetic creed prescribes. The æsthetic principles which M. Lefranc comes forth to champion fail to answer the crucial test of his own practical application of them.

What, then, is the æsthetic creed with which M. Lefranc thus plays fast and loose—the creed which leads him to expel Shakespeare from his accustomed place in order to find room for the Earl of Derby? Let M. Lefranc state it in his own words :

'Certes, plus un écrivain est grand, plus aussi il met de ses sentiments intimes, de ses idées personnelles, de son expérience de la vie, en un mot de son âme et de sa psychologie propre, dans ses ouvrages.'

This is equivalent to saying that all literature is to be judged as autobiographic portraiture of the writer; and that a writer's eminence varies according to the fullness and literalness with which he puts into his work 'ses sentiments intimes,' 'ses idées personnelles,' 'son expérience de la vie, en un mot son âme et sa psychologie propre.' One might question whether a writer's 'âme et psychologie propre' belong to quite the same class of entities as 'ses idées personnelles' and 'son expérience de la vie.' But, be that as it may, there are two fatal objections to M. Lefranc's æsthetic proposition. In the first place, M. Lefranc's postulate virtually ignores, in a great writer's equipment, the creative faculty, the faculty of the imagination. This is truly an unlucky oversight. 'The poet's eye,' according to one whose authority M. Lefranc will recognise as higher than his own, ranges far beyond the always comparatively puny scope of his personal experiences or private sentiment.

'The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.'

Against M. Lefranc's definition of the quality of supreme literature, we oppose the assertion that supreme literature is mainly the creation of the imagination working on and transmuting anything and everything in heaven or earth. We deny that the function of supreme literature is the reporting or the chronicling of private experience. The best authorities give M. Lefranc's contention small support. Coleridge, the soundest of all our æsthetic critics, placed very high amongst the signs of poetic genius 'the choice of subjects very remote from the private interests and circumstances of the writer himself.' The poet's triumph, Coleridge argued, is due to 'the alienation and, if I may hazard such an expression, the utter aloofness of his own

feelings from those of which he is at once the painter and the analyst.' To much the same effect writes, quite independently, M. René Doumic, a member of the French Academy: 'L'artiste n'est pas celui qui a ressenti d'avantage, mais celui qui est le mieux doué pour imaginer des états de sensibilité et pour en réaliser l'expression.'

The second objection to M. Lefranc's proposition is equally damaging. He draws no distinction between different forms of literature, and would seem to be as blind to the peculiar and fundamental characteristics of drama as to the creative and imaginative energy inherent in all great poetry. In lyric poetry, it may be admitted, without any disparagement of the imaginative faculty, that that faculty finds sustenance in the poet's private emotions and sensations which it digests and transmutes. But in dramatic poetry, it is axiomatic to assert with Ruskin, that 'the poet is expressing other people's feelings, his own not being told.'

An apology seems due to the reader for recalling his attention from M. Lefranc's vagaries to the unassailable fact that the dramatist is essentially the spectator of the life which he describes and interprets, and that he reproduces experience objectively by aid of his imaginative faculty. The dramatist's active imagination never limits his powers to the interpretation and reproduction of the scenes and persons, necessarily few, which come under his personal observation. All of which he reads or hears or thinks serves equally well his imaginative energy, which visualises suggestions or impressions, whencesoever they come, and invests them with one and the same dramatic vitality. The sort of discrepancy between a supreme artist's imaginative work and his everyday life, which M. Lefranc in the case of Shakespeare unjustifiably magnifies beyond all recognition, is, in varying degrees, among the most familiar facts of literary history. Such discrepancy is an inevitable condition of human faculty and is capable of endless illustration. Among great English men of letters, Chaucer and Sir Walter Scott shared with Shakespeare his business instincts and faith in property. Sir Walter Scott was once asked to explain how, when he was to all outward appearance completely absorbed by his private, financial, mercantile and legal affairs, he could write novels which

dealt with scenes and persons, emotions and opinions, as remote as they well could be from the matters of his current experience or private interest. He answered that, when he was at his writing-desk, his 'fancy' (by which he meant his 'imaginative faculty') did not consciously concern itself with any of his private and personal experiences or interests, but 'ran its ain rigs in some other world.' 'As soon as I get the paper before me,' he added, 'it runs off easily enough.'

The true question at issue in M. Lefranc's argument, as an illuminating reflexion of Montaigne suggests to me, is not whether Shakespeare's upbringing and mode of life at Stratford-on-Avon or in London are or are not literally reflected in, are or are not in close and obvious congruity with, the scenes and persons, the emotions and opinions of Shakespearean drama. Rather we should enquire whether or no the Shakespearean drama bears witness to its author's endowment with such force of genius as might conceivably lift his imaginative faculty, when he was wielding the pen, into a world quite different from that in which he habitually dwelt. The law governing the birth or distribution of genius is beyond human ken. Its manifestations are always rare and mysterious. The fellow-countrymen of Chatterton, Burns and Keats need not to be reminded how luxuriantly it may flourish in quarters which on any *a priori* reasoning seem to be worst adapted to its nurture. Nor again does it need pointing out that very high rank or great wealth seems incapable of procreating supreme poetic genius in any country or at any period. There is nothing either in the nature of things, or in the teaching of history, to forbid the miraculous gift to one of Shakespeare's origin and walk in life.

Contemporaries whose trustworthiness and access to the facts cannot be questioned knew Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon as 'the famous scenicke poet' and 'the admirable dramatic poet' whose comedies and tragedies were 'the glory of the stage.' Only obstinate habits of doubt, divorced from full knowledge, or lacking the power of testing literary evidence, can challenge their inexorable verdict.

SIDNEY LEE.

Art. 13.—SWITZERLAND AFTER THE WAR.

'Two voices are there; one is of the sea,
 One of the mountains, each a mighty voice;
 In both from age to age thou didst rejoice,
 They were thy chosen music, Liberty!'

LA Confédération suisse, placée au centre et au faite de l'Europe, à la jonction de deux civilisations, à la coupure de deux mondes, est, de tout le continent, le pays le plus soumis aux courants d'idées et aux répercussions des événements. De là vient son cosmopolitisme d'esprit, si souvent vanté; de là viennent aussi son importance politique, son désintéressement, son amour de l'ordre et de la paix. Qu'elle le veuille ou non, la Suisse est destinée à être un carrefour, une croisée de routes, une gare, un lieu public, où les foules de l'est et de l'ouest se rencontrent, se coudoient, se côtoient, prennent contact, se heurtent et s'influencent, un pays de transit, un centre de commerce, dans le sens le plus large du mot, moral aussi bien que matériel.

Beaucoup de Suisses ont, de leur patrie, un autre idéal, et conçoivent pour elle de plus grandes ambitions. Aussi bien serait-il à la fois inexact et injuste de réduire à n'être que cela un pays dont l'histoire est vieille de six siècles, dont toutes les forces de cohésion sont d'ordre sentimental, et dont le rôle moral dans le monde défie les plus grands. Mais il faut avoir présente à l'esprit cette situation, qui n'est pas seulement géographique, pour bien comprendre ce que la guerre a été pour le peuple suisse, quelles souffrances du corps et de l'âme, quels déchirements intimes, en sont résultats.

Ce n'est point ici une plaidoirie pour la Suisse; ce n'est pas davantage un hymne à ses vertus et à ses bienfaits, qui sièrait mal sous la plume d'un Suisse. Ce que nous voulons dire, c'est la situation de la Confédération au lendemain de la guerre, au moment où le rétablissement graduel des relations internationales va lui donner une importance accrue et lui imposer de nouveaux devoirs. Pour comprendre cette situation dans sa complexité, pour savoir apprécier ce que l'Europe a le droit de demander au peuple suisse et d'attendre de lui, il importe de connaître au moins dans les grandes lignes, ce qu'ont senti et pensé les Suisses pendant la guerre.

Il importe de détruire tout d'abord une légende tenace, celle de la germanophilie de la Confédération ou au moins de sa partie germanique. Malgré l'étroitesse des liens de toutes sortes qui unissaient la Suisse allemande à l'Allemagne, au début et pendant le cours de la guerre, on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait jamais eu en Suisse de véritable sympathie pour les Allemands. Le terme de 'germanophile' implique un élément sentimental qui n'a jamais existé nulle part.

Les Allemands, au contraire, se sont toujours plaint de l'hostilité latente ou au moins de l'indifférence à laquelle ils se heurtaient dans un pays qui leur était parent par la langue, dans lequel ils possédaient une foule d'intérêts, et qui semblait devoir leur être acquis. Au moment même où, par une contradiction singulière, on admirait et on craignait le plus leur force, au moment où on avait le plus besoin d'eux, les Allemands ne trouvaient en Suisse qu'une sorte de mépris mal dissimulé, qui se traduisait par ce terme de dérision, difficilement traduisible, 'der Schwobe,' le Souabe. Mais sans être germanophile, il est vrai que la Suisse allemande faisait grand cas de l'Allemagne, et que le sens de la guerre lui a échappé. Comment s'en étonner, lorsque l'on connaît la situation économique et morale du pays ?

Economiquement, la Suisse dépend de l'étranger, à la fois pour ses importations et ses exportations, pour sa nourriture et son travail. Elle ne se suffit pas au point de vue agricole ; elle n'a pas de matières premières, pas de charbon. Dans les dernières décades, s'étant de plus en plus industrialisée et ayant transformé son agriculture elle-même en une industrie d'exportation, la production dépassait de beaucoup les besoins du marché intérieur ; la Suisse en était venue à ne plus nourrir par elle-même qu'une proportion infime de ses enfants.

Pour son ravitaillement et ses débouchés, la Confédération était liée au monde anglo-saxon ; mais pour ses matières premières et ses communications, elle dépendait de l'Allemagne. Maître incontrôlé du Rhin, ayant établi sur ses chemins de fer et ses voies navigables des tarifs de transit qui déflaient toute concurrence, ayant construit d'énormes dépôts de céréales, l'Empire contrôlait à l'entrée et à la sortie tout le commerce de la Suisse. L'Allemagne était parvenue à s'assurer le

monopole même des denrées qu'elle ne produisait pas, comme les céréales; elle avait le monopole complet du charbon et avait su garder en main ou contrôler toute l'industrie électrique, dans un pays où les forces naturelles sont abondantes, mais encore peu exploitées. Bref, on ne pouvait avant la guerre, ni travailler, ni manger, ni vendre en Suisse, sans l'autorisation de l'Allemagne; et cette autorisation n'allait pas de soi, comme le prouve le sabotage systématique des relations économiques entre la Suisse et la Suède dont l'Allemagne s'est rendue coupable.

L'origine de cette sujétion était dans la défaite de la France en 1870; et c'est pourquoi il serait suprêmement injuste de reprocher au peuple suisse une situation dont il était le premier à souffrir et dans laquelle il voyait, avec une inquiétude grandissante, sombrer son indépendance. Et, lorsque nous disons 'la défaite de la France,' il ne s'agit pas d'une répercussion générale et indirecte comme on peut en découvrir dans tous les pays; il s'agit de la conséquence immédiate de l'article XI du traité de Francfort, qui, conclu contre la France, a automatiquement joué contre l'industrie suisse.

La Suisse, en effet, est économiquement la concurrente de l'Allemagne, au moins dans quelques unes de ses branches les plus importantes, comme la métallurgie et l'industrie chimique. Concurrente de l'Allemagne, elle ne peut travailler sur le marché allemand. Or, l'article XI a interdit pratiquement à ses fabriques de vendre en France, où elles se trouvaient en concurrence avec les maisons similaires allemandes, travaillant avec des frais de revient inférieurs et dans une situation douanière avantagée. Quant au monde anglo-saxon, il leur était fermé par le contrôle que l'Allemagne exerçait sur toutes les voies d'exportation de la Suisse, grâce à l'annexion de l'Alsace-Lorraine.

Enfermée dans le traité de Francfort comme dans un inextricable réseau, l'industrie suisse prit la seule issue qui s'offrait à elle, l'entente avec l'Allemagne; de là sont nés ces cartels, qu'on nous a tant reprochés au cours de la guerre et bien à tort, puisqu'ils étaient la rançon que nous devions payer nous-mêmes pour la guerre de 1870. Une entente en appelle une autre; l'influence allemande déborda de l'industrie sur les banques; elle s'efforça

même de saboter le développement économique du pays, comme ce fut le cas dans les affaires électriques, afin d'assurer le monopole allemand des charbons. Enfin la Convention du Gothard vient assurer un contrôle allemand sur l'ensemble de nos tarifs ferroviaires et mettre le sceau à une emprise économique sous laquelle nous étouffions de plus en plus.

La France, vaincue sur le terrain économique, s'abandonna pareillement sur le terrain moral. Tandis que les universités allemandes favorisaient de toutes façons nos étudiants et que le gouvernement impérial nous envoyait des professeurs de grande valeur, la France refusait d'admettre l'équivalence de nos grades universitaires et se confinait dans un protectionnisme intellectuel qui faisait obstacle à tout échange d'idées. Le peuple suisse est essentiellement bilingue. De même que les jeunes gens de la Suisse romande vont tout naturellement parachever leurs études en Allemagne pour se perfectionner dans une langue qui leur est indispensable, les Suisses allemands n'eussent pas demandé mieux que de terminer leurs études à Paris. Malheureusement les portes de cette université leur étaient fermées, et eux aussi durent aller Outre-Rhin pour compléter un développement, que, trop souvent, des professeurs allemands, installés dans nos universités, avaient déjà commencé.

C'est ainsi que les idées allemandes ont fini par s'infiltrer dans une partie de la classe bourgeoise et intellectuelle de la Suisse alémanique et par y semer cette malheureuse idée de la solidarité de la culture germanique, qui a troublé tant de cerveaux pendant la guerre. Le clergé protestant était spécialement contaminé, par l'étude de la théologie allemande, à la base de laquelle se trouvaient des préoccupations patriotiques, indépendantes de la foi.

Heureusement, si les liens économiques et intellectuels étaient étroits, d'autres motifs agissaient puissamment en sens contraire. Tout d'abord, le Suisse est républicain et démocrate de tempérament et de tradition. Depuis tant de siècles que les mœurs des vieilles communes du Moyen-Age se sont développées chez nous en une forme politique achevée, notre peuple, surtout dans les cantons primitifs, est imprégné de démocratie. La frontière du Rhin était, jusqu'ici, une frontière morale autant que politique et

plus qu'une frontière géographique. En face des Allemands monarchistes et impérialistes tout Suisse et surtout chaque paysan se sentait un étranger. La langue y aide. Car c'est une erreur de croire que les Allemands et les Suisses alémaniques parlent le même idiome. Sans doute, les Suisses savent tous l'allemand, mais ils parlent ordinairement un dialecte auquel ils tiennent beaucoup, dans toutes les couches de la population, et qui les distingue nettement de leurs voisins de la Bavière ou du pays de Bade. Enfin, l'intérêt national, dont l'évidence s'était imposée à la Suisse romande dès la première heure de la guerre, finit, au milieu des contradictions et des hésitations, par apparaître nettement aux Suisses alémaniques eux-mêmes. Une victoire de l'Allemagne eût entraîné la fin de l'indépendance de la Suisse, dans le domaine économique, politique et moral, et aucun Suisse réfléchi ne pouvait hésiter dans ses vœux.

On s'étonnera peut-être de la lenteur avec laquelle cette conviction s'est imposée aux Confédérés alémaniques. Mais on ne leur jettera pas la pierre si l'on songe à tous les obstacles qui s'opposaient à leur conversion et aux piètres moyens mis en œuvre pour la réaliser. La presse et le gouvernement, mal préparés par leur passé à de si grands événements, ont été également désorientés, en 1914, par la guerre. Les journaux, faute de connaître, dans ses fondements, la politique internationale, sont allés chercher des renseignements au plus près, c'est à dire dans des journaux de même langue, paraissant de l'autre côté de la frontière. Le gouvernement, de son côté, s'est confiné dans sa besogne administrative, sans chercher à gagner un contact direct avec la presse. Il n'y a pas de pays en Europe, sans en excepter les belligérants, où, pendant la guerre, le gouvernement a été plus silencieux, plus distant, plus fermé et plus autocratique que ce pays républicain, où les traditions démocratiques sont vieilles de six siècles. Ce manque de contact entre le gouvernement et le peuple a été pour beaucoup dans les crises morales graves que nous avons traversées et dont la cause la plus fréquente a été l'ignorance.

En dépit de toutes les difficultés matérielles et morales, la conviction de l'intérêt national a fini par s'imposer à la Suisse alémanique, comme elle s'était

imposée dès la première heure aux Suisses romands. La victoire de l'Allemagne aurait eu pour résultat une telle sujétion de notre pays à l'empire voisin, au point de vue économique et politique, que, indépendamment de toutes les raisons de justice qui devaient dicter notre sentiment, le doute ne pouvait pas être permis sur le terrain de l'intérêt national, même le plus étroit.

Cette évidence, qui avait eu quelque peine à se frayer un chemin dans les cerveaux d'un certain nombre de nos Confédérés, devint manifeste au moment de la paix de Brest en Lituanie. Ce fut la grande erreur psychologique de l'Allemagne de croire qu'elle devait donner au monde le spectacle de sa force et de sa victoire. Il était déjà trop tard alors pour que de semblables démonstrations pussent encore faire impression sur les neutres. Ils y virent seulement la démonstration ultime de ce qu'aurait été pour l'Europe l'hégémonie allemande, et du sort que la victoire de l'Empire eût réservé à ses voisins les plus proches.

De même qu'en 1915, l'entrée de l'Italie dans la guerre avait fait moralement du tort à la cause des Alliés, l'intervention des Etats-Unis en 1917 lui donna un éclat nouveau. Tous ces éléments venant s'ajouter les uns aux autres, la Suisse allemande vit avec lassitude commencer l'année 1918. Ne désirant plus une victoire allemande, n'espérant pas encore une victoire alliée, elle attendait la paix à tout prix et le plus vite possible. La victoire des Alliés en Octobre vint surpasser tous les espoirs qu'avaient formés les admirateurs les plus ardents de l'Entente. Elle comblait les vœux de tous ceux qui la désiraient et de ceux qui n'avaient d'autre désir que la paix. Elle fut le premier événement, depuis 1914, de nature à unir dans une même joie tous les Suisses.

Cependant le 11 novembre ne fut pas, pour notre pays, un jour de fête. Au moment même où l'on annonçait la signature de l'armistice la grève générale éclatait dans tout le pays. La guerre a provoqué dans la classe ouvrière de la Suisse allemande une aigreur dont les causes sont diverses. La plus importante, au point de vue économique, doit être cherchée dans les mesures prises par les puissances alliées en vue du blocus de l'Allemagne. La Suisse, nous l'avons dit, vit entièrement

de l'importation et de l'exportation. Les importations ont subi des restrictions de tous genres, dûes en partie au blocus, en partie à la raréfaction du fret et des matières premières dans le monde entier. Le résultat de ces mesures a été une diminution considérable des importations et la nécessité de mesures de restriction, tant au point de vue alimentaire que pour les industries. La conséquence en a été le chômage d'une part, l'accroissement du prix de la vie d'autre part.

La Suisse, à ce point de vue, s'est trouvée dans une situation plus difficile que celle des pays belligérants. Ceux-ci, en effet, pendant ces cinq années, ont souffert de la rareté de la main d'œuvre plus que du chômage. En Suisse, au contraire, la mobilisation a désorganisé le travail, et le chômage est devenu très général. Il a été accru dans des proportions considérables par les interdictions d'exporter. La Suisse n'a rien pu envoyer en Allemagne, pour satisfaire aux règles du blocus; elle n'a pas pu exporter d'une façon générale dans les pays alliés, à cause des mesures que ces pays ont édictées pour empêcher la chute de leur change. Enfin, dans la mesure où les exportations n'étaient pas interdites, elles étaient rendues presque impossibles, tant par des difficultés de transport que par la situation du change, qui mettait les marchandises suisses à un prix très élevé partout.

Vouée au chômage par les répercussions diverses de la guerre, la Suisse a vu le prix de la vie augmenter en même temps dans des proportions considérables. On dira que ce fut un phénomène général dans le monde entier, et c'est exact. Mais les pays belligérants ont émis une quantité énorme de monnaie fiduciaire; et, si le prix de la vie a monté, la circulation s'est accrue dans des proportions analogues et, avec elle, le taux des salaires. Il n'en a pas été de même en Suisse, où le gouvernement a cru devoir maintenir, avec de légères modifications, sa politique financière d'avant-guerre, et où l'augmentation du prix de la vie n'a été compensée que dans une faible mesure par l'augmentation des salaires.

Le mécontentement causé dans la classe ouvrière par les restrictions, le chômage et l'accroissement du prix de la vie a été compliqué de causes morales. La première, dont nous avons parlé déjà, est l'incompréhension de la Suisse allemande à l'égard des grands

problèmes internationaux posés par la guerre. On souffre plus patiemment et l'on souffre moins, lorsqu'on a l'impression de souffrir pour une cause juste et une grande cause. Ce ne fut pas là l'état d'esprit des bel-ligérants seulement, mais aussi des Suisses romands, dans leur grande majorité. Ils acceptèrent sans ré-
criminations des privations qui les mettaient, dans une certaine mesure, dans une situation analogue à celle des Alliés eux-mêmes. En Suisse allemande, au contraire, toutes les restrictions, tous les obstacles à l'activité, toutes les entraves firent l'effet d'attentats inouïs à la liberté et à la souveraineté du peuple, parce que celui-ci n'en comprit pas les raisons profondes.

Cet état d'esprit fut accentué et aggravé par les très nombreux étrangers qui, pendant la guerre, résidèrent sur notre territoire. Venus des quatre coins de l'horizon, Allemands et Autrichiens échappés de France, Français et Anglais fuyant d'Allemagne et d'Autriche, réfugiés alsaciens et polonais, Turcs, Grecs, Slaves de tous genres, protestataires, déserteurs et réfractaires, bons, mauvais, médiocres, toutes les classes de la population, toutes les races, toutes les situations étaient représentées.

Ce n'est pas de gaieté de cœur que la Suisse devint ainsi, pendant la guerre, le dépotoir de l'Europe. Elle le dut tout d'abord à sa situation centrale, ensuite à ses traditions de liberté. Le droit d'asile appartient, comme règle non écrite, au droit public suisse depuis les temps les plus anciens. Il eût fallu en Suisse une révolution morale pour que le peuple se résignât à fermer les portes du pays aux réfugiés politiques et aux victimes de la guerre. Cette révolution, cependant, se fût peut-être produite, en raison du caractère tout à fait exceptionnel des circonstances, si les Alliés eux-mêmes ne s'y étaient pas opposés. C'est un point qu'il importe de souligner.

Les autorités de Bâle ayant fait mine de refuser l'entrée du territoire suisse à un déserteur alsacien, la presse française protesta avec véhémence contre cette décision, qui lui paraissait de nature à favoriser l'Allemagne. La Suisse se vit donc obligée d'accueillir tous les déserteurs allemands, afin de ne pas courir le risque de repousser quelque Alsacien. Naturellement, elle fut obligée d'accueillir aussi les déserteurs alliés, pour ne pas

s'exposer aux reproches de partialité de l'Allemagne. Le nombre de ces irréguliers ne tarda pas à s'élever à un chiffre assez grand. Les Alliés prirent alors une décision de principe: toute maison de commerce ou industrie suisse qui emploierait un déserteur allié serait mise sur la liste noire; il en serait de même de toute maison qui emploierait un Allemand. Les déserteurs alliés étaient boycottés comme déserteurs, les Allemands comme Allemands.

L'effet de cette mesure fut considérable. Pendant la guerre toute l'industrie suisse dépendait des Alliés, tant pour son ravitaillement en matières premières que pour ses exportations. En outre, la plupart des fabriques importantes travaillaient directement pour les gouvernements alliés. L'Allemagne n'a eu recours à l'aide de l'industrie suisse que dans une mesure infime. Elle manquait de matières premières; et la Suisse, liée par le blocus, ne pouvait pas lui en fournir. Au contraire, les Alliés, qui avaient les matières premières, manquaient des moyens de les travailler, et c'est eux qui se sont adressés à la Suisse.

L'interdiction d'employer les déserteurs, combinée avec l'obligation de les accueillir, imposées l'une et l'autre par les Alliés, ont eu pour effet de créer en Suisse un prolétariat de désœuvrés, de chômeurs et d'affamés, prêt à la révolution. Le prolétariat suisse par lui-même était, jusqu'à la guerre, l'un des plus calmes et des moins agités d'Europe. La propagande révolutionnaire et bolchéviste n'eût pas eu sur lui la moindre prise. Mais lorsque ces éléments étrangers se furent répandus parmi les ouvriers suisses, la propagande révolutionnaire trouva chez nous un terrain fécondé par la misère. Il ne manquait plus, pour des troubles, qu'une occasion. Cette occasion fut la révolution allemande, dont le contre-coup se fit immédiatement sentir chez nous. La grève générale éclata le 11 novembre, sans qu'aucun événement intérieur, aucune revendication précise de la classe ouvrière, ne l'ait rendue nécessaire. La résistance énergique de l'armée et du gouvernement vint assez facilement à bout d'un mouvement qui n'avait pas été préparé de longue main, et dont l'organisation et les moyens étaient insuffisants. Mais, si la grève s'est rapidement terminée, les causes générales qui lui ont

donné naissance subsistent. Elles posent maintenant à notre peuple, au dedans, de graves questions.

Le premier de ces problèmes intérieurs, aggravés si non créés par la guerre, est celui que pose la présence en Suisse d'une proportion d'étrangers tout à fait anormale et inassimilable. Dans l'ensemble du pays, la proportion des étrangers atteint vingt pour cent. Dans certaines villes, comme Lugano, elle dépasse cinquante pour cent ; et les conditions de paix faites à l'Allemagne vont provoquer une émigration formidable qui, de ce pays, se répandra sur la Suisse.

Dès avant la guerre, un mouvement populaire s'était déclenché en vue d'obtenir la naturalisation obligatoire des étrangers nés en Suisse. Mais les expériences faites avec les naturalisés n'ont pas été favorables ; les faits ont prouvé que beaucoup étaient mal assimilés et plus dangereux sous leur apparence nationale que sous leur véritable étiquette. Le problème devra donc être repris entièrement sur des bases nouvelles. La première mesure que réclame l'opinion publique pour parer à l'invasion allemande est une révision de notre traité d'établissement avec l'Allemagne.

Les préoccupations financières ne sont pas moins graves. La Suisse a dépensé, pendant la guerre, plus d'un milliard de francs pour sa mobilisation, somme importante pour un pays de trois millions d'habitants et plus importante encore pour un pays fédératif. La Confédération, en effet, jusqu'à la guerre, n'a jamais eu de revenus directs. Son budget était alimenté uniquement par les ressources provenant des douanes et de certaines taxes indirectes. Ces ressources sont maintenant tout-à-fait insuffisantes pour faire face aux charges de la dette, et il faut en trouver d'autres. On sera obligé de les demander à l'impôt direct. Mais c'est là une grave atteinte aux bases mêmes de la constitution fédérale et, chose plus grave, aux bases politiques et morales du pays.

Politiquement, après les épreuves auxquelles notre unité nationale a été soumise pendant cinq ans par le fait de la guerre, toute atteinte directe au fédéralisme pourrait faire courir à la Suisse les dangers les plus sérieux. Or, les impôts directs sont la base financière des cantons ; et tarir cette source au profit de la

Confédération aurait pour effet de mettre les cantons hors d'état de remplir les tâches qui leur incombent.

Ce danger politique se double d'un danger social. La Suisse, nous l'avons dit, a une circulation fiduciaire très inférieure à celle de tous ses voisins. La guerre lui a imposé des sacrifices considérables, et, dans son ensemble, le peuple s'est sérieusement appauvri. Cet appauvrissement n'a pas été compensé, comme dans un grand nombre de pays belligérants, par un reclassement général des fortunes. Les nouveaux riches sont assez rares parmi nous, et la communauté aura de la peine à supporter les charges nouvelles qui lui sont imposées.

La révolution allemande, dont nous avons déjà parlé, n'est pas sans faire courir de sérieux dangers à la tranquillité intérieure de la Suisse. La transformation de l'Allemagne en un état républicain a abaissé brusquement cette frontière morale dont nous avons parlé; les répercussions des événements politiques d'Allemagne sont aujourd'hui plus immédiates en Suisse qu'elles ne l'ont jamais été par le passé, car les liens entre les socialistes suisses et ceux qui sont maintenant au pouvoir de l'autre côté du Rhin ont toujours été fort étroits.

Ces éléments, auxquels on pourrait ajouter bien d'autres sujets de préoccupation, imposent une vigilance toute particulière à l'égard des questions sociales. Le peuple suisse, dans son ensemble, en est parfaitement conscient. On pourrait même reprocher aux Suisses allemands d'être, à l'heure actuelle, trop exclusivement préoccupés des dangers sociaux et d'en perdre le sens des intérêts nationaux supérieurs. Les prochaines élections au Conseil National, qui doivent avoir lieu par anticipation cet automne, sur la base de la représentation proportionnelle, se feront presque entièrement sur la question sociale. C'est dire que les partis bourgeois marcheront unis au scrutin et remporteront un grand succès. On ne pourra donc pas compter sur le nouveau parlement pour résoudre les questions urgentes dans un sens progressiste et pour conjurer le danger.

Dans cette crainte, une Ligue, dite des réformes d'après guerre, vient de se fonder, qui se propose de briser les cadres des partis en vue des élections au Conseil National et de faire élire une majorité résolue à des réformes hardies. Il serait difficile de dire quel sort l'avenir

réserve à cette initiative, malgré les moyens financiers considérables qu'elle met en œuvre. Mais sa seule existence est une preuve de l'attention que prête la nation au problème social.

Malaisé dans tous les pays, il l'est en Suisse, plus que nulle part ailleurs. La Suisse est un pays fédératif, composé de petits états, de territoire très exigü. Il est extrêmement difficile de légiférer dans le domaine industriel et social pour d'aussi petites communautés, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les assurances, la législation ouvrière, etc. Si l'on veut faire une réforme sérieuse dans ce domaine, on est fatalement amené à régler les questions par voie de législation fédérale. Il en résulte de nouvelles diminutions des compétences cantonales, de nouvelles centralisations, de nouvelles extensions du fonctionnarisme fédéral et, indirectement, de nouveaux dangers d'un autre ordre pour la paix et l'équilibre intérieurs de la Suisse. La Confédération est comme un homme qui souffre du cœur et de l'estomac. Les remèdes à l'un de ces maux aggravent l'autre.

Toutes ces questions, qui se posent à la fois et exigent, pour la plupart, une solution rapide, ont fait naître l'idée qu'une révision totale de la constitution fédérale allait devenir inévitable à brève échéance. Née en 1848, au milieu des troubles qui secouaient l'Europe, la constitution a été révisée dans son entier en 1872-1874, après la guerre franco-allemande et le déplacement de l'équilibre européen qui en était résulté. Depuis lors, un grand nombre d'articles ont été amendés, mais aucune révision générale n'est venu remettre au point les modifications fragmentaires ordonnées par le peuple. Aussi la constitution fédérale n'a-t-elle plus aucune unité d'inspiration; elle ne répond plus, en beaucoup de ses parties, aux nécessités actuelles. Enfin, elle a été soumise par les événements à une épreuve dont elle sort ébranlée et amoindrie.

En 1914, dans l'idée que la guerre serait courte, et qu'un régime exceptionnel était justifié par les dangers extérieurs, le Conseil Fédéral se fit accorder, par les Chambres, des 'pleins-pouvoirs,' c'est à dire le droit de prendre, sans en référer, des mesures législatives de caractère dictatorial. Ce régime s'est prolongé avec la guerre. Le Conseil Fédéral a fait de ses pleins pouvoirs

l'usage le plus large, et parfois même le plus abusif. Il a socialisé notre régime économique, modifié notre arsenal de lois pénales, créé en tous domaines de faits accomplis dont personne ne sait comment nous parviendrons à nous dégager. Les protestations contre les pleins pouvoirs sont devenues de plus en plus nombreuses et véhémentes, surtout dans la presse romande. Elles n'ont pas été écoutées. Le Conseil Fédéral ne demanderait pas mieux que de se dégager d'un régime d'exception qui nuit à son autorité plus qu'il ne lui profite.

Mis par les pleins pouvoirs dans l'impossibilité d'en référer à personne, le Conseil Fédéral a été obligé de prendre en toutes questions des décisions autocratiques; il n'a pas pu mettre sa responsabilité à l'abri. Il a été faible de sa force, comme un souverain qui ne s'appuie plus sur la voix populaire. Les pleins pouvoirs ont désarmé le gouvernement dans toutes les négociations internationales; ils l'ont désarmé de même à l'intérieur. Les socialistes ont procédé, à son égard, par voie d'ultimatums; et chaque fois que le Conseil Fédéral s'est trouvé placé devant une menace précise, il a cédé. C'est ainsi que, de concession en concession et de chute en chute, le pays en est arrivé à la grève générale et à cet état de malaise politique qui caractérise l'époque actuelle. Tout le monde a l'impression que la constitution est usée jusqu'à la corde; mais personne n'ose en entreprendre la révision complète, de peur des initiatives socialistes et centralisatrices, de toutes les surenchères démagogiques auxquelles une pareille œuvre risque de donner lieu.

Tel est l'état moral et politique dans lequel le peuple suisse aborde les grands problèmes internationaux qui se posent à lui, et en particulier cette œuvre de reconstitution de l'Europe à laquelle il est appelé, par sa position, à collaborer dans une mesure éminente. Il n'est pas étonnant, dans ces conditions, que ces problèmes si délicats par leur nature, et si complexes par leurs données, trouvent le peuple suisse impréparé, hésitant et divisé.

La paix réagira, dans toutes ses parties et dans toutes ses dispositions, sur les intérêts de la Suisse placée au centre de l'Europe. Mais indépendamment de ces répercussions générales, qu'il serait trop long d'étudier ici, le

traité de paix intéresse directement la Suisse dans quatre de ses dispositions. Ce sont, tout d'abord, les articles 354 à 362, concernant le régime du Rhin; en second lieu, l'article 374, qui prévoit la dénonciation de la convention du Gothard. Au point de vue politique, l'article 435 établit le statut international futur de la Confédération, son rôle dans la Société des Nations, et tranche la question des zones franches de Savoie. Enfin, la Suisse est directement touchée par les clauses territoriales et politiques du traité avec l'Autriche.

On sait ce que représente le Rhin pour la Suisse; c'est son artère vitale. Jusqu'au moment encore imprévisible où le Rhône sera navigable jusqu'à Genève, où la ligne entre la Suisse et Bordeaux sera devenue une ligne de grand trafic international, et où les tarifs des chemins de fer français pourront entrer en concurrence avec ceux des voies fluviales, le Rhin restera pour la Suisse la route normale à la fois de ses importations et de ses exportations, la communication exclusive entre la Confédération et le monde anglo-saxon. C'est la raison principale pour laquelle les Suisses ont considéré le retour de l'Alsace-Lorraine à la France, non seulement comme une nécessité de la justice immanente, mais encore comme un intérêt national direct. La possession exclusive par l'Allemagne des deux rives du Rhin et des deux chemins de fer qui parcouraient ces rives avaient mis, comme nous l'avons expliqué, la Suisse sous la dépendance complète de l'Allemagne. Aujourd'hui, l'Alsace-Lorraine est redevenue française, le chemin de fer Bâle-Strasbourg est en concurrence avec celui de Bâle à Mannheim, et le Rhin est un fleuve international, non seulement de droit mais de fait. Nos communications avec l'Angleterre, avec ses colonies, avec les Etats Unis et l'Amérique du Sud, avec tous les grands marchés qui nous font vivre, ne sont plus sous le contrôle exclusif d'un seul voisin. Pour la Suisse, c'est la libération.

Comment cette situation s'exprime-t-elle dans le traité? En ceci tout d'abord, qu'en vertu de l'article 355, la Commission du Rhin, qui était composée jusqu'ici exclusivement de membres allemands et hollandais, comprendra deux Suisses, deux Belges, deux Anglais, etc.—en tout 19 membres. Comme les intérêts de la Suisse sont identiques avec ceux de la Belgique, de l'Angleterre et en

général des autres petits états riverains, ils seront maintenant défendus; sous le régime précédent, ils étaient entièrement à la merci de l'Allemagne, qui ne leur accordait aucune attention.

Malheureusement, la Suisse n'a pas obtenu, comme elle le demandait, la garantie que le Rhin resterait navigable, dans son cours principal, jusqu'à Bâle. L'article 358 réserve expressément à la France le droit d'établir des barrages entre Bâle et Strasbourg, ce qui aurait pour conséquence de nuire gravement à la navigation. Cette question a déjà été discutée très âprement entre la Suisse et l'Allemagne; l'établissement de barrages pour la production de force électrique menace sérieusement les échanges de la Confédération avec les pays d'outre-mer; et c'est une déception sérieuse de voir que nos autorités n'ont pas pu obtenir la reconnaissance complète de notre droit de navigation.

La liberté du Rhin est reconnue en principe 'soit sur le fleuve principal, soit sur les canaux latéraux.' Or, la valeur économique des canaux n'est pas comparable avec celle du fleuve. L'utilisation de canaux doublerait le prix de revient de la navigation entre Bâle et Rotterdam et augmenterait sa durée de quatre jours. Ce problème ne pourra être résolu définitivement que par la commission du Rhin elle-même; et les Suisses comptent beaucoup sur l'appui de l'Angleterre, dont les intérêts sont analogues et qui aura l'occasion de nous donner là une nouvelle preuve d'aide et de sympathie.

L'article du traité qui oblige l'Allemagne à accepter la dénonciation de la Convention du Gothard ne sera pas moins bien accueilli en Suisse. Par la Convention de 1907, arrachée à la faiblesse et à l'impéritie de nos négociateurs, l'Allemagne s'était fait accorder à perpétuité le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée sur tous nos tarifs ferroviaires. C'était là une concession inouïe, non seulement par sa valeur pécuniaire, mais surtout par les entraves qu'elle mettait à notre politique ferroviaire et économique.

Dès l'instant que l'Alsace et la Lorraine redevenaient françaises, les suppositions de fait sur lesquelles reposait la Convention du Gothard se trouvaient profondément modifiés. Le tunnel du Saint-Gothard, construit avec de l'argent allemand et italien, servait jusqu'ici au trafic

italo-allemand de Milan à Bâle et *vice-versa*. Or, le trafic de Bâle à Milan ne sera plus un trafic italo-allemand que pour une part; ce trafic là passera dorénavant plus à l'est, par l'Arberg ou le Brenner; le Saint-Gothard se consacrera au trafic venant d'Alsace, du Nord de la France et de Belgique vers l'Italie. Il est donc tout naturel que la Convention du Gothard soit remaniée. La Suisse se verra imposer, de ce fait, le remboursement de l'avance de 70 millions, faite par l'Allemagne pour la construction de la ligne. Mais, comme l'Allemagne nous doit, pour des avances faites pendant la guerre, sur le modèle de celles que nous avons dû consentir aux Alliés, environ trois cents millions—ce qui représenterait près de quatre milliards pour la France—il sera facile d'imputer le remboursement du Gothard sur cette créance assez compromise par la ruine de l'Allemagne.

L'article du traité qui aura pour la Suisse les plus vastes conséquences est l'article 435, réglant la question des zones. Il se présente sous deux aspects, l'un immédiat, l'autre indirect, qu'il faut envisager séparément.

Le Congrès de Vienne, tout en refusant à la Suisse de lui donner la Savoie du Nord, qui appartenait alors à la Sardaigne, avait placé sur cette province des servitudes internationales de deux sortes: économiques d'une part, militaires de l'autre. La Suisse fut chargée de défendre la Savoie du Nord contre toute agression de la France; en outre une partie, à vrai dire assez petite, de cette province fut déclarée franche de droits de douane, pour faciliter le ravitaillement de Genève, qui en est la capitale économique naturelle. En 1860, se basant sur ses droits anciens, la Suisse revendiqua la Savoie du Nord, mais sans succès. Tout ce qu'elle obtint fut le maintien de ses droits d'occupation, devenus tout à fait illusoire depuis que la France était elle-même maîtresse du pays, et une extension de la zone franche. L'article 435 du nouveau traité prévoit que la Suisse renonce à la neutralisation de la Savoie du Nord; de plus, elle devra s'entendre directement avec la France au sujet d'une revision du régime des zones douanières.

Ce sont là, de notre part, deux concessions d'une certaine portée. Le droit d'occupation militaire n'avait pour nous qu'une valeur théorique, mais il était assez incommode à la France; et le mécontentement que

manifeste à ce sujet la presse italienne montre bien que, dans un conflit entre l'Italie et la France, la neutralisation de la Savoie aurait pu avoir pour ce pays de réels inconvénients. Quant aux zones franches, elles ont pour le ravitaillement de Genève une importance considérable ; et la population genevoise n'a pas vu sans inquiétude la Confédération se départir des droits que lui accordaient les traités.

Nous n'ignorons pas que l'intention de la France est de supprimer les privilèges des zones franches. Quelles concessions avons-nous reçues, en retour de cet abandon ? on se le demande tout d'abord. Pour le comprendre, il faut connaître les discussions qui ont eu lieu en Suisse depuis quelques mois au sujet de la neutralité et de la Société des Nations. La Suisse—cela restera l'honneur de son gouvernement, et surtout de son ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Calonder—a été l'un des premiers pays à adhérer officiellement à l'idée d'une Société des Nations, et à l'étudier, par l'organe de ses pouvoirs officiels. Mais elle s'est heurtée à une grave difficulté. La Suisse est neutre, de façon permanente et traditionnelle, depuis 1516. En 1815, elle a obtenu du Congrès de Vienne la reconnaissance officielle et la garantie de sa neutralité permanente, qui a pris au cours du XIX^{me} siècle, une valeur mystique aux yeux du peuple suisse.

La notion de neutralité est difficilement conciliable avec le pacte de la Société des Nations, qui prévoit l'assistance militaire obligatoire de tous les membres à un état qui serait attaqué injustement. Le gouvernement fédéral, décidé en principe à adhérer au pacte de Paris, mais redoutant de se heurter à une opposition insurmontable dans le peuple, s'il abandonnait l'idée de la neutralité permanente, s'est dès lors appliqué à concilier ces deux notions. Il y est parvenu, au prix de grandes difficultés et de quelques accrocs à la pure doctrine. Le Conseil Fédéral a dû tout d'abord abandonner complètement l'idée de la neutralité économique, partie essentielle, pourtant, de la neutralité permanente. Il a dû promettre que, dans tous les cas où la Société des Nations décréterait le blocus contre un Etat récalcitrant, la Suisse y participerait sans réticence. Mais il a demandé que la Confédération fût dispensée de participer activement aux opérations militaires de la Société

et même de laisser traverser son territoire par les troupes. Ce que le peuple suisse, placé, comme il l'est, au cœur de l'Europe, redoute par-dessus tout, c'est que son territoire devienne le théâtre des guerres futures. Ce point de vue a eu quelque peine à triompher. Mais dès l'instant que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis demandait qu'on réservât expressément, dans le pacte de la Société des Nations, la doctrine de Monroe, il devenait difficile de refuser à la Suisse le maintien de sa neutralité. La question se réduisait dès lors à la découverte d'une formule.

C'est ainsi que le Conseil Fédéral a été amené à céder sur la question des zones. En échange, les puissances ont reconnu, dans le préambule de l'article 435, que 'la neutralité suisse constituait un engagement international pour le maintien de la paix,' ce qui la fait rentrer (comme la doctrine de Monroe) dans la catégorie des 'engagements internationaux qui assurent le maintien de la paix' prévus et réservés à l'article 21 du pacte de Paris.

La question de savoir si le maintien partiel de la neutralité permanente de la Suisse valait les sacrifices que le Conseil Fédéral a faits, doit être réservée. En soi, l'auteur de ces lignes ne le croit pas, car il a toujours pensé qu'on exagérerait beaucoup en Suisse les avantages de la neutralité. Mais c'est sous un autre angle qu'il faut envisager le problème. La concession faite par le Gouvernement n'apparaît pas comme excessive si elle était le seul moyen d'obtenir du peuple suisse l'adhésion à la Société des Nations, et si la Société doit elle-même remplir les espoirs qu'on place en elle.

En ce qui concerne la première question, la seule que nous ayons à traiter ici, les avis sont très partagés. Un courant d'opinion très fort se fait jour, dans une partie du pays surtout, mais non exclusivement en Suisse alémanique, contre l'entrée de la Suisse dans la Société des Nations. Nos confédérés reprochent à la Société de n'être pas universelle, et de ne pas sauvegarder suffisamment les droits des petits états; ils reprochent enfin au Conseil Fédéral d'être allé trop loin dans l'abandon d'une neutralité dans laquelle beaucoup de nos concitoyens voient le palladium de nos libertés.

L'adhésion de la Suisse ne pourra avoir lieu qu'à la suite d'une votation populaire, et il serait très difficile

d'en prévoir dès maintenant le résultat. C'est là, pour les Suisses, un sujet de graves préoccupations. Car Genève a été désignée comme siège de la Ligue; et, si la Suisse refusait d'en faire partie, une question nationale se poserait à nouveau, qui nous diviserait. Aussi faut-il espérer que les puissances, comprenant l'intérêt général qui s'attache à la participation de la Suisse à la Société des Nations, chercheront, dans les mois qui viennent, à rassurer autant que possible, par leurs actes, l'opinion suisse. On est malheureusement obligé de constater que, pour le moment, cela n'a pas été le cas, et que les puissances alliées et associées ne paraissent pas avoir envisagé et mesuré exactement toutes les répercussions de leurs actes à l'égard de la Confédération suisse.

Elles lui ont demandé, par exemple, pour le cas éventuel où l'Allemagne refuserait de signer la paix, de se joindre au blocus renforcé qui sera proclamé contre ce pays. On comprend fort bien le désir des Alliés de rendre le blocus de l'Allemagne hermétique pour qu'il soit aussi court que possible. Mais c'est demander à la Suisse de renoncer brusquement, au profit des vainqueurs et contre les vaincus, à une neutralité qu'elle a toujours gardée et qui fait son honneur. La neutralité suisse résulte du Traité de Vienne; aussi longtemps que ce traité n'a pas été expressément abrogé, il subsiste; et, en acceptant de rompre sa neutralité dans les circonstances actuelles, la Suisse se rendrait coupable d'une violation grave de la foi jurée. Ce que le peuple suisse hésite à faire pour l'avenir, en se basant sur des traités réguliers, il ne peut la faire dès maintenant en violation du droit. Lui demander de prendre sur lui les charges de la Société des Nations, alors que les avantages en sont encore problématiques, c'est donner un argument très fort à ceux qui conseillent au peuple de refuser son adhésion au Pacte de Paris.

Dans une circonstance plus récente encore, les puissances n'ont pas paru prêter aux intérêts suisses toute l'attention qu'ils méritent. Le Vorarlberg est un petit territoire autrichien géographiquement orienté vers la Suisse, et habité par une population qui au point de vue ethnique et linguistique appartient à la Suisse. Uni à notre histoire par des liens anciens et étroits, ce pays a toujours gardé, en dépit de son appartenance à un

pays monarchique, un caractère démocratique accentué. Lorsqu'éclata la révolution à Vienne, il n'eut rien de plus pressé que de se proclamer indépendant. Résolument décidé à ne pas devenir allemand, sans liens véritables avec l'Autriche ni géographiques ni moraux, ce peuple a organisé un plébiscite absolument régulier, qui a eu lieu le 11 Mai dernier, et dont le résultat a été le suivant : 47,727 voix pour l'accession à la Suisse, 11,378 contre. Dans un grand nombre de communes, surtout dans la montagne, la presque unanimité des voix se sont prononcées en faveur de la Suisse.

Il n'y a pas en Europe de peuple plus dépourvu de toutes visées impérialistes que le peuple suisse. Le mouvement d'accession du Vorarlberg s'est heurté chez nous à une extrême réserve, allant jusqu'à l'indifférence, et même, dans certains milieux, à une opposition basée sur des motifs de politique intérieure. Il est certain cependant que l'accession du Vorarlberg répondrait à un intérêt national de premier ordre. L'Autriche a toujours été pour la Suisse une voisine courtoise et sans ambition ; le désir du peuple suisse eût été, que l'Autriche subsistât. Mais dès que les puissances en ont jugé autrement, il nous importe extrêmement de savoir qui la remplacera à nos frontières.

L'Autriche allemande, telle que la prévoit le traité de Saint-Germain, privée du Tirol méridional et de la Moravie du Sud, dépourvue de matières premières, d'agriculture, d'industrie, de débouchés, ne nous semble pas pouvoir conserver longtemps son indépendance. C'est donc l'Allemagne que la Suisse ne tardera pas à avoir comme voisine sur sa frontière orientale, comme sur sa frontière septentrionale ; cette éventualité est de nature à nous effrayer. Le Rhin, en effet, au-dessus du lac de Constance, est une très mauvaise position défensive ; de plus, les intérêts des deux rives du fleuve sont si étroitement liés, les relations des deux populations sont si intenses, que l'influence allemande se ferait sentir très fortement dans notre pays ; enfin, le Vorarlberg est nécessaire à la Suisse au point de vue ferroviaire, pour empêcher que notre territoire ne soit tourné par le grand trafic international et que notre position centrale en Europe ne soit sérieusement amoindrie.

On a été très affecté en Suisse de voir les puissances

tenir pour nul et non avenu le plébiscite du Vorarlberg. On y voit la preuve tout d'abord que les principes de libre disposition des peuples n'ont qu'une valeur de propagande, et ensuite que les intérêts des petits pays comme la Suisse se heurteront à la mauvaise volonté ou à l'indifférence des puissances, même lorsqu'ils ne heurtent aucun intérêt véritable des autres pays.

Dans ces circonstances, et en vue d'un avenir que nous avons tous de la peine à distinguer nettement, un sentiment domine en Suisse—c'est que nous ne pouvons plus compter sur aucun de nos voisins. L'Allemagne est vaincue; l'Autriche disparaît; l'Italie ne cherche pas à inspirer confiance à notre peuple, et nos relations, sans être mauvaises, ont toujours été froides; quant à la France, nous la voyons faire, depuis un certain temps, une politique renouvelée du second Empire qui nous inspire quelques réserves. La politique d'équilibre entre ses voisins que la Confédération a faite pendant la plus grande partie du XIX^{ème} siècle et qu'elle croyait pouvoir continuer toujours, est finie. Seule, livrée à nous-mêmes, nous sommes obligés de chercher au loin des points d'appui nouveaux ou de recourir à d'anciennes amitiés.

La Suisse a toujours eu à se louer dans le passé de l'Angleterre. La raison en est facile à comprendre. Un même amour de la liberté nous lie, et plus encore l'identité miraculeuse de nos intérêts. L'Angleterre, comme nous, redoute tout ce qui, en Europe, pourrait être de nature à troubler la paix; elle soutient tout ce qui assure l'équilibre. Or, c'est là la définition même des intérêts et des conditions d'existence d'un petit pays placé au centre du Continent et qui craint à la fois toute hégémonie et toute guerre. Au moment où la Société des Nations va se constituer et où, en dépit de ses hésitations, le peuple suisse va essayer d'y trouver la sauvegarde de ses intérêts essentiels, moraux et matériels, il est naturel qu'il regarde aux grandes puissances anglo-saxonnes comme à ses protectrices naturelles et qu'il se souvienne de tous les services vitaux que l'Angleterre lui a déjà rendus dans le passé, qu'il envisage tous ceux qu'elle peut lui rendre encore.

WILLIAM MARTIN.

Art. 14.—THE PEACE WITH GERMANY

THE first diplomatic sign of an inclination towards peace on the part of the Central Powers and their allies was manifested in the notes sent by them to the neutral Governments, for transmission to the Entente Powers, on Dec. 12, 1916. Confident in their resources and in their capacity to maintain successfully what they asserted to be a defensive war, they yet expressed their willingness 'to enter forthwith into negotiations for peace.' That the peace contemplated was one which would have secured for Germany at least the greater part of her existing advantages was evident from the uncompromising speech of the German Chancellor, uttered on the same day. No hint was given respecting the actual intentions of the Central Powers, nor was any prospect of concessions held out. Military conditions at the moment were, to all appearance, favourable to Germany, and there was as yet no sign that the United States would intervene. The occasion therefore seemed opportune. The German rulers evidently calculated either that their opponents would grasp at the chance of peace, or that, if they refused, their own peoples would be strengthened in their resolution to continue the war.

The reply (Dec. 30) was the only one that was possible in the circumstances. It was an unequivocal refusal, on the ground that 'a mere suggestion, without a statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace'; and that the German note was 'no more than a calculated attempt to influence the course of the war, and to end it by imposing a German peace.' The Allies added that

'No peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationality and of the free existence of small States; so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world.'

The German rejoinder (Jan. 11, 1917) threw no further light on the intentions of Germany, beyond the remark

that she and her allies considered their aims—'the defence of their liberty and their existence'—to have been already attained.

Meanwhile President Wilson had, on Dec. 18, addressed a letter to the belligerents, in which he suggested an immediate interchange of views. He took care to guard himself against the assumption that his proposal was prompted by, or in any way associated with, the overtures of the Central Powers; and he carried the aloofness of the impartial neutral to the length of attributing a virtual identity of aim to both sides in the conflict. It was only natural that this suggestion should be repudiated, with some indignation, by the Allies in their reply of Jan. 10; but, in order to remove all doubt as to the meaning of their triple demand for 'restitution, reparation, and guarantees,' they amplified their reply to the German note by setting forth their concrete objects in considerable detail. The Allied Governments were at the time, and have been since, taken to task for this declaration, on the one hand by some who thought the demands excessive and therefore likely to discourage negotiation; on the other, by those who considered such a proceeding undiplomatic and likely to prove inconvenient in the future. But frankness was probably in this case, as usual, wisdom; and it has been justified by the sequel. The statement was as follows:

'Their objects in the war are well known; they have been formulated on many occasions by the chiefs of their divers governments. These objects will not be made known in detail, with all the equitable compensations and indemnities for damages suffered, until the hour of negotiations. But the civilised world knows that they include, of necessity and in the first line, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, and the indemnities which are due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, Russia, and Rumania, with just reparation; the re-organisation of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime and founded not only on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development which all nations, great or small, possess, but also on territorial conventions and international regulations suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the

Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, and Teheco-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Power, which is distinctly alien to Western civilisation. The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia regarding Poland have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It need hardly be said that, while the Allies desire to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it has never been their design, as has been alleged, to compass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire, above all, is to ensure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, and upon the inviolable fidelity to international obligations, with which the Government of the United States has never ceased to be inspired.'

Meanwhile the German Government, in their reply to Mr Wilson's note (Dec. 26), refrained entirely from showing their hand, and merely reiterated their proposal for 'an immediate meeting of delegates' with the object of 'an exchange of views.' The frankness displayed by the Allies was neither congenial nor convenient to the Central Powers.

With this interchange of notes the first attempt at pacification—if such it can be called—came to an end. But, a few days later, Mr Wilson summed up the results and his own ideas about peace in an address to the Senate of the United States (Jan. 22, 1917). After noting, with satisfaction, that both parties had abjured any intention of crushing their opponents, he observed that, to his mind, this statement implied that 'it must be a peace without victory.' However explained, it was an unfortunate phrase, for it meant, at any rate, a compromise peace, one in which the Allies would have to sacrifice the greater part of their aims. Nevertheless, among the results which were to be regarded as assured by universal agreement he included 'a united, independent and autonomous Poland.' How such a result was to be secured without victory over the Central Empires it is not easy to perceive. There was no hint of active intervention; nevertheless, ten weeks later, the United States entered the war.

Before this event occurred, but possibly with 'intelligent anticipation' of it, the Emperor Carl, in March 1917, authorised his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, to communicate to President Poincaré, 'secretly and unofficially,' the information that he (the Emperor) would 'support, by all means and with all his personal influence, the just claims of France with regard to Alsace-Lorraine.' He added that Belgium should be entirely restored, with its sovereignty undiminished and its African colonies; and that Serbia should also recover its sovereignty, with secure access to the sea, subject only to the condition of behaving well in future. The views of Great Britain touching these proposals were also to be ascertained, in order to provide a basis for official conversations which would result in the satisfaction of all concerned.* The Emperor's letter, written with his own hand, was communicated by the Prince to the French President on March 31.

What connexion this step had with the next is not clear, but the somewhat mysterious negotiations which took place during the summer of 1917 can hardly be disconnected from the Emperor's letter. In June 1917, the French Government, according to M. Painlevé's statement (April 8, 1917), was informed that Count Nicholas Revertera had made several attempts to get into communication with a distant relation of his, Major Armand, who was in confidential French employ. With the consent of M. Ribot, meetings took place at Freiburg between these two persons in the month of August—on what basis does not appear. No positive result was attained; but when, in November, M. Clemenceau came to power, he found the conversations still going on. Not wishing to put a stop to interviews which might at least result in useful disclosures, the new Premier allowed them to continue—with instructions, however, to Major Armand, 'Écouter, et ne rien dire.' According to Austrian authorities, Armand renewed his approaches in January 1918; and on Feb. 2 a meeting took place at Freiburg, in which Revertera informed Armand that Count Czernin was of opinion that a conversation between

* This letter was published in the French papers on April 12, 1918. The narrative in the text is drawn from official or semi-official statements only.

him (Czernin) and a French representative might lead to good results, if only France would abandon the claim to Alsace-Lorraine. M. Clemenceau replied that this was impossible; and the negotiation thereupon dropped.

It would, no doubt, be interesting to know whether the Emperor's letter was written with the knowledge and consent of Berlin, or not. Mr Balfour, speaking later on the matter, inclined to believe that it was all a plot concocted between Vienna and Berlin, with a view to sowing dissension between the Allies. To us his arguments do not appear convincing, but it is hardly worth while to discuss the matter now. That Germany, while apparently willing to make terms of some sort with regard to Belgium, was absolutely firm on the question of Alsace-Lorraine, was shown by Herr von Kühlmann's subsequent statement, that only that question stood in the way of peace. The object of such a statement is too obvious to require explanation.

That Austria wished and imperatively needed peace, general or separate, is clear; whether it was possible, is quite another question. The interview, or interviews,* between Count Mensdorff and General Smuts in Switzerland seem to show that our Government thought there was some chance of one or other solution, or at any rate were unwilling to reject offhand an overture doubtless made by Austria. The Reichstag resolution (July 19, 1917), in favour of peace 'without annexations or indemnities' displayed a pacific tendency in the German people which may have encouraged hopes of success. The Papal appeal (Aug. 1) immediately preceded the Armand-Revertera interviews, of the imminence of which the Vatican could hardly have been ignorant. Finally, Lord Lansdowne's famous letter (Nov. 29), perhaps reflecting the views of a former Government, manifested a conviction that outspoken and conciliatory statements on the part of the Allies might bring about a general peace and avert world-wide disaster.

Nevertheless, it may be confidently asserted that a separate peace with Austria was then out of the question. Germany would not, and could not, have permitted it;

* According to French authorities, there was only one interview; according to Austrian, there were several.

Hungary, whose interests were bound up with those of Germany, stood to lose everything she valued, and indeed her very existence as a kingdom, through such an event; and, between the two, the Austrian Government was helpless. The change of front regarding Alsace-Lorraine indicated above shows how impossible it was for Austria to emancipate herself from the guidance of the dominant partner; and the almost pathetic apology of the Emperor Carl (April 10, 1918), followed by the patronising acceptance of the Emperor William (April 12), showed that Austria-Hungary was doomed to sink or swim with her imperious ally.

Nor were the prospects of a general peace any brighter. The German Government, whatever the Reichstag was allowed to say, had given no sign whatever of an inclination to make peace on tolerable terms. The military party still reigned supreme. The Russian revolution may have given them some moments of anxiety; but they calculated, and calculated rightly, that, whether Kerensky retained power or gave way to more extreme men, Russia was practically lost to the Entente. By this event, in spite of America, the whole aspect of the war was changed. Even Mr Wilson, who had travelled a long way from his peace-without-victory phase, had convinced himself that attempts at pacification were premature. In his reply to the Papal note of Aug. 1, after pointing out that Germany was still dominated by the military caste, he said (Aug. 27) that 'to deal with such a power by way of peace, upon the plan proposed by His Holiness, would . . . involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy.'

We have spent some time upon these abortive efforts of 1916-17 because it seems desirable to show, on the one hand, that peace could not have been had, on any tolerable terms or with any security for the future, in those years; and, on the other, that the aims of the Allies, as publicly set forth, were practically identical with those secured by the Peace. With the opening of the year 1918, the war entered on a new phase, marked, on the one hand, by President Wilson's successive formulations of principle, and, on the other, by the great German attacks, their eventual failure, and the Allied advance

which ended the war. On Jan. 8 the President, in his message to Congress, laid down his famous Fourteen Points. On Feb. 11 he stated four principles on which territorial adjustments should be made. On July 4 he somewhat amplified these principles, and added, among the ends he was fighting for, the destruction of every arbitrary power. Finally, on Sept. 27, he stated, in general terms, the issues involved, and, speaking especially of the League of Nations, declared that impartial justice must be done, without discrimination; that every particular settlement must be consistent with the common interest of all; and that there could be no special covenants or alliances and no selfish economic combinations within the League. Attention has been so much concentrated on the Fourteen Points that Mr Wilson's subsequent utterances have often been forgotten; but it should be observed that, equally with the Fourteen Points, they form the basis of the understanding arrived at on Nov. 11. How far they have been observed in the Treaty of Peace we shall endeavour presently to ascertain.

Already, before this last utterance, the disruption of the enemy forces had begun. On Sept. 14 the Austrian Government issued an appeal to the Pope to support their proposal for a conference of the belligerent Powers. This proposal was curtly declined by Mr Wilson (Sept. 16), at greater length but with equal firmness by Mr Balfour on the same day, and by M. Clemenceau two days later. On Sept. 25 Bulgaria requested an armistice, which was granted on Sept. 30. On Oct. 5 Prince Max of Baden, now Imperial Chancellor, addressed an appeal to President Wilson, begging him to intervene in order to bring about a general armistice with a view to negotiations for peace. He found in the Fourteen Points and the President's later utterances, especially the speech of Sept. 27, a programme for general peace which he was willing to accept. Similar appeals were simultaneously addressed to the President by Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

The President replied by asking certain questions bearing on the nature of the authority by which the proposal was made, and stated that he did not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms so long as the

armies of the Central Powers were upon invaded soil. The German Government replied (Oct. 12) that they accepted the terms and consented to evacuation. Mr Wilson's next note (Oct. 14) informed the German Government that the armistice, the conditions of which would be fixed by the military advisers of the Allies, must be such as would secure the 'present military supremacy of their armies in the field'; and reminded them that his terms included that stated by him on July 4, 'the destruction of every arbitrary power that can . . . of its single choice disturb the peace of the world.'

The President's reply to the Austrian note was delayed for some ten days. It was not till Oct. 18 that he informed the Austrian Government that, owing to recent events in the Empire, he could no longer be content with the autonomy for the subject races which he had demanded on Jan. 8 (Point 10), but that they, having become independent, must decide their own future. This solution was accepted by Austria on Oct. 29.

On Oct. 20 the German Government assured the President that a complete change in the constitution having taking place, power in Germany now rested on a popular basis. Thereupon the President, taking note of this change and of the pledges given by the German Government, informed them (Oct. 23) that he had submitted the proposal for an armistice to the Powers 'associated' with the United States. At the same time he doubted whether the change of system effected in Germany was adequate, and repeated his declaration that he could deal only with 'veritable representatives of the German people.' If it had to deal with 'the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany' now or hereafter, his Government 'must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender.' The abdication of the German Emperor was the result.

On Oct. 29 the German authorities repeated their assurances that their Government was now, *de facto* and *de jure*, a popular government, to which the military powers were subordinated. The Allies having intimated to the President 'their willingness to make peace with Germany on the terms laid down in his address of Jan. 8, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses,' with certain 'qualifications,' the

President, on Nov. 5, communicated this decision to the German Government. The 'qualifications' were only two. Firstly, the Allies pointed out that clause 2 of the Fourteen Points, concerning the Freedom of the Seas, 'was open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept'; secondly, they made it clear that, under the term 'restoration,' mentioned in Points 7, 8 and 11, they understood that 'compensation would be made by Germany for all damages done to civilian population . . . by land, by sea, and from the air.' Mr Wilson expressed his agreement with the second 'qualification' but said nothing about the first.

From the moment when the last Presidential note was despatched, the cessation of hostilities proceeded with rapidity. Bulgaria had, as we have seen, left the field on Sept. 30. On Oct. 31 an armistice was concluded with Turkey; on Nov. 3 one with Austria-Hungary. No serious difficulties were experienced with either of these Powers; but it took somewhat longer to reduce our principal antagonist to terms. On Nov. 7 the German delegates received the conditions from Marshal Foch. They made a strenuous resistance, and obtained certain not unimportant modifications, mainly in regard to the amount of matériel to be surrendered and the time allowed for evacuation. The armistice was signed on Nov. 11, and hostilities ceased the same day.

With regard to the conditions then imposed on Germany we do not propose to offer any observations, for they only embodied a temporary agreement. Many of the stipulations, such as the surrender of ships and matériel, and the evacuation of territory, were indeed final, but they were not terms of peace; they were but steps towards it. We need only say that, severe as the terms undoubtedly were, they were necessary in order to secure the object stated by Mr Wilson in two of his recent notes as indispensable, viz. to secure 'the military supremacy of the Allied armies in the field,' and to leave the Allies 'in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into.'

With regard to the steps which led to the armistice, it may be observed that the method of procedure adopted by Mr Wilson was fraught with serious inconveniences. His position, as at once a belligerent and a mediator, was

somewhat illogical, but did not necessarily involve grave difficulties; the attitude of Napoleon III at the close of the Crimean War was somewhat similar. But Mr Wilson was so anxious to bring hostilities to a close that he acted with undue precipitancy; and he showed so little consideration for his 'associates' that he began the negotiations, and even carried them on for some time, without consulting them. This seems clear from the official British declaration of Oct. 21, and still more from the semi-official telegram of Oct. 23, which says that 'the first German note [of Oct. 5] was sent to Washington for transmission to the Allies, but, before definitively communicating it to them, the President put to the Germans a series of questions,' etc.

Further, the way in which these questions were put was itself inconvenient. The series was a succession of afterthoughts, each of Mr Wilson's four notes containing fresh demands. That this was likely to irritate and alarm the Germans did not perhaps matter much, but it would have been better, not to say more considerate towards the Allies, had the whole series been carefully thought out, in consultation with them, and submitted to the Germans in one collective document. Finally, in one most important respect, he went back on his previous utterances. Having said, on Oct. 5, that he could not submit the proposal for an armistice so long as the German armies were on invaded soil, he actually submitted it before the evacuation began.

It cannot be said that the Presidential diplomacy was faultless, but the defects noted are relatively unimportant, compared with the inopportuneness of the proposal when actually made. That Mr Wilson chose his own time for this, and chose it independently, seems clear from what has preceded. When put before the Allies, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for obvious reasons, for them to refuse. But note the result. Had the war continued for a fortnight longer, there seems to be no doubt that the German armies would have suffered another and a far greater Sedan. Nor is it probable that, considering the rapidly increasing demoralisation of the German forces, this result would have entailed any great loss. Needless to say, it was the sacred duty of all concerned to stop the

bloodshed at the earliest possible moment—the earliest moment, that is, at which the objects of the Allies were fully within their grasp. Those who say that this moment had arrived on Nov. 11 fail to reckon with the peculiar mentality of the German people.

There are doubtless many intelligent men in Germany who know that their armies were hopelessly defeated. But the mass of the German people, including the bulk of their journalists and even of their more educated classes, do not know this and continue to believe that they were undefeated in the field. The troops who passed through Cologne on their way home marched with flags flying and bands playing, and were hailed by the population as victors. The arrival of the Allied forces was, and still is, explained by the assertion that Germany gave way only because she was starved out by the blockade and tricked into submission by perfidious diplomacy. This belief has taken its place as an article of faith in the German mind; and the results have shown themselves in many ominous and unpleasant ways—notably, for instance, in their attitude and action on the Eastern frontier—and will continue to show themselves hereafter. Nothing short of crushing military disaster would have brought the truth home to a people so gifted with the capacity for self-deception, and so deeply infected with the military spirit.

It is therefore no foolish regret for the lost opportunity of a military triumph that leads us to call the armistice inopportune, but the conviction that a grave mistake was made. We wanted not only peace, but a permanent peace; and the chances of permanence are gravely affected by the state of mind of the German people. It is just one of those *imponderabilia* which, as Bismarck said, are so apt to be neglected by politicians, but, like the sentiment of the French for Alsace-Lorraine, have an immeasurable effect on history. It may be said that the exact nature of the military situation was probably unknown to Mr Wilson at the time. This may be true, but, if so, it is no excuse; for such want of knowledge was the inevitable consequence of his aloofness and his ambition to do everything alone.

The armistice signed, the field was clear for the peace

negotiations. Why did they not begin immediately? Because Mr Lloyd George was anxious to seize the opportunity of 'sweeping the country,' and because Mr Wilson desired to 'tour' the Allied States in order to create an impression favourable to the League of Nations. As a result, two invaluable months were lost. The object of holding a General Election at that juncture was obvious; its necessity was by no means equally clear. It is true that the Parliament, elected in 1910, had ceased adequately to represent the country. But it had carried through the war, and might very well have been kept in being a few months longer. It was absurd to pretend that the problems of the Peace and those of Reconstruction required the intervention of a new Parliament; for with the discussion of peace terms Parliament could have nothing to do, and Reconstruction could not really come before it till after peace was made. The prestige of the Prime Minister, who had inspired the country and maintained its spirit throughout the struggle, could hardly be enhanced by the result of an election, however favourable. His two European colleagues, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando, did not think it necessary to obtain such fresh support; and Mr Wilson came to the Conference suffering from a defeat at the polls, without, so far as can be perceived, losing any influence at the council-table. The fact is that the character and ability of a negotiator, and the weight of the country which he represents, are the factors which determine his influence in international affairs; and it required no general election to show that Great Britain had confidence in its Prime Minister.

Be that as it may, two months were consumed in these occupations; and the formal discussions about the Peace, which might have begun within a few days of Nov. 11, did not begin till Jan. 12. That peace should be made as speedily as possible was not only a universal sentiment; it was also a matter of universal interest. So long as uncertainty about great territorial and other changes existed, the work of repairing the ruins of war could not really begin; the blockade of Central Europe had to be continued, with all the hardships and the dangers it involved; the advance of Bolshevism was thus facilitated, and a spirit of bitterness and resentment

for the needless prolongation of suffering was engendered. The Conference, when at last it met, was forced to work under great pressure, and with a feeling of hurry which is not conducive to wise decisions. Moreover, the delay fostered vain hopes in Germany; the military were emboldened to adopt a more arrogant attitude, and to take steps on the eastern frontier and in East Prussia which caused much trouble during the Conference. Worst of all, time was given for nationalist feeling to become embittered, for violent propaganda to take effect, and for political agitations to be started which it became increasingly difficult to keep within bounds.

Nor was this the only serious mistake made by the Allied Powers at this juncture. Abandoning the precedent set by almost all the great pacifications of the last century, they dispensed with 'preliminaries' of peace altogether. It may be said that the Fourteen Points and Mr Wilson's subsequent utterances took their place. To a certain extent this is true, for both parties agreed to make peace upon the basis thus laid down. But as a substitute for 'preliminaries,' as previously understood, this series of statements was utterly inadequate. Preliminaries of peace have always been in more or less general terms, but they have been precise and unmistakable, and have only required elaboration in detail in the final Treaty. Such were by no means all of Mr Wilson's 'Points,' which appear to have been drawn up under the impression that a compromise peace was inevitable. Not to mention the enigmatic clause 2 (Freedom of the Seas), we may refer to clause 5, which demands an 'impartial adjustment of colonial claims,' based on the principle of giving equal weight to 'the interests of the population concerned' and 'the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.' Mr Wilson's words would have justified the Germans in demanding a full consideration of their claims in East Africa, for instance. Whatever other justification may be found for the insistence on the immediate surrender of all the German colonies, it is not to be found in this clause, to which, nevertheless, both parties had agreed. Much the same may be said about the statements concerning reparation, which, even with the Allies' reservations mentioned above, were left in a state of uncertainty

that led to a serious divergence of opinion at the Conference. Other examples might be given, but these two will suffice to show the grave inconveniences caused by the lack of consideration, due chiefly to the President's precipitate action, and by the desertion of precedent, for which the Allies are themselves to blame.

In 1814, 1856, 1859 and 1871, an armistice was followed by the signature of preliminaries within an interval, at longest, of six weeks; while in 1866 and 1878 both armistice and preliminaries were signed on the same day, the preliminaries being signed first. For preliminaries are the natural and proper condition precedent to the grant of a cessation of arms. The territorial surrenders to be demanded of Germany and her allies could have been settled in a very short time; the subsequent difficulties have mostly arisen over the question what was to be done with them. One or two specially difficult questions, such as that of the Saar Basin, might have been reserved, Germany undertaking to abide by the Allies' decision in this matter, as in regard to certain disputed racial boundaries, subject to the general principles enunciated by the President. Full reparation could have been insisted on, without exact definition of the amount. The League of Nations need not have been mentioned, for it was obvious that, if such an institution came into being, Germany could not expect, even if she desired, to enter it at once. Had the armistice been deferred till preliminaries, fully considered and jointly arrived at, were ready, the Germans would have known what to expect, and much trouble would have been avoided.

Eventually, on Jan. 12, the Peace Conference got to work. It would be interesting, had we the requisite space, to discuss the organisation of the Conference, the attitude of its principal members, and the causes which hindered a speedy completion of its proceedings. Much of its secret history will long remain hid, perhaps will never be known. At any rate, we must await the publication of the official history to learn what is permitted to transpire. It will not be the most interesting part. But with regard to the duration of the Conference, any one who considers the state of Europe

at the time, and who observes the enormous bulk of the Peace Treaty and the bewildering multiplicity of its details, will rather be amazed that so gigantic a task was accomplished in so short a time. On May 7 the Treaty was submitted to the German delegates at Versailles. They fought hard; and a few modifications, not unimportant, were introduced; but the Treaty, as signed on June 28, was virtually identical with that on which the Allies had agreed.

It would of course be hopeless to attempt a general survey of this great instrument, with its 15 parts and its 440 articles; we can only endeavour to supply a brief commentary on some of its most important provisions, which may help to form a judgment on the goodness or badness of the treaty as a whole. In forming such a judgment a sense of proportion is essential. If we concentrate our attention on the objectionable features—for such there doubtless are—and forget the good sides, we shall arrive at a narrow and perverted view. No such treaty, ending so widespread a war and covering so vast a field, can be expected to be faultless. When we consider the losses sustained and the passions raised, we may well congratulate ourselves that the faults due to fear, ambition and the spirit of revenge were not more numerous and deplorable than they are.

In considering the treaty, we will take its more important provisions in the order in which they occur. The League of Nations takes precedence, not only because of its intrinsic importance, but still more because much that follows is based on the hypothesis of its establishment and continuance. By its inclusion in the Treaty of Peace, Germany recognises its existence and the powers conferred upon it by general consent, though she can only gain admission to it by the consent of two-thirds of the members, and provided 'that she gives effective guarantees of her sincere intention to observe her international obligations' (Art. 1). As originally sketched, it was to be a league to maintain, or (as some of its American supporters put it) to enforce, peace; and all the earlier discussions about it* turned on this aspect,

* Cf. an article in this 'Review' for January 1919.

and this aspect only. But the League, as now constituted, is much more than this. It not only binds its supporters to maintain the independence and the territorial integrity of each of its members (Art. 10), but it establishes (Art. 22) what is known as the Mandatory System, under which the League acts as a trustee for the universe, and exercises a sort of tutelage over 'the colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them,' and are as yet unable to stand by themselves.

The League, therefore, really consists of two distinct parts; and it is the second part, involving, as it does, incalculable responsibilities, that is objected to by the Republican party and the hard-and-fast supporters of the Monroe Doctrine in the United States. But it is just this accretion, this towering edifice built on the original foundations, which should save the League. It gives scope for constant employment and therefore real vitality to a combination which otherwise might have died of inanition. Moreover, it indicates a machinery for the revision of the treaty, in view of new conditions and unforeseen circumstances. It may at once be acknowledged that the Mandatory System was worked out chiefly on this side of the water, and is therefore not of American origin. Hinted at first, we believe, in a speech by Mr Balfour, foreshadowed in addresses by Lord Robert Cecil, it was fully developed in General Smuts' admirable pamphlet, which may be regarded as the literary basis of the present League.

The adoption of the Mandatory System supplied a way out of the difficulties raised by the 'no annexation' principle when confronted by the facts of the situation. It was generally agreed that the conquered colonies could not be restored to Germany, nor the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire to Turkey; what was to be done with them? A solution was found in the Mandatory System, and was accepted by Mr Wilson and our Allies. It was not accepted without protest by the self-governing Dominions concerned; and their objections to the restrictions imposed by the League, as at first drafted, upon their freedom of action in the territories to be allotted to them threatened at one time serious

trouble. The difficulty was met by a careful graduation of the powers to be granted to the Mandatories in accordance with the stage of civilisation reached by the territories in question, and other circumstances.

The earlier provisions of the League have been so fully discussed that, even if space allowed, it would not be worth while to refer to them here; but it will be well to mention some of the more important alterations and additions introduced after the submission of the draft on Feb. 14, because the character of the League, and perhaps its capacity for effective action, have been considerably modified thereby.

In the constitution of the League little alteration was made. The 'Body of Delegates' becomes the 'Assembly'; the 'Executive Council' becomes the 'Council'—a concession to the smaller States who were inclined to regard, with some justice, the machinery of the League as devised to execute the will of the Great Powers. For similar reasons, the Council is now empowered, with the consent of the majority of the Assembly, 'to increase the number of members [i.e. the minor States] of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council' (Art. 4). But, inasmuch as the Council (i.e. the Five Great Powers and four other members) is also empowered to name additional members for *permanent* representation on the Council, the Great Powers will always be able to retain the dominating position accorded to them, which, after all, is only just and in accordance with facts. By an important addition to Art. 1, any member, if it gives two years' notice and has fulfilled all its obligations, may withdraw from the League.

By Art. 5, decisions, whether in the Council or in the Assembly, are now to be unanimous. This momentous innovation is doubtless an adequate safeguard against indiscreet meddling; but, considering the difficulty of getting the 'Concert of Europe' to agree about anything, it seems not unlikely that it will generally reduce the League to inaction. The seat of the League is now fixed at Geneva (Art. 7), but may be transferred. By the same article, all posts in connexion with the League are now thrown open 'equally to men and women.'

With regard to the reduction and limitation of armaments, the plans formulated by the Council 'for the

consideration and action of the several Governments' are now to be revised (Art. 8) at least once every ten years. Such a process is likely to prove an 'acid test' of the unanimity required by Art. 5. The powers of the International Court of Justice are somewhat enlarged (Arts. 13, 14); and the jurisdiction and procedure of the Court are more clearly defined (Art. 15). By Art. 16 it is now decreed that the Council may, by an unanimous vote, expel any member who violates the Covenant.

One of the most striking modifications is introduced by a new article (Art. 21) which enacts that 'nothing in the Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of . . . regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace.' This provision was, of course, inserted to appease the susceptibilities of the United States; but it is somewhat difficult to see why an announcement of policy by a member of the League should be styled an 'understanding,' seeing that, so far as we are aware, the Doctrine has never hitherto been officially recognised by any other Power. That recognition has now been obtained; and the control of the United States over the New World is thereby assured. But it may be pointed out that, by adhesion to the League of Nations, the United States have abandoned one side of the Monroe Doctrine—the abstention from 'entangling alliances'; while, if the League of Nations is a reality, the other side, viz. the veto on European acquisitiveness in the western hemisphere, has become superfluous. The clause is a blot on the Treaty, masking a separatist *imperium in imperio* under the transparent disguise of a measure to maintain peace.

It cannot be said that the scheme for a League of Nations, though slightly improved in detail, has been strengthened by the criticism to which it has been subjected. It has rather been weakened, for the criticism has generally been actuated by dislike for the limitations of national sovereignty which such an undertaking must entail. But, such as it is, we welcome it as the embodiment of a progressive idea, the expression of a lofty hope. It is but a fragile vessel, though it has been launched by the greatest assemblage of power that the world has ever seen. It will have to face tempestuous seas. If its commanders display in peace the qualities

which they have shown in war—unity, courage and determination—if they put into vigorous and concerted action the powers conferred upon them, it will weather the storm and bring a precious cargo home. If, on the other hand, they shrink at the outset, if they neglect the opportunities for self-assertion which are sure to present themselves, the League will fall into disrepute and fade away. Nevertheless, even if such an ending proves that the world is not yet ripe for the great adventure, the Covenant will go down to history as a long step towards a true Comity of Nations.

We come now to those portions of the Treaty which more directly concern Germany, and, first, the territorial cessions. The future boundaries of the German State are defined in Arts. 27–30, and follow the lines laid down in the subsequent Articles (31–114).

Germany recognises (Art. 31) the determination of the treaties of 1839, which established the neutrality of Belgium, and cedes to that country (Arts. 32–39) the small territories of Moresnet, Eupen and Malmédy. These territories lie on the eastern frontier of Belgium, between Aix-la-Chapelle and the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg. There is no question that Moresnet, with its predominantly Walloon population, rightly belongs to Belgium. In Eupen and Malmédy the population is more mixed; but Eupen is part of the Belgian district of Baelen, and the economic relations of all three districts indicate a closer connexion with Belgium than with Germany. In these somewhat ambiguous conditions it has been rightly provided that a plebiscite shall be taken in Eupen and Malmédy (Art. 34) to determine whether 'the whole or part remain under German sovereignty.' The ultimate decision in view of this vote is to rest with the League of Nations.

To France Germany restores (Art. 51) Alsace-Lorraine. The conditions and consequences of the restoration occupy Arts. 52–79, and are too elaborate for discussion here. We can only observe that it is a retrocession which requires no defence, for it is in accordance with justice, with the principle of self-determination, and, in particular, with clause 8 of the Fourteen Points. But perhaps nothing in the Treaty marks more definitely the

defeat of Prussian militarism than the loss of these two provinces, whose conquest and retention were universally recognised as the chief symbol of its power. Their great economical value will, it may be hoped, go far to enable France to restore her crippled resources and to revive her manufactures. We may also trust that, for her own sake as well as theirs, she will treat her new acquisitions with due regard to their peculiar character, their special interests, and their ethnological diversity.

Closely connected with Alsace-Lorraine, not only geographically but also historically, is the district known as the Saar Basin. The principal coal-field lies on each side of the Saar, a tributary of the Moselle, from Saargemünd (Saarguemines) to near Merzig, the larger portion being on the right or eastern bank of the river. It extends for about 90 miles in a N.E. and S.W. direction, and covers an area of about 1400 square miles. Its value lies largely in the fact that close by are the great deposits of minette iron-ore, which extend along the western or left bank of the Moselle, from Longwy on the Belgian frontier to Nancy, a distance of some 70 miles, and cover an area of about 1300 square miles. The Saar coal-field lies wholly within the late German frontier; and the population, except a single commune in the south-west, is German. The iron-fields, excepting the southern portion near Nancy, are half in what was since 1871 German, half in French territory; but the population is almost purely French. The south-western quarter of the Saar coal-field, lying within the old frontier of Lorraine, and the German portion of the iron-field, were annexed in 1871; and German publicists have frequently regretted that they did not annex the whole. The rectification of this mistake was one of their chief aims in the recent war.

By the retrocession of Lorraine the whole of the iron-field comes back into French hands; and by Arts. 45-50 France obtains temporary usage of the greater part of the Saar coal-field, an irregular square extending north-eastward from the old Lorraine frontier to Homburg and St Wendel, and measuring from 30 to 35 miles each way. This transfer is made (Art. 45) 'as compensation for the destruction of the coal-mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the

total reparation due from Germany.' By Art. 49 the government of this district is renounced 'in favour of the League of Nations, in the capacity of trustee'; and a long annex to Art. 50 lays down the conditions of government, and of the plebiscite which, at the end of fifteen years, will decide under what sovereignty the inhabitants desire to be placed. Meanwhile, the deposits of coal within the ceded area are to be 'the absolute property of the French State.' The government of the district will be in the hands of a Commission of five, nominated by the League—one French, one German, and three belonging to other countries. The local courts and assemblies will continue; and a representative assembly will be established. There will be no military service. The League will eventually decide, on the basis of the plebiscite, whether the district shall be united with Germany or with France or remain under control of the League. In any portion eventually restored to Germany the French mines will have to be bought out.

This arrangement has been violently attacked on the ground that it is unjust to Germany and a departure from the principles laid down as a basis of the Peace. Neither objection can be maintained. The Germans destroyed the mines in northern France, not as a necessary military measure but with the deliberate intention of preventing that country from recovering its industrial prosperity after the peace; and the destruction was so complete that industry in the devastated regions can hardly return to normal conditions within ten years, and will only do so at enormous cost. Meanwhile a supply of coal is absolutely required; and the Saar Basin is evidently the district from which it can be most conveniently and cheaply obtained. The surrender of its deposits for fifteen years is the smallest compensation which Germany can be called upon to pay for the destruction she has wrought.

But, it is argued, even if this be granted, the district should not have been annexed, at all events without consulting the inhabitants. The German delegates offered to secure the delivery of coal in sufficient quantities if they might retain control. It must of course be granted that, if the inhabitants had been consulted, they would have voted against even a temporary

occupation. But the principle of self-determination, when it clashes with other recognised principles, is not necessarily to be applied. No one denies the right of temporary occupation of conquered territory, without the consent of the inhabitants, in order to secure the execution of a treaty; and the occupation of the Saar Basin is temporary. The eventual right of self-determination is preserved. As for the proposal of the German delegates, the good faith of Germany is not so obvious as to encourage confidence in her discharge of any such obligations; and it would have been very difficult to keep an adequate watch on her proceedings.

Finally, it should be noted that the Conference, in drawing the new boundaries of Lorraine, did not go back, as many in France wished, to those drawn in 1814. They adopted the boundaries of 1815, when France was obliged to retire to the frontiers of 1792, losing not only Saarbrücken (acquired in 1793) but also Saarlouis, a true French town in the heart of the coal-field, and the district of Landau. The restoration of these territories would have placed a large German population under permanent French rule and would have been a misfortune for France. Still more is it a subject of congratulation that the Conference refused the demand, put forward by an influential party in France and strongly supported, for military reasons, by Marshal Foch, for the whole Left Bank of the Rhine. To have yielded to this demand would have been a political crime more reprehensible than even the annexation by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine.

No question submitted to the Conference was more difficult than that of Poland. Its solution, so far as Germany is concerned, is contained in Arts. 87-108. The Powers were pledged to undo the wrong of the Partitions, and to recreate 'an independent Polish state,' with 'a free and secure access to the sea.' But it was to be limited—such at least is the implication of the vague language of Mr Wilson's 13th Point—to 'the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations.' Hence arose one of the thorniest dilemmas in which the Allies, by their hasty acceptance of the Fourteen Points, landed themselves. Mr Wilson may perhaps be excused for his ignorance of intricate European conditions; but the Allies should—and might—have known better. The

'free and secure access to the sea' was not to be had without violating the second condition. Indeed, it is not too much to say that if Poland were limited to 'populations indisputably Polish,' it would have no access to the sea at all. Hence the necessity for including a certain number of Germans in the territory of the Polish state.

The southern shore of the Baltic, between Pomerania and the Russian frontier, was occupied heretofore by two Prussian provinces—East Prussia and West Prussia. East Prussia had been under German control, as a fief of the Kingdom of Poland, since the 13th century, and an independent portion of the Prussian state since the 17th. It was cut off from Germany by West Prussia, the northernmost portion of the Kingdom of Poland. Hence the first partition (1772), when Frederick the Great linked up East Prussia with the rest of his kingdom by occupying that part of Poland which lay between. Twenty years later, in the second partition, he got possession of Danzig, a German city under Polish suzerainty, but practically autonomous, like other Hanse towns. The population of East Prussia is almost purely German-speaking—whatever the original substratum may racially be—except in the south (the region of the Masurian lakes), where there is a large admixture of Poles. The population of West Prussia is mixed, the Poles being generally in a majority; but in one portion, running unfortunately right across the narrow 'corridor' between the Vistula and Pomerania, the German element predominates. The large majority of the population of Danzig is German. Such, roughly, are the conditions of this particular problem.

It has been solved, first, by leaving East Prussia in German hands; secondly, by incorporating the greater part of West Prussia in the Polish state; thirdly, by making Danzig, with the territory immediately surrounding it, a free city under the League of Nations; lastly, by the resolution to hold a plebiscite, as between Poland and Germany, in disputable regions, viz. the southern portion of East Prussia and a small area in the eastern part of West Prussia. It was at first proposed to give Danzig to Poland, but this was objected to on the ground of its strongly German character; and the actual

compromise—on the whole, the most satisfactory way out of the difficulty—was the result.

The loss of the ancient German city of Danzig is undoubtedly a sore blow to Germany, and is to be regretted as a departure from the principle of self-determination. But it appears inevitable, in order to secure for Poland that access to the sea without which an industrial state can hardly live; for the coast of West Prussia is scarcely forty miles long and possesses no harbours. The separation of East Prussia from Germany is also to be regretted, but, for the reason just given, it is inevitable. The importance of the land connexion is chiefly strategic; commerce between East Prussia and Germany goes mainly by sea. The convincing argument is this: There is no use in resuscitating Poland at all unless it is to be a strong, prosperous and—if this is possible—contented Poland; and to this end the control of the Vistula, its great avenue of communication with the outer world, is essential. That outlet might easily be blocked by a German Danzig.

This, however, is only one of the problems which encompassed the formation of the new state. In the province of Posen, secured by Prussia in the second and third partitions, and confirmed to her, though with losses to Russia, by the Congress of Vienna, there was not any serious difficulty in drawing the new boundary; for the Poles, in spite of all the efforts to germanise or expatriate them, have vigorously maintained their nationality; and, except in some of the towns and along the western border, parts of which are left to Germany, the majority of the population is 'indisputably Polish.' But in the south-west, in the German province of Upper Silesia, the population is so mixed that the principle of nationality is hardly applicable. From a point on the German frontier, in the latitude of Breslau, to the frontier of Galicia opposite Cracow, this disputable area extends—a large pear-shaped district, nearly 100 miles from north to south, and some 60 miles across at its widest part. It contains some of the best mines in Germany and much fertile land.

The difficulty is to be solved by a plebiscite, which, like that in East Prussia mentioned above, will be under the authority of a commission appointed by the Allied

Powers. In both cases, the result of the popular vote is difficult to foresee; and it may very likely be so ambiguous as to leave the ultimate decision to the Allies. Germany, now deprived of the Saar Basin, is largely dependent on the Silesian mines for her industrial prosperity, on which, in turn, depends her capacity to make financial amends for her sins. We may trust that this fact will not be forgotten when the decision is made. It is no doubt an unfortunate feature of the Peace that between two and three million Germans will be incorporated—though of course with rights of emigration—in the Polish state, whose total population will number about 25,000,000. That there are so many is largely due to the policy of colonisation and compulsory purchase, and other methods of forcible eviction, ruthlessly pursued by Germany for a long time past against the native inhabitants of territories that rightfully belonged to them. The Germans have only themselves to thank if this policy has now turned against them. The alternative was to leave a still larger number of Poles under the German yoke, and to strangle Poland at its birth.

With regard to the next section of the treaty—that dealing with Schleswig (Arts. 109-114)—there will be no hesitation in approving the decision made. When, after the war of 1866, the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein passed under Prussian control, it was arranged between Austria and Prussia, by Art. 5 of the Treaty of Prague, that the population of North Schleswig should be allowed to decide by plebiscite whether they should belong to Denmark or to Germany. The plebiscite was never taken; and in 1878, when the Austro-German alliance was made, Art. 5 was cancelled by mutual consent of the two Powers. This wrong has now been righted by the agreement that a plebiscite shall be taken in the disputed area. In the interval, in order to guard against intimidation or undue pressure, the area will be governed by an International Commission, on which Sweden and Norway will (if they wish) be represented. The vote will be taken by communes; and in accordance with it the new boundary will be drawn.

Finally, by Arts. 115-158, Germany makes a number of concessions concerning Heligoland, the German colonies, Russia and countries outside Europe. The

naval harbours and fortifications of Heligoland, ceded by us to Germany in 1890 in exchange for Zanzibar, are to be demolished; the island, though rightly belonging to Denmark, remains German. The independence of all the territories forming the Russian Empire at the outset of the war is recognised; and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) and subsequent treaties with the Bolshevik Government are cancelled. By Arts. 119-127 Germany cedes to the Principal Allied Powers all her oversea possessions. She renounces, in favour of China, her existing concessions at Tientsin and Hankow—which are to be opened to international trade—and, in favour of Japan, her claims on the territory of Kiaochow and her rights in the province of Shantung. She renounces also any treaty-rights she may possess in Siam, Liberia and Morocco, and recognises the British Protectorate in Egypt.

Most of these clauses will meet with general approval, but against two of the decisions, expressed or implied, we venture to raise objection. In the first place it will be observed that nothing is said about the retrocession by Japan to China of the German rights over the territory of Kiaochow and the province of Shantung, though this was expressly promised by Japan when she undertook to expel the Germans. Whatever may be the understanding between Japan and the other Allied Powers regarding the ultimate fate of these possessions, there is nothing in the treaty to ensure that Japan shall redeem her pledges. It is a grave omission. It is true that in a note accompanying the treaty of 1915, between Japan and China, Japan repeated her promise to restore to China 'the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay.' But it was under conditions that render this restoration to a large extent nugatory; for they include 'a concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan, to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.' There is nothing to prevent this concession being Tsingtao itself, with its docks and other appliances; and that this is intended seems clear from a subsequent clause, which reserves the disposal of German buildings and properties for arrangement '*before* the restoration takes place.'

The circumstances in which this treaty was concluded should be briefly recalled. On Jan. 18, 1915, Japan laid before the Chinese Government a draft treaty containing

what are known as the Twenty-one Demands. After many conferences, which led to some revision, Japan agreed to defer five of these, but extorted China's consent to the rest by an ultimatum (May 7) which but slightly veiled a threat of war. Accordingly, on May 25, two treaties were signed, one dealing with Shantung, the other with Manchuria and Mongolia; and several supplementary notes, dealing with other concessions to be made by China, were exchanged. By these, not only does China bind herself to accept whatever arrangement Japan may make with Germany respecting Shantung, to obtain capital from Japan for the building of a railway connected therewith, and to lease no part of the province to any foreign Power, but also Japan obtains rights in South Manchuria and East Mongolia which give her full control of those vast provinces. All their resources may be exploited by Japanese; the chief railways, built or to be built, are brought under Japanese control; Japanese advisers are to be employed in military, financial and police matters. In short, the provinces become, for all practical purposes, Japanese. Between Shantung and Manchuria Peking is enclosed as between the jaws of a nutcracker; and the independence of China disappears.

Moreover, the control over enormous supplies of coal and iron which results from these concessions will free Japan from all dependence on foreign countries for these articles; and in the near future she will be able to build a fleet which will dominate the Pacific. It is a heavy price to pay for the temporary abandonment by Japan of her claim to racial equality, and for her adhesion to the League of Nations. The League has formally recognised the Monroe Doctrine for the Western hemisphere; it now sanctions a sort of Monroe Doctrine for the Far East. The tacit recognition of these arrangements is one of the most grievous blots on the Treaty of Versailles.

Our other objection to the last-mentioned series of articles is of a very different nature, and one which, in the present temper of this country, will, we fear, meet with scant approval. Nevertheless, we feel bound to say that, in our judgment, a grave mistake has been made in depriving Germany of all her colonies. It was not thus that we dealt with France in 1815. Our statesmen

then perceived that to deprive a great and vigorous nation of all outlet for its colonising energies is to stop a safety-valve which renders innocuous those explosive forces that otherwise may take more harmful directions. The result, in the case of Germany, will inevitably be that her adventurous spirits, supported by her Government, will turn their attention to the East. The *Mitteleuropa* plan may be revived in another form. Poland and Russia are, in any case, open fields for commercial and other forms of peaceful penetration, from which political influence will inevitably result. Such methods can be pursued in countless ways without giving the League any handle for intervention. And they are certain to be followed; for what else can Germany do? A nation of between 60 and 70 millions, as capable, in many ways, as any on earth, is not going to sit inactive within its borders very long.

It will be replied that, whether this be so or not, it was impossible to return any of the German colonies, firstly, because, by her treatment of the natives, at least in Africa, she had shown herself unfit to rule over barbarous peoples; secondly, because she was credited, on good grounds, with the intention of raising a vast black army which might have overrun the whole continent and of using her colonial ports as bases for submarine warfare; lastly, because in certain cases, it was unfair and might have been disastrous to our self-governing Dominions to expose them to the dangers which the contiguity of German possessions implies. These are all good reasons; and, in the case of German S.W. Africa, New Guinea, and Samoa with other Pacific islands, the last was imperative. But with regard to her other African possessions the matter is not equally clear. Granted that the interests of France demanded the cession of Togoland and the Cameroons, there remains German East Africa, which has fallen to Great Britain.

Now there can be no doubt that Germany's treatment of the native races was, at the outset, brutal in the extreme; but there is good reason to believe that, if only from considerations of self-interest, there had been considerable improvement in recent years. And it may be remarked that, if this is to be the test, there are other nations which would have forfeited their claim to tropical

possessions long ago. In other respects we must concede that the German colonies were, latterly, well and successfully administered, and that great material development had taken place. Had we returned East Africa, we might have retained possession of its western portion, to secure the corridor, complete the Cape-to-Cairo railway, and control the great highway of the lakes. Under the supervision of the League, it would surely not have been difficult to obtain adequate guarantees against the formation of a native army, against the use of the ports for any but commercial purposes, and against abuses of power, of which forced labour is the chief. It cannot indeed be said that, considering all the circumstances, there is any injustice in the forfeiture to which Germany has been condemned; we regret it from considerations of enlightened self-interest.

For ourselves, the possessions of the British Empire—and its responsibilities—are surely large enough without German East Africa. We have lost terribly in this war, but, as a result, our Empire is largely increased. We could have done without this additional colony; and its restoration to Germany, under strict conditions, would have been an act of generosity which would have done more than anything else within the bounds of possibility to pave the way to that ultimate reconciliation without which the world cannot attain harmony or even the League of Nations continue to exist.

We have dealt at some length with the territorial articles of the Treaty, because they are in some ways the most important, and, we may hope, the most permanent in their main results. But the territorial articles form little more than one-third of the whole; and those which follow, though mostly of a temporary nature and not unlikely to be revised, are for the immediate future not less important than the changes in the map.

A long series of military, naval and air clauses (Arts. 159-213) provides for the demobilisation of the German, and fixes the number of troops, etc., the ships of war, and the quantity of supplies which Germany may in future possess. We cannot enter into the details of these enactments; it must suffice to say that they amount to the practical disarmament of Germany. They

may, and doubtless will, be revised when she enters the League; their object is to secure the execution of the terms of peace, and 'to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations.'

After certain stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners and interned civilians, and the care of graves (Arts. 214-226), the Treaty proceeds (Arts. 227-230), firstly, to 'arraign William II of Hohenzollern for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties,' and to create a tribunal for his trial, with the right to inflict any punishment it may consider just. Secondly, other persons 'accused of acts in violation of the laws and customs of war' may be brought before the military tribunals of the Allied Powers concerned, and, if guilty, will be 'sentenced to punishments laid down by law.'

On the question of trying those directly guilty of the crimes which have horrified us during the last five years, there is little disagreement. No nation which believes in law and in the deterrent effect of merited punishment, or which desires to limit, so far as possible, the evils of war, can afford to pass over in silence what has been done; while some cases, such as the judicial murder of Captain Fryatt, involving (as it did) the right of self-defence, cannot be ignored without admitting a fatal departure from the recognised principles of international law. But with regard to the trial of the late Emperor there is a wide division of opinion. Outside Germany it is generally agreed that the responsibility for the war rests with that country and her allies; and that the invasion of Belgium, with all it implied, was a high crime against international morality. But that responsibility falls on the enemy countries as a whole; and they have been condignly punished. The question is whether the misdoings in question can be brought home to William II. Even in Germany the head of the State is no absolute autocrat; and the trial will involve the most difficult questions of constitutional law and practice. Considering the circumstances, and the composition of the tribunal, condemnation may be regarded as a foregone conclusion. We do not consider the want of law and precedent to be a bar to judicial proceedings; for in unprecedented circumstances law and precedent

have to be made. But will the world at large regard as judicial a trial in which the aggrieved parties are judges, or their verdict as legal and unbiassed?

There would have been much more to say for trying the late Emperor on the counts to be brought against officials under the second head; for it would be unjust to try subordinates for acting on orders emanating from higher authority, while leaving that authority untouched. There can be no doubt, for instance, that the sinking of the 'Lusitania' and the ruthless submarine warfare could be brought home to William II; for the Emperor's control of the navy was direct and absolute. But the Allies, by restricting the charge against him to the initiation of the war and the violation of treaties, have deliberately cut themselves off from such proceedings.

If the late Emperor had to be tried, it should at all events have been in a neutral country and before a neutral court. Even an acquittal, under these conditions, would not have implied approval of the war; it would only have meant a refusal to regard the culprit as solely guilty. Many other considerations, such as the undesirability of making William II a martyr in the eyes of the German people, and of raising up and perpetuating a Hohenzollern legend like that of Napoleon, might be urged; but enough has perhaps been said to show why we regard the arraignment, in its actual form, as a grave mistake, and an unfortunate concession to thoughtless popular clamour.

The enactments concerning Reparation occupy Arts. 231-244, with seven long annexes which go into minute particulars. We cannot attempt to summarise them here. It must suffice to say, in the first place, that Reparation is limited to damage done in and through the war. There is no demand for Indemnities, properly so called, i.e. repayment for the costs of the war, such as were exacted by Germany after her triumphs over Austria-Hungary and France. The Allies were precluded from making such a demand by acceptance of the Fourteen Points, even with the reservation mentioned above (p. 236). There was some difference of legal opinion on this head; and it was maintained that the omission of Indemnities in that document was not prohibitive. Had the prohibition of Indemnities been

intended, they would (it is urged) have been specifically forbidden. Common sense, no less than considerations of honour, appears to exclude this interpretation. The omission was unfortunate, and was another instance of the mischievous results due to the haste and want of consideration with which Mr Wilson's programme was accepted. But the United States, it is generally understood, stood firm, and their arguments prevailed.

What probably weighed still more at the Conference was the consideration that the limit of Germany's capacity for payment, without permanent injury to her industrial activities and therefore to the commercial and financial interests of the Allies, would be reached long before the sum required for the repair of actual damages was obtained. Consequently, had Indemnities been included, the states which had *suffered* most in the war would have been the losers, while those which had *spent* most would have gained. Moreover, to calculate the actual costs, considering the enormous amount of waste, would have been an almost hopeless task.

No one who has seen the awful devastation of northern France, or who knows anything of the damages inflicted there and elsewhere, can regard the pecuniary compensation (fixed provisionally at 5,000,000,000*l.*) as excessive. In point of fact, it will not come anywhere near covering the destruction wrought; and it would have been fixed at a far higher figure had not enlightened self-interest intervened. Nor will the reparation in the matter of shipping come near covering our maritime losses. The net result is that we and our allies are left with an enormous addition to our National Debts, to be borne as best we may. It is true—though it seems to be generally forgotten—that some compensation is to be found in those vast and rich lands, especially Mesopotamia, that have passed under our sway; but, after all, these territorial gains cannot be set in the balance against our losses, of which the financial are the least.

With regard to the Financial clauses (Arts. 245-263), the want of space forbids more than a note that, as Germany refused to take over, in 1871, any part of the French debt on account of Alsace-Lorraine, France now recovers those provinces unburdened by any share in the German debt; and that Germany pays (as is usual in

such cases) the cost of the armies of occupation on German soil, which will continue for fifteen years.

The Economic clauses (Arts. 264-312), with many annexes, form perhaps the longest section of the Treaty, but we must pass them over briefly. One of their principal objects is to secure that Germany shall not discriminate, directly or indirectly, against the trade of the Allied countries. Most-favoured-nation treatment is to be accorded to the goods and manufactures of those countries imported into Germany, and also to Allied shipping. There appears to be no restriction on the right of the Allies to impose discriminatory duties on German goods—an omission hardly to be brought within clause 3 of the Fourteen Points. Taken as a whole, it must be allowed that the economic clauses of the Treaty are, as Lord Hugh Cecil pointed out in an admirable letter (May 21), unduly harsh and exacting, and may react unfavourably, in the end, upon Allied commerce. It is here, probably, that the Treaty will require most revision at the hands of the League.

After allowing Allied Aircraft (military or commercial) free passage over Germany territory, but without reciprocity (Arts. 313-320), the Treaty passes to the regulations touching Ports, Waterways, and Railways (Arts. 321-386). On these we can only observe that discrimination against the Allies is again forbidden; that the lower portions of certain great rivers—the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube—are declared international; that for these rivers a general convention, regulating navigation, etc., is to be drawn up by the Allied Powers, and approved by the League; and that special provision is made for the Rhine. In regard to this last great artery of international trade, there is room for doubt whether the interests of neutrals, especially Holland and Switzerland,* have been adequately protected. France, having complete control of the left bank where it forms her frontier, gains rights on the other bank, with that of taking water for canals, etc., and of erecting weirs, which go far to make the Rhine a French river. These privileges appear excessive; and the League will, at all events, have to take care that they are not abused.

* Cf. pp. 220-221 of this number of the 'Quarterly Review.'

Articles 387-427 contain an agreement which social reformers will probably regard as second in importance to hardly any other part of the Treaty, namely, the Labour Convention. Its aim and scope are sufficiently explained by the preamble, which runs as follows:

"Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice; and whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; . . . whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries; the High Contracting Parties agree," etc.

A permanent organisation, composed of the members of the League of Nations, is established, consisting of (1) a General Conference of representatives, (2) an International Labour Office controlled by a Governing Body of 24 persons, 12 of whom represent the Government, the rest representing employers and employed in equal proportions. The Office will collect and distribute 'information on all subjects relating to the international adjustment of conditions of industrial life and labour.' The Conference may draft recommendations for national legislation or international conventions, receive complaints of bad conditions or non-performance of obligations, and initiate enquiries. Conventions, if duly ratified, will be registered by the League. Special commissions of enquiry may be appointed by the Governing Body; and the failure to execute conventions may be brought before the permanent Court of International Justice to be established by the League.

Finally, the Convention lays down the principles on which proposals and judgments should be based. Recognising that differences of climate and habits and other conditions make strict uniformity difficult to attain, they enumerate a number of standards to be aimed at, including the right of association, the life-wage, the eight-hours day, the weekly rest, the abolition of child-labour, equal payment for equal work to men and women,

inspection by women as well as men, etc. For the fulfilment of this programme no coercive power is assumed; reliance is placed mainly on the force of public opinion, a force which daily gains in power. Such a project has never found a place in a treaty of peace before. What will come of it, time alone can show; but it remains on record as a project inspired by noble sympathy and a rational sense of the interests, not only of Labour, but also of Society at large.

We have now finished our survey, however inadequate, of this epoch-making Treaty, from which the world will certainly date a new era in its history. We have endeavoured to preserve an impartial balance, and have not hesitated to call attention to faults where, in our judgment, faults are to be found. Some of these are undoubtedly serious and regrettable; a few may even be regarded as departures from the bases of peace accepted by us as well as by our former foes. But we protest emphatically against the wholesale condemnation with which, in some quarters, the Treaty has been received. For instance, an esteemed contemporary, on the morrow of its first presentation to the German delegates, declared that the Treaty, 'in its main features, is as devoid of constructive wisdom and even of fundamental common-sense, as of every trace of the Sermon on the Mount'; that 'the victorious democracies will never sacrifice their sons and give their toil for the maintenance of a wrong and the assertion of a lie'; that it tends 'to Balkanise three-fourths of Europe'; and that it will not last five years.' Such intemperate, we might say hysterical, language no doubt represents sincere convictions, but it cannot be justified by a calm analysis, and a survey that views the whole thing in its right proportions.

Look at what has been accomplished. We set out to destroy the military power of Germany and to thwart her covetous ambitions, which were a menace to the peace and liberty of mankind. Those ambitions have been checked, and the military power which was to have attained them has been destroyed. We set out to rescue Belgium from slavery and to save France from ruin. Belgium has been rescued, and France, though sorely wounded, has been saved. We set out to defend the

sanctity of international engagements, to assert the right of the weaker nations to an independent existence, to protect democracy against the attacks of autocracy armed to the teeth. These objects have been attained. We set out, finally, to protect our own shores against the danger of an invasion which the triumph of Germany over Belgium and France would have rendered irresistible. The danger has been averted, and in saving ourselves we have helped to save the world.

As the conflict went on, other objects emerged. We did not set out with the aim of recovering Alsace-Lorraine for France, or of emancipating the Schleswigers, the Jugo-Slavs, the Rumanians, or the Czecho-Slovaks, of calling Poland back to life, or of liberating western Asia from the tyranny of the Turk. But it speedily became evident that only by these revolutionary changes, and by the recognition of nationality as the basis of government and the best security of peace, could the ultimate harmony of Europe and the Nearer East be built up on sound and durable foundations. The realisation of these sweeping aims has been embodied in the Peace. The enormous and beneficent changes that have been made, the righting of secular wrongs, the emancipation of many millions from a detested servitude—surely such achievements outweigh incalculably the minor mistakes—call them injustices, if you will—that have been committed in the Peace. Do the people who talk about 'Balkanising three-fourths of Europe,' and of 'sowing the seeds of countless future wars,' realise the conditions that prevailed or compare them with those which have now supervened? The seeds of national unrest and war have existed for ages, in Poland, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and elsewhere; in many parts of Europe, where races are inextricably mixed, it is impossible wholly to eradicate them. But, by the drastic process which has been applied, they have been mostly eradicated; in numerous cases the principle of self-determination by plebiscite has been applied; and Central Europe has at least a chance, such as it never had before, of dwelling harmoniously on what, in these democratic days, is the only basis of inter-racial peace.

But, it is argued by assailants of the Treaty, even if all this is true, was it necessary to impose conditions

of such severity, military, economic and other, on a defeated enemy? Are not these conditions inspired solely by a spirit of revenge, which regards generosity as weakness and reconciliation as a foolish dream? We have already said that we consider the economic conditions as unwisely severe, but they are not unjust. Have our opponents such short memories that they have forgotten the character of the injuries inflicted, and the impossibility of making adequate amends? Justice comes before generosity; and we could not be generous to the enemy without being unjust to our friends.

As for reconciliation, it is a thing to be hoped for, an infinite blessing that will come in time; but only dreamers and enthusiasts could expect it, under any conditions, to come at once. A compromise peace would not have won it; on the contrary, we know, from ample evidence, how the Germans would have regarded an indecisive issue. The Allies being victorious, no peace was conceivable—even after the German revolution—which would at once have secured them from renewed attack, and yet have left no hatred and resentment in the German heart. The basis of reconciliation must be repentance and the confession of wrong; there is unfortunately no sign of repentance in Germany; all our information points the other way. This being so, the only possible course was to render Germany harmless, at least for some time to come; to establish the League of Nations with the intention of admitting our former enemy as soon as possible; to contemplate a revision of the terms if and when the good faith of Germany becomes clear; and to hope that in time a new generation will arise across the Rhine, which will perceive that their heavy punishment was deserved, and that the Treaty which inflicted it was, with all its faults, a blessing to the world.

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